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ABSTRACT 
 
Developing countries emerging from conflict often feature enduring, destitute 
poverty amid often fast-growing economies at the national level.  This dissertation 
explores a critical question: What accounts for variation in human development 
levels across similar communities in conflict-affected countries? In particular it 
explores how some equally poor, indigenous, highland communities in Guatemala 
have made advances in health and education, while others have stagnated or 
regressed. These results are demonstrated through a quantitative analysis of all of 
Guatemala’s 334 municipalities, utilizing difficult to access data from myriad 
sources, combined with the results of qualitative field methods – including over 
250 key informant interviews and focus group participants across 6 paired 
communities throughout the Western Highlands – which aided in process tracing 
the implementation of a widely acclaimed government anti-hunger program at the 
village level. The principal finding is that, contrary to an emerging recognition of 
the role of “ordinary citizens” in peacebuilding and violence reduction, human 
development requires complementarity of citizen mobilization and government 
resources.  When state actors at the local level coordinate with traditional leaders, 
and gain the cooperation and support of the mayor – giving meaning to 
complementarity –local governance allows for measurable gains in human 
development at the local level. By highlighting stark differences in local 
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governance and development outcomes across otherwise similar communities in 
the highlands of Guatemala, this paper raises important questions about:  the role 
of durable social forces at the local level and their ability – if not taken into 
consideration – to thwart what are otherwise award-winning development 
schemes designed abroad or in the capital city; the complications of “local 
ownership” and local legitimacy with respect to development in complex 
environments of state-society discord; and the limitations of our knowledge of 
local forces on human development outcomes. 
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  INTRODUCTION 
Guatemala’s thirty-six year long civil war, unfulfilled land reforms, unimplemented 
peace accords, and its drastically high rates of criminal violence and subsequent impunity 
each contribute, and intertwine, to hinder more equitable development gains nationally.1 
These factors – along with what some call a dysfunctional state apparatus, ongoing 
security concerns, and a structural racism that severely disadvantages the large 
indigenous population – remain critical to explaining Guatemala’s stalled prosperity. 
This dissertation, however, diverges from the more common narratives concerning 
the trajectory of development in Guatemala. In fact, it probes a somewhat different and 
mostly overlooked phenomenon altogether – why communities of otherwise similar 
historical, geographical and demographic backgrounds in Guatemala have diverging 
experiences with, and outcomes from, twenty years of post-war development. 
Specifically, some communities are doing better in reducing infant mortality, or illiteracy 
rates, while otherwise very similar communities continue to struggle to survive under 
conditions of widespread poverty and hunger. Rephrasing the question: what explains 
spatial variation in human development in rural western Guatemala? 
This heretofore unexplained, and generally overlooked, phenomenon is significant for 
several reasons. First, Guatemala has received significant external assistance since the 
                                                      
1 A concise synopsis of human rights and security setbacks from 2013, by Professor Mike Allison, 
University of Scranton, is available here: http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/2013/10/in-what-
world-are-these-businessmen.html  
 
 
2 
 
1996 Peace Accords were struck – through the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), World Bank organizations,2 foreign NGOs and through bi-lateral aid.3  Despite 
outside assistance and capacity enhancement programs, however, and despite an alphabet 
soup of ministries and a revolving door of anti-poverty and development initiatives,4 in 
fact poorly-understood local conditions thwart well-intentioned and even comprehensive 
development programs – squandering resources and limiting both scope and impact. 
Development studies and poverty reduction scholarship, nevertheless, remains principally 
concerned with the comparative effectiveness of different social assistance or lending 
programs, and their influence on individual incentives,5 rather than how village-level 
politics might affect outcomes. This paper explicitly addresses the implementation of 
development programming over similar communities, underscoring its complexity, and 
striving to tease out which local factors explain differing development outcomes. 
                                                      
2 Including $1.758 billion in IRBD Loans as of 5/31/2012 (http://data.worldbank.org/country/guatemala) 
 
3 Including an average of approximately $95 million in recent years from the US government, consisting 
of$28 million dedicated to “health” in 2012, $9 million in education and social services and another $19 
million for economic development  for a country of almost 15 million people , see: 
http://foreignassistance.gov/OU.aspx?OUID=205&FY=2012&AgencyID=0&budTab=tab_Bud_Planned&t
abID=tab_sct_Peace_Planned (accessed 7/5/2013). OECD DAC official development assistance (ODA) 
totaled an additional $289 million in 2011 – second only to Haiti in the region 
(http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE2A).  
 
4 A frequent complaint expressed in my interviews with each local, regional and even ministerial-level 
officials concerned the discontinuity of social and development programs between successive 
administrations. Citizens I interviewed were frequently unclear as to whether they participated in Mi Bolsa 
Seguro, Mi Familia Progressa, or Bolsa Solidario (or which one currently existed, because most did not 
participate in any government program). Each is a variation of programs promoted by different 
administrations, which have tenures of only 4 years maximum. 
 
5 This includes the vast array of literature devoted to the study of microfinance, conditional (and even 
unconditional) cash transfers by governments, and more recently “cash-on-delivery” models of aid. Each of 
the above models tinker with how small disbursements of cash to families spurs changes in the individual 
pursuit of education, through increased attendance, for example, or health, through increased visits to local 
doctors. The principal critique of such models is that they ignore “supply-side” constraints like the quality 
or availability of schools and hospitals. The politics of disbursement are generally omitted from analysis.  
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Second, spatial variation in development outcomes confounds basic assumptions of 
development – that rural regions, or all indigenous groups, for example, share identical 
needs and/or identical obstacles to development. Spatial variation, as this project 
demonstrates, also calls into question the efficacy of top-down statebuilding projects that, 
again, assume a uniform level of state legitimacy and efficacy throughout a territory, 
when in fact state-society relations themselves differ spatially, and considerably, with 
important development implications. Comparing across similar communities with 
diverging outcomes, as is done here, helps clarify which local conditions directly affect 
human development, and how.  
Emerging literature supports the notion that locally-specific factors – whether a 
individual community’s social cohesion (Kaplan 2012) or deeply-entrenched resistance to 
state authorities (Pugh 2005) – can significantly influence post-war outcomes across 
space, upending a conventional wisdom of the state’s preeminence, and endowing the 
“local” with far greater agency than has traditionally been granted. This is especially 
relevant in a country like Guatemala, where the breadth and scope of state presence is 
notoriously limited, and where indigenous governance and “legal-pluralism” have had 
observable influence on local outcomes (Yashar 1998, Godoy 2006, Larson 2008). But 
whereas local communities might have leeway in affecting peacekeeping, conflict 
resolution, or local forest management, this paper also explores the limitations that local 
actors face when the dependent variable is something as complex as human 
development.6 
                                                      
6 Human development is rooted in the philosophy of development articulated by Nobel laureate economist 
Amartya Sen (1992), whose “capability approach” argues that an individual’s capacity (her capability set) 
to achieve well-being, to be well-nourished, or to avoid preventable morbidity (her functionings), will 
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None of the communities under investigation in this paper experience excellent 
outcomes in development, as they each continue to face severe challenges, and are 
generally low-income.7 Nevertheless, the variation across similarly poor communities is 
stark. Figure 1, for example, illustrates widespread variation in infant mortality rates 
across communities in the southern tier of El Quiché (see also Appendix C and D). 
This paper argues that one important factor explaining this variation is the degree to 
which state actors, with important material resources, work with and even defer to the 
authority and local legitimacy of both official and informal authorities at the community 
level in order to mobilize citizens and distribute resources equitably and more 
transparently. Crucially, this paper finds that development gains are best when informal 
authorities are expressly incorporated into the implementation of a key development 
program. This is a rare occurrence, and the toxic combination of state mismanagement, 
deep distrust of state authorities, and increasingly local political divisions and rivalries 
thwart this “state-local complementarity” routinely.  
Guatemala is particularly compelling in this regard. At the national level, the country 
has experienced modest gains in development. Its national-level human development 
index (HDI) score, for example, has steadily increased over the past two decades, 
                                                                                                                                                                 
drastically affect whether or not she prospers in society. Illness contracted through dirty drinking water, for 
example, or weakness from malnutrition, limits an individual’s actual achievements, and furthermore, 
curtails her opportunities to achieve well-being. She may not be able to take advantage of work 
opportunities, or will otherwise be less productive in her work, resulting in less income, whatever the 
opportunity. Similarly, a lack of education limits her capabilities, effectively excluding her from 
opportunities, and limiting both her intellectual and fiscal horizons, or what Sen might call her “freedom to 
achieve.” Income is not abandoned from this perspective, but using it as a metric for “achievement” is. In 
other words, income should represent the means, on a minimal level, with which to achieve functionings 
like well-being, securing appropriate shelter and maintaining good health. It is not an adequate measure of 
achievement by itself.  
 
7 Limited economic generation, natural disasters and a severe drought in 2014 
(http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/04/us-centralamerica-drought-idUSKBN0GT2NK20140904) are 
examples of sustained challenges to development throughout rural Guatemala. 
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indicating improvements in health and education levels and, more certainly, income 
(UNDP 2014: 2).8 These gains have not been uniformly distributed, however, and 
Guatemala has obtained the unfortunate distinction of becoming Latin America’s most 
unequal society, with alarming rates of chronic poverty, illiteracy, and malnutrition, 
despite moderate economic growth, and even while regional neighbors make 
advancements in these same areas.9 Deep social cleavages continue to separate 
Guatemala’s large, indigenous population from its ladino counterpart, broadly speaking, 
and socio-economic indicators confirm massive inequalities in health, education and 
opportunity across this divide (Brunori, Ferreira and Peragine 2013).10 
Guatemala, in fact, has been somewhat of a leader in missed opportunities. A recent 
project to rank-order 40 developing countries from around the world in their political 
commitment to ending hunger and malnutrition placed Guatemala at the top of its list, 
ahead of fast-growing African powerhouses and wealthier emerging countries.11 Yet 
                                                      
8 Guatemala has followed a global trend with steady improvements in HDI scores, though it remains well 
below the Latin America average, and is ranked 133 out of 187 countries. The country has experienced 
GDP growth, meanwhile, of 5 and 6 percent in certain years since the civil war. It was hampered by the 
global recession in 2009 (.5% growth), but has since rebounded and has reported growth of 3 and 4 percent 
the last two years (see: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG ). These articles 
discuss the prevalence of the ultra-wealthy in Guatemala: http://elmundo.com.sv/fortuna-de-los-ultra-ricos-
de-el-salvador-suma-20000-mll and http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/2013/09/you-want-rich-
we-got-rich.html  
 
9 “Latin American Wealth Gap Climbing, Despite Progress Against Poverty,” Available at:  
http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-wealth-gap-climbing-despite-progress-against-poverty-un-752885 
(accessed August 30, 2012) 
 
10 The country as a whole loses an additional 31.6 percent of “potential human development” due to 
inequality according to the UN’s inequality-adjusted HDI (or IHDI). Guatemala scores equally poorly 
when the UN calculates its multidimensional poverty index (MPI), which identifies “multiple deprivations 
in the same households in education, health and standard of living.” (United Nations Development Program 
2011). Alternative measurements of inequality also confirm Guatemala’s backwards slide: 
http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/Blogs/Inequality-debate/A-post-2015-development-goal-for-
inequality#comment_9739 with the pertinent document available here: http://ftp.iza.org/dp7155.pdf  
 
11 See: http://www.hancindex.org/ 
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despite the apparent commitment in the form of progressive laws and various programs,12 
results have lagged considerably, with rates of poverty and extreme poverty, and more 
specifically chronic and seasonal hunger and childhood stunting, ranking among the 
worst in the hemisphere.13 Guatemala is also the only country in the region where its poor 
are getting poorer.14 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Variation in Infant Mortality Rates Across Select Guatemalan Highland Communities (2011) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
12 See: http://scalingupnutrition.org/sun-countries/guatemala and 
http://www.rlc.fao.org/es/paises/guatemala/noticias/pacto-hambre-cero/  and 
http://www.mides.gob.gt/noticias/item/204-pacto-hambre-cero  
 
13 A series of news stories makes that abundantly clear: 
http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/comunitario/Alta-inversion-reducido-desnutricion_0_982701757.html 
and  http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/comunitario/familias-alimentos_0_979102114.html  
 
14 “Guatemala’s Poor Getting Poorer.” Available at: http://www.dw.de/guatemalas-poor-getting-poorer/a-
17917809 (accessed September 12, 2014). 
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Guatemala, in fact, has been somewhat of a leader in missed opportunities. A recent 
project to rank-order 40 developing countries from around the world in their political 
commitment to ending hunger and malnutrition placed Guatemala at the top of its list, 
ahead of fast-growing African powerhouses and wealthier emerging countries.15 Yet 
despite the apparent commitment in the form of progressive laws and various programs,16 
results have lagged considerably, with rates of poverty and extreme poverty, and more 
specifically chronic and seasonal hunger and childhood stunting, ranking among the 
worst in the hemisphere.17 Guatemala is also the only country in the region where its poor 
are getting poorer.18 
Justification: Local Factors in Development Analysis 
The chasm between an objectively measured “political commitment” by central 
authorities to combat hunger, and yet poor results, suggests the potentially important role 
of local actors, or at least local-level factors, in influencing development outcomes at the 
community level, with national-level implications. While the role of local elites, tribal 
authorities or religious leaders in influencing peace and security outcomes after conflict 
has been explored in the peacebuilding literature (discussed more in Chapter Two), the 
role of informal actors as either “spoilers” or heroes of development is much less well 
                                                      
15 See: http://www.hancindex.org/ 
 
16 See: http://scalingupnutrition.org/sun-countries/guatemala and 
http://www.rlc.fao.org/es/paises/guatemala/noticias/pacto-hambre-cero/  and 
http://www.mides.gob.gt/noticias/item/204-pacto-hambre-cero  
 
17 A series of news stories makes that abundantly clear: 
http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/comunitario/Alta-inversion-reducido-desnutricion_0_982701757.html 
and  http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/comunitario/familias-alimentos_0_979102114.html  
 
18 “Guatemala’s Poor Getting Poorer.” Available at: http://www.dw.de/guatemalas-poor-getting-poorer/a-
17917809 (accessed September 12, 2014). 
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understood, and is in fact only just emerging.19 Given that improving living conditions 
and well-being in post-war societies is an explicit goal of UN Missions and other external 
agencies in a post-war context, it is peculiar that little in the literature examines post-war 
human development outcomes more explicitly. Moreover, as global development and aid 
agencies increasingly embrace a “Do No Harm” position on projects and assistance, an 
awareness of subtle, local (even “street-level”) political dynamics is essential.20 
In Guatemala, decentralization following the 1996 Peace Accords, which ended the 
36-year long civil war, was designed in order to improve both the practice of democracy 
(Torres-Rivas and Cuesta 2007), and the delivery of basic resources for development. 
Community-level development councils (consejos comunitarios de desarrollo, or 
COCODES) are legally responsible for articulating pressing local needs, and then 
securing government resources with which to tackle the problem at hand.21 In this 
                                                      
19 For example, see: http://participationpower.wordpress.com/2013/10/30/whose-legitimacy-the-spectrum-
of-authority-in-conflict-settings/ (accessed October 30, 2013). There is otherwise only sporadic evidence of 
non-state actors influencing development, specifically, including the role of Hezbollah in supplying basic 
services in Lebanon for example (see: “Habitat for Hezbollah” by Melani Cammett (2006), available at 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/08/16/habitat_for_hezbollah). Other examples include the role 
of informal lending networks between Mexican women (see for example: 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/codeswitch/2014/04/01/292580644/lending-circles-help-latinas-pay-bills-and-
invest) Much of the literature exploring non-state service delivery, however, does not consider how 
populations fair under these conditions, and if health and education measurably improves. 
 
20 “Do No Harm,” as articulated in the 2010 OECD-DAC document, “Do No Harm: International Support 
for Statebuilding,” has been increasingly embraced by post-conflict statebuilding actors and the broader 
development community as part of a wider effort to encourage more local (national) influence over 
outcomes. 
 
21 The Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation was signed by 
representatives of the rebel umbrella group, the Guatemala National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), and the 
Alvaro Arzú administration on 6 May 1996. Among the details, which included a commitment by the 
government to ensure availability of primary education and a 70% literacy rate by 2000, was the 
‘potentially transformative’ commitment by the government to increase spending on health and education 
by 50% compared with 1995 levels, measured by percentage of GDP (Stanley 2013). In part to accomplish 
these goals, the 2002 Ley de Consejos de Desarollo Urbano y Rural (Urban and Rural Development 
Councils Law) was passed, following previous back-and-forth iterations, thus establishing the community 
development councils and formally recognizing the role of the indigenous population in public policy 
decision-making.  
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system, legal-formal actors (COCODE presidents, local mayors, and council members, 
for example) are easily identified by the architects of new development initiatives and 
programs – whether those in the central government or foreign NGOs – and are thus 
those recruited to act as conduits between aid agencies, material resources, and the 
targeted community. Development– according to the formalized blueprint of community 
councils – is intended to take place in a programmatic fashion that clearly articulates 
needs upwards, and disperses resources downwards through the dedicated channels, or 
persons and their offices, all the while soliciting the input of community members.  
In reality, myriad actors, each endowed with varying degrees of local legitimacy, 
credibility and influence – not formally recognized by any code or law – complicate what 
is effectively local-level governance, and therefore outcomes, at the community level. 
Some communities, for example, where non-state actors leverage deep-seated community 
sympathy and influence, have resisted implementing the COCODES altogether – viewing 
them as a threat and a form of state control, deferring to traditional mechanisms of 
governance based loosely on Mayan traditions of “service” already in place,22 or more 
radically stamping their own authority, and demands for autonomy, over the local 
territory (Klick 2013, Seider 2011, Ekern 2010). These organizations and actors are 
frequently overlooked by government offices and non-governmental development 
agencies alike with respect to development governance, thus overlooking a potentially 
critical variable influencing the implementation, impact, and outcomes of any program or 
assistance.  
                                                      
22 Totonicapán municipality, for example, is extremely well-organized at the local level, including the 
powerful “48 Cantones of Totonicapán” organization, which frequently clashes with department and state 
offices. Because of its opposition, there are no local level development councils in Totonicapán, which is 
highly unusual (based on interviews, October 2013). 
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That is not to say that if only local conditions were embraced, or that if local actors 
with robust legitimacy were deferred to over central authorities always, that things would 
be better. In fact, this project is quite clear that “the local” can be overly-romanticized 
when scholars assume that customs, norms and traditions must be more inherently just, or 
always result in policies and outcomes which resonate more deeply with local 
populations. At least with respect to development, “the local” – in all of its various 
manifestations – can perpetuate as much harm as good when attempting to convert 
resources into development gains, or by actively resisting cooperation with state entities 
with valuable development resources (Klick 2013).23 This possibility remains widely 
overlooked by development practitioners and policymakers alike, to their detriment, and 
to the detriment of targeted populations and their well-being. More important for the 
process of development to unfold locally, and to result in measurable gains in health or 
education, I argue, is complementarity between state offices and local actors.  
Complementarity reflects a situation in which state actors with important resources 
(from food aid to medicine to cash) work in harmony with more locally-trusted, non-state 
actors in order to deliver basic services more equitably, or to distribute resources more 
efficiently. Crucially, complementarity includes, on the part of state actors, recognition of 
the predominance of, and deference to, local authorities – formal and informal – by state 
                                                      
23 Though I argue that, in our effort to embrace local contexts and conditions as starting points for more 
effective aid and development, local actors and conditions can sometimes be deleterious to the well-being 
of the community, there is a much more developed scholarly community devoted to correcting what it sees 
as a systematic dismissal of local conditions from scholarly work. This community has largely blossomed 
through a study of peace, peacebuilding and post-conflict statebuilding – arguing that conventional, liberal-
oriented missions, in their effort to reconstruct an ideal OECD-type state, misunderstand the persistence, 
and resistance, of local orders of authority and informal rules. Outcomes instead are “hybrid” in nature. The 
hybridity literature, discussed more in Chapter Two, explicitly recognizes the coexistence and interaction of 
state institutions and a multiplicity of non-state actors and sources of legitimacy (see in particular Boege et 
al. 2009a, 2009b; Clements et al. 2007; Kraushaar and Lambach 2009, Wiuff Moe 2011), and emphasizes 
the “existing” local, or “everyday” conditions that influence outcomes (see Richmond 2010, 2011). 
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actors (Klick 2013). A complementary governance arrangement stands in contrast to 
“competitive” ones, in which local actors utilize their influence to rebuff state influence 
or action (see footnote 18). 
This study demonstrates, in fact, that when the legitimacy, credibility and authority of 
local non-state actors is coupled with, or “complements,” the resources and expertise of 
state offices, development outcomes are indeed better, though this is rather rare. It is 
particularly challenging, on the one hand, for the state to strike a balance between 
building capacity, and imposition, especially in areas with strong indigenous identity and 
where the state may be perceived as a threat. On the other hand, a lack of human capital, 
corruption, racism, mismanagement or simple neglect plague many official government 
offices at the local level, including those observed in this study, and this project does not 
absolve the state or local officials of necessary reform.	  In fact, there are perverse forms of 
complementarity as well, in which central authorities utilize local networks to undermine 
local (official) government – complicating any linear notion of complementarity and 
underscoring the extent of heterogeneity in state-society relations in Guatemala, even 
among similar communities.  
My findings nevertheless suggest that local, semi-formal institutions are most 
effective at influencing development outcomes when their legitimacy is coupled with 
resources that only the state can provide, and currently monopolizes, or when local 
institutions complement their state counterparts. This, however, hinges most frequently 
on whether individual actors representing the state in each community show a respectful 
deference of local/traditional authority, and an ability, or desire, to work with local 
authorities to achieve development-oriented policy implementation. Of course, in return, 
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official entities – like the mayor’s office in particular – are key to establishing 
complementarity, and are well-positioned to thwart any likelihood thereof, which is also 
observed in this study.	  
Significance 
This project offers an important contribution to both the scholarly and practitioner 
understanding of development and its conundrums. First, by exploring the complex 
processes of development at the community level – where disbursements of resources 
need take place, but also where the official, local authorities confront various brands of 
civil society, competing political parties with active grudges, and informal actors with 
significant local credibility – this project is an important contribution to our 
understanding of how policy implementation and service delivery is manipulated at the 
micro level, and to a degree not readily apparent even to monitoring and assessment 
specialists back in Guatemala City, New York City or Geneva. 
Second, despite its local focus, this study also adds to the global development 
discourse, which is currently at an important juncture. The academic and development 
practitioner communities are increasingly preoccupied with what will follow the current 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) after 2015. Much of the debate has surrounded 
the role of inequality,24 while other components concern the value of measurements and 
indices, human rights, and how crime and violence should be accounted for in post-2015 
objectives. Ultimately, however, the post-2015 debate centers on connecting development 
theory with practice, resulting in well-defined and measurable targets (like reductions in 
poverty, premature deaths, etc.). The results of this study, therefore, which observes a 
                                                      
24 See, for example: http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/Blogs/Inequality-debate (accessed September 30, 2013) 
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breakdown between centrally-articulated development programs and intended outcomes 
because of largely overlooked social forces, raises a certain cautionary red flag with 
respect to the current approach to development assessment.  
Third, the findings that stem from this study also shed light on the complexities of 
development in the most intractable cases globally, addressing directly the wider universe 
of cases commonly referred to as “fragile” or “vulnerable” states – or those 30-40 
countries that experience recurring bouts of violence and instability, weak capacity on the 
part of central authorities to deliver basic services, and which have retained stubbornly 
high poverty rates.25  
While other countries throughout the world, and certainly in Latin America, have 
made significant advancements in reducing poverty and delivering basic services under 
difficult conditions, Guatemala has failed to achieve its MDG targets, and continues to 
lag behind the rest of the region – with the highest rates of poverty, chronic hunger and 
inequality in all of Latin America. A more thorough examination of what thwarts 
development gains in a potentially prosperous middle-income country, in a region that 
has made measurable strides, is thus key to understanding what complicates development 
elsewhere. In so doing, this study also emphasizes the complexities that potentially await 
other, more recent, post-conflict states and societies, underscoring the limitations of a 
conventional top-down statebuilding approach for development.  
                                                      
25 See: World Bank, “Harmonized List of Fragile Situations FY11” (presentation, World Bank, New York, 
2010),http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTLICUS/Resources/5117771269623894864/FS_List_FY11_(
August_8_2010).pdf, as well as: OECD-DAC, “Resource Flows to Fragile States” (Paris: Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010), 156, and finally, for a discussion of vulnerability, see: 
Hughes, Moyer and Sisk, “Vulnerability to Intrastate Conflict: Evaluating Quantitative Measures” 
(Peaceworks, No. 72, 2011). 
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While Guatemala cannot be considered indicative of what awaits Sierra Leone or 
Liberia, per se, the findings here do suggest that, even in the medium to long-term, 
human development is particularly handicapped by the legacy of conflict, distrust of state 
authorities, and dysfunctional state-society relations. Guatemala, therefore, might serve 
as an important lead indicator of what awaits other post-conflict countries, twenty years 
forward, without a more thorough re-thinking of development policy. 
Finally, a fourth significant contribution of this project is its emphasis on state-local 
complementarity. As in many fragile states, Guatemala confronts the reality of 
communities traumatized by war, and by demographic fault lines. These factors, 
combined with the state’s own shortcomings with respect to security, human rights and 
justice, make the state an unwelcome entity throughout much of rural Guatemala, 
particularly where indigenous groups have organized thoroughly and directly influence 
governance and local politics. The grievances of local populations cannot be ignored, nor 
should they be taken lightly. However, from a strictly development perspective, neither 
local resistance nor local legitimacy is sufficient for making measurable gains in health 
and human development, and the agency of the most poor should not be overstated. 
Though elusive, “best” outcomes are achieved when state actors tread thoughtfully, 
threading the needle between their responsibilities and their limitations in a local context, 
and deferring, and indeed cooperating, with local, formal and, crucially, informal non-
state actors to deliver resources efficiently, and to begin the long process of development 
in places long-neglected. 
With these factors in mind, I argue that more emphasis in the post-2015 policy must 
be placed on the micro-politics of development, and thus consider the largely hidden 
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barriers to progress out of poverty, and in combating hunger, that escapes even the most 
politically committed central governments. These micro dynamics, I argue, have macro 
consequences.  
Project Background and Description 
This project seeks to explain variability in human development outcomes across 
similar communities. Human development, as opposed to economic development, 
strictly, or national development of industrial policy, for example, places greater 
emphasis on measuring the well-being of citizens, as opposed to assuming that income 
will necessarily generate a higher standard of living by itself. From this perspective, 
indicators of health and education are added to income metrics in an effort to better 
capture the quality of life of citizens. And indeed, the most interesting cases in this study, 
discussed in more detail below, are those that reveal strong swings in health and 
education outcomes, after development indicators are disaggregated, despite little or no 
changes in income over time. 
Human development is rooted in the philosophy of development articulated by Nobel 
laureate economist Amartya Sen (1992), whose “capability approach” argues that an 
individual’s capacity (her capability set) to achieve well-being, to be well-nourished, or 
to avoid preventable morbidity (her functionings), will drastically affect whether or not 
she prospers in society. Illness contracted through dirty drinking water, for example, or 
weakness from malnutrition, limits an individual’s actual achievements, and furthermore, 
curtails her opportunities to achieve well-being. She may not be able to take advantage of 
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work opportunities, or will otherwise be less productive in her work, resulting in less 
income, whatever the opportunity.  
Similarly, a lack of education limits her capabilities, effectively excluding her from 
opportunities, and limiting both her intellectual and fiscal horizons, or what Sen might 
call her “freedom to achieve.” Even cash transfers, or other mechanisms of augmenting 
income,26 for instance, will be of minimal value from a human development perspective 
if access to health and education remains limited. If large swathes of a country’s 
population are structurally excluded from access to health and education – either out of 
racism, neglect or incapacity – then economic development as measured by GDP growth 
will again be limited in reducing poverty or increasing opportunity, and the freedom to 
achieve well-being will be similarly constrained. This disconnect between income and 
development is particularly relevant to the Guatemala case, which has the largest 
economy in the region but among the lowest health and education achievements in 
aggregate.  
Income, however, is not abandoned from this perspective altogether, but using it as a 
metric for “achievement” is. In other words, income should represent the means, on a 
minimal level, with which to achieve functionings like well-being, securing appropriate 
shelter and maintaining good health. It is not an adequate measure of achievement by 
itself, however.  
                                                      
26 See footnote no. 5 
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Combining income with health and education opportunities into an indicator of 
development, as the UN has done with the Human Development Index (HDI),27 provides 
a crude, but nevertheless augmented glimpse into the capability set, or the resources and 
degrees of freedom, with which to pursue well-being, while also providing a snapshot of 
general health and well-being of citizens of a country or sub-region. 
This project proceeds by first comparing the most recent HDI scores from across all 
334 municipios in Guatemala.28 This initial survey reveals stark spatial variability in 
human development across all communities, and most surprisingly, even within rural, 
mountainous and largely indigenous departments (See Table 1).29  
 
Table 1. Summary of Human Development Scores in Guatemala 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev. Min Max 
HDI_2005 331 .591 .089 .306 .828 
HDI_2005, 
where elevation is 
>6500 ft above sea 
level 
85 .571 .103 .306 .784 
 
This peculiar outcome is made yet more puzzling when, after a regression analysis, 
no statistical relationship (P=.238) is found between the presence of the state in a given 
                                                      
27 The HDI was the collective effort of Sen and Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq, who spearheaded the 
UN’s annual Human Development Reports as well, partly as a counterweight to the World Bank’s World 
Development Report. 
 
28 Municipios are much like counties in the United States in that there is a “urban” head or seat (usually 
with the same name), where the local government and its offices are located, which is also responsible for a 
designated area consisting of several much smaller villages (aldeas or cantones). Collectively they make up 
the entire municipio. In Guatemala, data was available only as low as the municipio administrative level for 
statistical analysis (n=334). During fieldwork, I visited surrounding aldeas in my three primary municipio 
cases as well, and conducted focus groups with villagers, in order to gather data from across the municipio 
itself. 
 
29 Departments are the next administrative level up from municipios. There are 22 in Guatemala. 
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community30 and HDI scores and other development indicators, suggesting a disconnect 
between state capacity, service delivery, and development outcomes – while 
simultaneously leaving open the question of what better explains this variation, if not 
levels of state presence (See Figure 2). These early steps, along with a more thorough 
analysis of all quantitative data, are described in more detail in Chapters Three and Four.   
      
 
Figure 2. Scatterplot of Changes in Chronic Hunger Rates  
Across State Density Scores (2009) 
 
Ultimately, I argue that it is those communities which organize in such a manner as to 
effectively partner with state actors that are demonstrating the best returns from 
development programming thus far, including Guatemala’s now internationally-
recognized anti-hunger initiative, El Pacto Hambre Cero (or the “Zero Hunger Pact”). It 
is in these communities where basic resources can be distributed effectively and 
impartially, and where trust can be engendered between state-level resources (like the 
local medical clinic) and rural citizens. It is in these same communities where citizens are 
                                                      
30 State Density Index (SDI) scores were crafted and produced, at the municipio level, for the 2009/2010 
Guatemala Human Development Report, and based on indicators of the level of state offices, bureaucracy 
and redistributed tax revenues per capita for each municipio. A more detailed description is available in the 
Statistical Annex of the UNDP report (UNDP Guatemala 2010: 410), while a translated reproduction of the 
index’s components is available in Appendix B of this paper. 
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mobilized to make the trek to area clinics as well, and get needed supplies, education or 
vaccinations. This happens because local leaders have been endowed with a level of 
respect, deference and autonomy, by state actors and the municipal mayor, which has 
resulted in their active participation and project “buy-in.”  
Unfortunately, most communities exhibited the opposite tendencies, and each petty, 
personal as well as electoral grievances deepened rifts within the community and pitted 
state actors against municipal authorities. In these cases, no amount of local-level, 
indigenous authority or even self-organization could overcome such divisions. Indeed, 
electoral politics and party affiliation, combined with confessional divisions, were 
becoming increasingly salient at the village level,31 and also factored into which 
communities fostered partnerships and complementary relations between local authority 
structures and state service delivery. 
Testing my hypothesis was not an easy task, requiring  thorough familiarization with 
the country of Guatemala, with the communities and regions under scrutiny, their 
histories, and the confluence of literatures that have already explored the topics of local-
level governance, post-conflict societies, poverty reduction, development, 
decentralization and participatory development. This paper is therefore structured in 
order to guide the reader through the step-wise progression of important background 
material and through a detailed explication of the study’s experimental design, case 
selection criteria, and ultimately its case studies, before a thorough analysis and 
discussion of the findings.  
                                                      
31 This is based on interviews in all six communities, and an almost unanimous consensus among 
interviewees, regarding the role of parties and politics on local cohesion and government relations. 
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Structure 
Chapter One provides important background into the Guatemala context, including a 
brief overview of the armed conflict which officially ended in 1996. This section includes 
a discussion about why Guatemala, for multiple reasons, is an ideal case study for this 
project.  I also discuss what insights a country like Guatemala might provide scholars and 
practitioners, concerned not only about development conundrums more broadly but also 
post-war reconstruction and development, despite almost 20 years after the official end of 
fighting and with minimal risk of a return to large-scale conflict.  
Chapter Two relates the current project to an array of literature. As hinted at above, 
the Guatemala case was originally situated within the larger debates surrounding “local 
ownership” and “hybridity.” Indeed, this project can sharpen what are conceptual loose 
ends in both, and contribute to the debates surrounding local ownership and post-conflict 
peacebuilding and development. But as the study progressed, it is apparent that the 
Guatemala context diverges from the focus of hybridity scholars, concerned mostly with 
the interaction of either state or local actors and the international community (frequently 
UN peacekeepers or UN civilian staff). This project is more concerned, ultimately, with 
state and society, and the influence of informal actors and institutions on human 
development outcomes. First, by expanding the dependent variable to something more 
complex (like development, and well-being, versus the very narrow achievement of a 
negative peace, for example), this project inherently concerns itself with more complex 
socio-political dynamics and governance processes. The project also includes an 
unvarnished and in-depth examination of micro-level politics at the community level, 
also touching on a level of complexity that, as argued already, needs to be more 
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thoroughly considered by state and external officials alike when considering development 
programs and policy. Though this is a relatively nascent focus of study, important extant 
literature on local-level governance, including studies from Guatemala, provide important 
points of reference and help orient this project conceptually. Other literature under focus 
includes that of informal institutions, the political geography of development, political 
culture, state service delivery and the intersection of state and society in fragile conflict-
affected states. This diverse array of literature is framed according to a rubric of state-
centric, state-society, and society-centric approaches to politics and development. The 
chapter concludes with a more in-depth discussion concerning the puzzle under 
examination and an explication of the research design. 
Chapter Three provides an exploratory quantitative analysis of available data. Though 
the quantitative analysis here, given data constraints, is insufficient by itself to facilitate 
conclusive findings, it nevertheless serves an important function. First, the analyses 
presented in Chapter Three demonstrates surprising relationships between myriad 
development indicators and diverse independent variables, like the level of official 
denunciations of formal actors for abuse of power, filed per community, for example, or 
conflict intensity – which is calculated at the municipal level here for possibly the first 
time. As well, the distinct lack of a relationship between state density at the municipal 
level, and development outcomes, challenges conventional wisdoms regarding 
statebuilding for development, and makes room for alternative hypotheses while 
justifying case selection.  
Chapter Four provides crucial background into the six case study communities that 
are at the heart of this study’s qualitative analysis. They are all communities from 
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Guatemala’s western highlands region, but spread across three different departments (the 
administrative level between municipal and state). Collectively, these three departments 
are the worst performing with respect to development, but the experiences of the six 
communities themselves vary considerably. This chapter specifically explores the array 
of formal and informal actors influencing governance at the community level, and myriad 
conflicts that impinge on development outcomes, and constrain state-society relations. 
In Chapter Five, a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) structures the analysis 
and findings from each community in order to draw out how complementarity, rival 
hypotheses, and development outcomes relate in each community. This chapter probes 
deeper into the puzzle at the local level than what is possible through a quantitative 
analysis, and provides critical context necessary for scrutinizing causality. Chapter Six 
utilizes process-tracing, through the examination of how the country’s acclaimed anti-
hunger program is implemented in each community, in order to even more deeply 
uncover the causal chain between governance and development outcomes. 
This paper concludes with a re-examination of state-society relations and human 
development, including policy recommendations aimed at each national and community 
leaders, development agencies and their field workers, and even global development 
policymakers, who continue to overlook just how micro-level dynamics hinder billion 
dollar development campaigns, including the effectiveness of the Millennium 
Development Goals. This study is also directed at the scholarly literature, however, that, 
while correctly highlighting the capacity of local actors to resist state incursions or to 
influence local outcomes, overlooks “the local’s” limitations, particularly when it regards 
the health and well-being of post-war societies. More strongly, this paper calls for a 
 
 
23 
 
reorientation of post-war scholarship. It argues that development and peacebuilding 
scholarship remain largely “siloed” in their respective search for “what works,” 
overlooking the inherent overlap.  
This paper muddies these waters, intentionally. Robust state authority is empirically 
rare, and indeed governance of innumerable processes and actors fills this void. But 
development, unlike self-policing or internal-sanctioning, for example, requires material 
resources and basic services. State actors need acknowledge the extent of their 
limitations, while local leaders need acknowledge the depths of their needs. A marriage 
of the two, however fraught, is critical to human development in the 21st century.  
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CHAPTER 1: THE GUATEMALA CONTEXT 
Much has been written concerning Guatemala’s civil war, which unfolded over thirty 
six long years, but which also included both spikes and lulls in intensity, a democratic 
transition of government despite ongoing hostilities (and despite abysmally low electoral 
participation in rural areas), as well as shifting rebel ideologies, coordination and 
leadership. Perhaps more peculiar than the episodic nature of the civil war itself, 
however, is that – despite nearly four decades of conflict resulting in an estimated 
200,000 dead, a million displaced, and another 100,000 disappeared (the overwhelming 
majority of which, 93 percent in fact, being the result of state military operations)32 – the 
overall political and socio-economic divisions that were the principle drivers of conflict 
remain largely intact today (Fuentes 2011, Schneider 2012, Segovia 2005).  
Guatemala remains, as noted in the introduction, the most unequal country in Latin 
America, a region already synonymous with class divisions and disparities in wealth. 
Somewhat more shocking, however – given relatively robust rates of economic growth 
and, additionally, millions of US dollars (USD) in remittances – Guatemala has the 
highest rates of chronic malnutrition and hunger in all of Latin America, and is in fact 
one of the most undernourished countries on the entire planet, despite abundant 
resources.33 It also experiences persistently high rates of poverty and extreme poverty34 
                                                      
32 Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) 1999 
 
33 The World Bank ranks Guatemala third in the world in chronic hunger in children under age five, using 
stunted growth as its primary indicator. It also notes Guatemala’s exceptionally poor performance in this 
regard in comparison with countries around the globe with similar incomes, and argues that the country 
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while simultaneously experiencing absurd crime rates – compounded by a feeble justice 
system of questionable political independence with reported impunity rates of over 90 
percent.35  
Despite a government elected in 2011 on a platform of civilian security (or perhaps 
because of it, according to some wary of the President’s personal history as a military 
officer during the civil war, with responsibility for operations in Quiché department 
specifically, which experienced the greatest share of conflict intensity), 2013 saw a rash 
of murders of media personnel,36 indigenous community leaders37 and union leaders,38 
reminiscent of the tactics of a political elite-military alliance during the civil war which 
threatened and killed peasant and union organizers (Costello 1997: 13).  
Guatemala, in fact, despite its middle income status, is a regional and even global 
development laggard, and is emblematic of both the disconnect that exists between 
                                                                                                                                                                 
loses as much as USD 300 million to “vitamin and mineral deficiencies.” See: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLACREGTOPNUT/Resources/Guatemala4-20-10.pdf  
 
34 The most recent statistics (2011) from the country’s National Living Conditions Survey indicate that 
40.38% of the population lives under conditions of non-extreme poverty with an additional 13.33% living 
under conditions of extreme poverty (ENCOVI 2011).  
 
35 Guatemala, as part of Central America’s “northern triangle” is considered one of the most violent 
countries in the world. Its homicide rate has hovered around 40 per 100,000 over the past several years, or 
roughly ten times the U.S. murder rate (see: http://www.estadonacion.or.cr/estadisticas/compendio-
estadisticas/compendio-centroamerica/compendio-centroamerica-politico or 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html ). The country is also host to the 
International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG in its Spanish acronym), which was 
established because of Guatemala’s glaring judicial inefficiencies and failure to prosecute reported crimes. 
The impunity rate for homicides was at 95% as late as 2010, though recent reports claim this has been 
slashed to 70% in 2012 (see: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/204664.pdf)   
 
36 http://en.rsf.org/guatemala-another-journalist-shot-dead-in-20-08-2013,45078.html (accessed October 23, 
2013). 
 
37 http://www.ticotimes.net/More-news/News-Briefs/Indigenous-leader-killed-in-Guatemala_Tuesday-
March-12-2013 (accessed October 23, 2013) and http://frontlinedefenders.org/node/26913 (accessed 
August 22, 2014) 
 
38 http://www.ticotimes.net/More-news/News-Briefs/As-trade-unionist-attacks-continue-Guatemala-faces-
tough-decisions_Thursday-October-17-2013 (accessed October 21, 2013) 
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economic growth and inclusive development, as well as how a combination of state 
fragility and durable social forces hinders human development in an otherwise 
prosperous context. 
Exploring Guatemala’s persistent underdevelopment, despite its relatively strong 
economic performance, is therefore valuable for several reasons: for understanding 
underdevelopment in fragile and conflict-affected states more broadly – which remain the 
most intractable cases of development globally and to which the evolving post-2015 
development debates increasingly speak, and in order to more systematically probe the 
largely obscured and overlooked mechanisms that complicate even well-designed and 
well-financed development schemes. Understanding what allows extreme poverty and 
underdevelopment to persist, and even flourish, in a middle-income country like 
Guatemala, provides important insights into what complicates poverty reduction and 
development everywhere. 
This chapter begins with an overview of the civil war and subsequent peace accords, 
which on the one hand continues to reverberate throughout society, particularly in the 
areas which experienced the most intense episodes, but which on the other hand is 
increasingly fading into the past as a wave of young people39 seek education, a middle 
class lifestyle, or concern themselves more with smartphones and Spanish League soccer 
than past injustices. This chapter proceeds with a brief exploration of some of the longer-
term complications of the war, with special focus paid to the resulting tapestry of local 
governance dynamics, including the diverse set of actors – formal and informal – that 
                                                      
39 See “Demographic Indicators” here: http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/guatemala_statistics.html and 
a more general discussion of Guatemala’s youth boom here: http://matthewklick.com/2013/09/15/youth-
boom-or-bubble/  
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influence the nature and scope of governance at the local level, and the varying nature of 
state-society relationships across communities throughout Guatemala. It is this diversity, 
I argue, that is a key part of the Guatemala story, and likewise an important variable in 
explaining the variations in opportunity and development that exist across otherwise 
similar communities. 
1.1 A Civil War Overview: From Marxism to Massacres 
It is first worth considering the context immediately preceding the start of the 
Guatemalan civil war. The October 20th, 1944 revolution first brought down the military 
dictatorship of Jorge Ubico, and ushered in what has probably been the most progressive 
era in Guatemala’s history to date or since – introducing for the first time a veneer of 
modern social welfare programs and anti-feudal laws that promised education, land for 
all citizens, including poor campesinos and indigenous peoples, while formally 
abolishing indentured servitude for the first time. The revolution came to a swift end in 
1954, however, when the CIA and Guatemalan military elites toppled the Jacobo Árbenz 
administration after it decreed the turnover of uncultivated land in private holdings for 
redistribution, which disproportionately affected the American-owned United Fruit 
Company and which, through a Cold War prism, was interpreted as a lurch towards a 
communist ideology. The 1954 “counterrevolution,” however, according to many 
Guatemalan scholars,40 cemented both social inequalities and a political oligarchy – out 
from under which the country is still trying to progress – while snuffing out a flicker of 
opportunity for Guatemala’s peasants. 
                                                      
40 http://www.s21.com.gt/edelberto-torres-rivas/2013/10/20/ula-injusticia-me-indigna-tanto-como-hace-69-
anos (accessed October 20, 2013). 
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After a tumultuous interim, the armed civil conflict itself began when left-wing junior 
military officers rebelled in 1960 over fraudulent elections orchestrated by the civil-
military regime. Having lost, the leaders of the uprising fled to the central and western 
highlands where, over time, grievances related to the systematic discrimination and social 
exclusion of the majority Mayan population became the driving force behind the efforts 
of anti-government forces in the 1970s and 1980s, though such a simple depiction of their 
leading role is regularly contested (Smith 1990, Nelson 2009).  
Various iterations of the war and interpretations of the role the indigenous people 
themselves during this period are under some scrutiny. David Stoll (1999, 1993), for 
example, recognizes the fury with which the state army reacted to uprisings, but generally 
disputes the notion of a “popular” insurgency, and blames rebel forces for exaggerating 
the plight of poor farmers in order to garner international support. This interpretation has 
been widely condemned, however, and consensus – after vast amounts of social science 
research, the unarchiving of police records, and even ongoing forensic work – has rather 
definitively recognized the asymmetries between rebel and state forces, and the 
disproportionate response of the army that included over 600 separate massacres – the 
overwhelming number of victims (83 percent) being poor, indigenous peasants, including 
women and children, and concentrated in the Guatemalan highlands and northern Ixil 
region (Brett 2007, Streeter 2000, Steinberg et al. 2006, Jonas 1991, CEH 1999).41  
The rebel movement was itself weakened by internal divisions – between Marxist-
inspired intellectuals, for example, as well as between ladino leaders and Mayan leaders.  
These divisions resulted in multiple rebel factions, which included the Guerrilla Army for 
                                                      
41 See, for example: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/pressrelease/pbs-newshour-reports-on-how-forensic-
science-is-being-used-in-guatemalan-genocide-trial/  
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the Poor (EGP), the Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA), the 
Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) and finally the Guatemalan Worker’s Party (PGT) – which 
only united under the single flag of the Guatemala National Revolutionary Unity (Unidad 
Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca or URNG) in 1982.  
Violence and oppression during the civil war reached its zenith between 1980 and 
1984, under the administrations of General Romeo Luca García and the notorious 
General Efrain Ríos Montt, who is currently on-and-off trial in Guatemala for genocide.42 
In fact, one of the case study locations for this project (Zacualpa, in the department of El 
Quiché) was a focal point of the “scorched earth” policies of Ríos Montt. Government 
forces there killed over six hundred civilians and even commandeered the Catholic 
Church – turning it into a detention and torture center while unceremoniously disposing 
bodies throughout the Church grounds and its wells.  
Given the disproportionate effect of the violence on the young (ages 16-45), students 
and traditional community leadership, some authors have argued that the war, and its 
most intense episodes, “attacked the core of Guatemala’s human capital and dismantled 
its potential for social leadership,” the effects of which still reverberates today (Flores, 
Ruano and Fuchal 2009: 39).  
The landmark report by the Historical Clarification Commission (CEH 1999)43 
documents how community leaders – whether rural teachers, traditional health promoters 
                                                      
42 Ríos Montt was convicted of genocide in May 2013 – the first former head of state to be convicted in his 
own country for such crimes – but the conviction was annulled shortly thereafter and his status remains in 
limbo. See: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2013/latam/justice-on-trial-in-
guatemala-the-rios-montt-case.aspx (accessed 10/24/2013) 
 
43 The CEH (1999), or in its full Spanish-language title, “La Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico de 
las Violaciones a los Derechos Humanos y los Hechos de Violencia que han Causado Sufrimientos a la 
Población Guatemalteca,” emerged from the peace process itself, and a specific accord (signed June 23, 
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(midwives with traditional community leadership roles), or priests – were associated with 
“subversion” by the state and were thus specifically targeted and frequently executed. 
The forced participation of community members in “civil defense patrols” (Patrulla Civil 
de Autodefensa, or PACs) designed to limit the incursion of guerillas into rural villages, 
divided communities further – pitting patrol members against traditional leaders, and 
allowing patrollers to arrest and use violence against suspected collaborators within their 
own communities. “Local indigenous authority,” argues Flores et al., “no longer rested 
with a council of elders, but rather with the head of the patrols … These fractures 
affected systems of authority, norms of community relations, and even elements of 
identity” (2009: 41). Indeed, as Tania Palencia Prado (1996) observes, the Army used 
PACs and other “military commissioners” to actively suppress Mayan identity, exalting a 
homogenous Hispanic, or ladino, culture instead.  
Some observers (Duque 2009) have expressly linked contemporary distrust of state 
institutions among Guatemalans (Azpuru 2011) to experiences with violence and 
repression during the war. Indeed, in a surprising moment, one of my interviewees linked 
former PAC members to a particular political party active in her community currently, 
and to specific delinquencies that have resulted from political turf-battles since.44 Other 
observers explain limited political participation by citizens in Guatemala as another 
outcome that can be directly traced back to the civil war era in which any institutional 
organization could be construed as political, and potentially subversive (del Valle 2009).  
                                                                                                                                                                 
1994 in Oslo, Norway) which both approved the commission and solicited an objective report, organized 
by the UN and its peace process mediators, on all violations and war crimes perpetrated over the course of 
the conflict (CEH 1999: 23). 
 
44 Interview in Zacualpa, department of El Quiché, with key informant (October 15, 2013). 
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It is unclear, however, whether the legacy of civil war outweighs even more recent 
experiences with heavy-handed government treatment of indigenous protestors, or a 
backlog of unsolved and unprosecuted murders throughout the country (International 
Crisis Group 2010, International Crisis Group 2011). This is discussed in more detail 
below. 
1.2 The Peace Accords: Victors or Vanquished? 
By the end of the state campaign of terror of the early 1980s, the rebels were unable 
to protect civilians in areas where they operated, nor muster any sort of significant 
military threat to state forces. Despite their relative weakness, however, their small 
numbers and flexibility allowed them to persist and cause sporadic damage, indefinitely. 
This factor, combined with the scaling back of military operations and the 1985 elections 
that brought to power a civilian president, opened the door for a political settlement 
(Arnault 1999). It would take ten years, many separate processes and negotiations, and 
ultimately the influence of the United Nations, which established MINUGUA (the UN 
Mission for the Verification of Human Right and of Compliance with the Comprehensive 
Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala), before comprehensive peace accords were 
signed on December 23, 1996 in Guatemala City.  
The rebels could hardly claim victory, but given the military asymmetries between 
the two parties, the ability of URNG to make their key grievances the center of debate, 
and ultimately negotiate a settlement, is a remarkable feat (Stanley 2013). URNG, 
combined with the participation of a diverse array of civil society actors, was able to 
make human rights, the electoral regime, and access to land and rural development 
central tenets of direct talks. (Ibid: 20). Despite this achievement, however, the 
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implementation of the Peace Accords since has been a stunning disappointment (Brett 
2013, Godoy 2006: 44). 
Since the 1996 conclusion of the Peace Accords process, the state of Guatemala has 
been unable to effectively address the country’s greatest social challenges, nor implement 
some of the most basic agreed-upon components of the Accords themselves. In part, this 
reflects what some have called Guatemala’s “permanent state of fragility,” and a 
statebuilding project “in crisis,” given the state’s consistent inability to coalesce a 
powerful economic elite around badly needed fiscal reforms, and the instability of 
Guatemalan politics itself, which has experienced continuous political turnover and 
spontaneous political party generation and disintegration (ASIES 2012, González 2014, 
Schneider 2012, Jones 2011).  
For example, a key component of the Peace Accords was a government obligation to 
increase social spending in poor regions – a goal which remains largely unmet (Schneider 
2012, Stewart and Brown 2009, Kurtenbach 2010, Fuentes 2002).45 Instead, Guatemala 
has the lowest tax revenues in Central America (and second lowest in all of Latin 
America). The notably regressive nature of Guatemalan taxes, as well, combined with a 
confusing policy patchwork and ad-hoc reforms, have resulted in state revenues that are 
unable to adequately fund even the state’s paltry commitments to public goods provision 
(Schneider 2012: 172, USAID/ICEFI 2009). Thus despite the formal end to hostilities 
                                                      
45 The Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation was signed by 
representatives of the URNG and the Alvaro Arzú administration on May 6, 1996, in Mexico City. Among 
the details, which included a commitment by the government to ensure availability of primary education 
and a 70 percent literacy rate by 2000, was the “potentially transformative” commitment by the government 
to increase spending on health and education by 50 percent compared to 1995 levels, measured by percent 
of GDP (Stanley 2013). 
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and the disbanding of rebel groups,46 contemporary Guatemala continues to cope with 
many of the same social grievances and inequalities that fueled the civil war. General 
consensus, in fact, is that Guatemala’s miserable development performance is the result 
of a constellation of a weak state, inchoate political parties and, crucially, a fundamental 
social cleavage dividing indigenous groups from Ladinos. 
1.3 Contemporary Guatemala: A Continuum of Violence?  
Scholars like Frances Stewart and Graham Brown (2009) argue that, regardless of 
revenues, the largest bilateral, multilateral and even domestic development initiatives 
have articulated so-called poverty reduction strategies without adequately addressing 
what are severe “horizontal inequalities” in Guatemala. From their analysis, disparate 
rates of poverty, HDI scores, levels of education, housing conditions and access to basic 
services between Guatemalan regions reflect a structural exclusion of the large 
indigenous population from post-conflict economic growth (Stewart and Brown 2009: 
55).  
Roddy Brett (2013) argues that the relatively robust indigenous movement that 
emerged from the peace process, at the time bolstered by local and international civil 
society pushing for collective and cultural rights, was ultimately sidestepped after the 
conclusion of the Accords. “Entrenched racism,” the economic and political weakness of 
progressive sectors, and a “return to normal” after the conclusion of the peace accords – 
whereby industrial and military elites returned to dominate politics, particularly as 
                                                      
46 The URNG in fact would formally enter the political system as a party with the end of the civil war, and 
remains active, if generally uncompetitive as a political force (Allison 2009). 
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international influence and interest waned – spelled a quick end to the more emancipatory 
ambitions of indigenous rights leaders. 
Another legacy of the civil war is a culture of violence that continues to afflict the 
populace. As noted above, Guatemala has experienced increasingly high rates of violent 
crime over the last decade, reflecting what some observers have called the country’s 
“continuum of violence” – an evolution from state-sponsored terrorism and insurgency to 
organized crime and street criminality (Erlyck 2001). 
Some of the violence is notably the result of turf battles between drug cartels in what 
has become a principal thoroughfare in North-South trafficking, and a renewed mano 
dura (“iron fist” literally, or “security-first”) government response.47 Gangs have also 
been cited as the sources of much criminality in urban centers. According to a 2011 
World Bank report on crime and violence in Central America, Guatemala ranks among 
the highest in the region in homicide rates, with measureable, negative effects on 
attitudes of state institutions (World Bank 2011, López 2010).48 One unanticipated result 
of this explosion in crime, and the apparent impunity of criminals in the vast majority of 
cases49 has been a rash of a form of vigilante justice referred to as “lynching” 
(linchamientos) resulting in yet more bloodshed, crime, and impunity (Godoy 2006).  
State violence has recently re-entered the discourse as well, with the UN condemning 
deadly clashes between military forces and protesting indigenous groups in the Western 
                                                      
47 The Guatemalan state has, under Pérez-Molina, increased its purchase of military and police weaponry, 
as well as new vehicles for its national police force, whose increased visibility (and effectiveness in curbing 
crime) is a central goal of the administration. 
 
48 According to the World Bank (2011) “Violence and Crime in Central America: A Development 
Challenge,” urban areas in and around Guatemala Department (Guatemala City) have experienced crime 
rates that are among the highest globally.  
 
49 See Footnote 24 
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department of Totonicapán, which as many as six dead and thirty injured on October 4, 
2012.50 Even more recently, clashes over mining in San Marcos department, as well as 
over the future of new dams in Barillas, Huehuetenango were at times extremely violent, 
leaving both citizens and police officers dead, and requiring the President to personally 
intervene.51 The forced disappearance of local activists, union leaders, and even radio DJs 
openly critical of the government and police tactics, has been routinely reported by 
human rights groups throughout 2013 and 2014. 
Though these events have made little in the way of international headlines, they have 
created a toxic mix of fear, distrust and anger throughout much of the indigenous 
community, though this too varies from location to location, and competes with more 
immediate concerns and needs, from income to surviving natural disasters like 2014’s 
exceptional drought in Central America.52 
1.4 Puzzle – Spatial Variation in Governance and Human Development 
Perverse discrepancies in human development between indigenous-majority and the 
most urban departments clearly exist. But after drilling down more deeply, greater 
variation between rural communities (and the many different language groups) reveals 
                                                      
50  “UN Human Rights Teams Head to Scene of Deadly Clashes in Western Guatemala,” Available at: 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43218&Cr=&Cr1=#.UIDJxVEsGvs_ (accessed on 
October 18, 2012). This event hardened opposition to the state within the municipality of Totonicapán, in 
particular, whose well-organized, indigenous-led and inspired 48 Cantones de Totonicapan continue to 
memorialize this event, while also remaining perhaps the most vocal and outspoken critic of perceived 
injustices, and actively resisting the “incursion” of the state and state offices in its community (based on a 
combination of public information as well as fall 2013 interviews with 48 Cantones leadership. I attended 
the first anniversary events of the 2012 shootings and interviewed leadership. See Appendix E). 
 
51 Regarding Barillas protests: http://americasquarterly.org/node/3656 (accessed September 22, 2014); 
regarding other mining activities: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-27678668 (accessed 
September 25, 2014). 
 
52 See: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/04/us-centralamerica-drought-idUSKBN0GT2NK20140904  
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itself as well. Even after controlling for population size, a preliminary comparison of 
municipalities reveals surprisingly drastic variation in Human Development Index scores. 
Plotting HDI scores against “state density” index scores similarly reveals that, for a given 
density of state services/resources, HDI scores vary dramatically (See Figures 1 and 2 
and Table 1, previous chapter). Other data, including illiteracy rates among children of 
various ethno-linguistic groups, demonstrate additional, unexplained discrepancies in 
performance.53  
One possible explanation for these discrepancies includes the variability in local 
governance from community to community, or more specifically the differences across 
communities in who can influence decision-making at the local level, and the 
relationships between municipio officials and non-state actors vying for influence. In 
contrast to the narrative of more-or-less uniform oppression and depravity in rural 
communities, some scholars have already highlighted the resilience of certain indigenous 
communities – by resurrecting traditional alcadías idígenas (or “indigenous mayors”) in 
order to make executive decisions that affect local municipal governance, or by self-
organizing health services by recruiting traditional promotores (that were not long-before 
the targets of government death squads for their leadership roles in rural communities) 
(Flores et al. 2009, Danel and Forgia 2005). Rachel Sieder (2011), in her effort to 
understand how local populations in El Quiché, Guatemala resolve a desire for 
sovereignty (particularly over criminal matters) with the presence and demands of 
formal-state institutions, provides special insight into the capacity and influence of one 
                                                      
53 A 2011 Procurador de los Derechos Humanos (PDH) report reveals stark variation in illiteracy across 
different ethno-linguistic groups, and vastly different experiences between 2008 and 2011. The 
Sipakapense group for example, largely concentrated in the Sipakapa municipio, experienced increased 
illiteracy (from 40-68% of its children from 2008-2011), while the Sakapulteca virtually eradicated 
illiteracy in the same time frame. 
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indigenous organization in a single community. Though as her work also suggests, this 
capacity and influence will inevitably vary, and thus conditions, from community to 
community.  
There is evidence, as well, that the 2002 Ley de Consejos de Desarollo Urbano y 
Rural (Urban and Rural Development Councils Law), which created a tiered system of 
increasingly local-level councils through which citizens could actively participate in 
development planning, has positively impacted perception of the state in some locales 
(Flores et al. 2009, Danel and Forgia 2005), whereas in other communities the system has 
been captured by local elites and is perceived less positively (Torres-Rivas and Cuesta 
2007).54 In certain communities, local, informal leaders have prevented the 
implementation of COCODES altogether – citing them as a direct attempt by central 
authorities to undermine their own role, and divide the indigenous community.55 In other 
communities, locally-organized, semi-formal comités cívicos, or essentially non-affiliated 
political campaigns for local offices, have influenced the local political and development 
agenda in order to intentionally side-step national political parties and the formal system, 
though these frequently dissolve after elections, or are otherwise ephemeral.56 
Some scholars have argued that, more generally, indigenous rights movements 
throughout Latin America, including in Guatemala, have gained in strength since the end 
                                                      
54 This notion was confirmed in interviews throughout this study. A description of this system is available 
here: http://sistemas.segeplan.gob.gt/siscodew/ddpgpl$modulo.indice 
 
55 This was most obvious in Totonicapán municipality, where the 48 Cantones are well-established, 
influential, and remain vehemently opposed to the idea of state-coordinated COCODES. This was 
confirmed over several interviews throughout the Fall of 2013. 
 
56 See the following link for an example: http://www.deguate.com/artman/publish/noticias-guatemala/los-
comites-civicos-alternativa-para-llegar-al-poder-local.shtml#.UUNfn1cl_0e. Comité Cívico candidates 
amounted to 3.5 percent of all candidates running for office in the 2011 general elections, and, were 
relatively effective in winning office (16.8% won their respective campaign – the fourth most effective 
among all parties)(ASIES 2011). 
 
 
38 
 
of the civil war – this being a perverse outcome of liberal statebuilding that 
simultaneously threatened rural indigenous autonomy without compensatory 
opportunities to participate in formal, democratic institutions (Yashar 1998). Whatever 
gains might be made through such movements are called into question by others, 
however, who observe a division between “culturalist” and “popular” wings of the 
Guatemalan indigenous movements, with neither adequately penetrating the formal 
political realm (Thorpe, Caumartin and Gray-Molina 2006).  
Other scholars have focused on the role of civil society in post-war Guatemala, 
documenting both qualitative differences in organizational type, function and 
cohesiveness, with subsequent variability in “effectiveness” (Kurtenbach 2010, Birle 
2000). Finally, others have attempted to document the role of “hidden powers,” or so-
called “clandestine groups” that wield power through force and who exploit criminal 
networks. This influence, as crime statistics indicate, also varies spatially (Peacock and 
Beltrán 2002).  
Collectively, the above accounts suggest that, to a yet undetermined degree, there is 
variation in the constitution and capacity of local “societies” – or the constellation of 
actors influencing governance at the local level – from local NGOs and official 
development agencies to more traditional alcadías and even narco-traffickers.  
While the state and its aid agency develop nation-wide service delivery programs, 
local communities have mobilized themselves, in various ways and with varying 
capacity, to address their own needs, or to assist in (or substitute entirely for) state 
governance. Guatemala is therefore not a simple story of the effects of either state 
capacity or decentralization on human development, but instead one revealing how a 
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patchwork of community-level responses, taking various institutional forms and varying 
in credibility and local legitimacy, interacts with national level programming to effect 
development.  
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CHAPTER 2: GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT FROM A GLOBAL 
PERSEPCTIVE 
 
The global development community is currently at a crossroads. As the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) come to a conclusion in 2015, scholars and practitioners 
alike are debating the impact and value of the current model and what, if anything, should 
replace them. And though certain scholars praise the MDGs for, if nothing else, 
reorienting global development from a strictly neoliberal foundation to a more human 
development inspired orientation (Hulme 2010), others question the efficacy of the 
MDGs, and the effectiveness of foreign assistance more broadly,57 given the rather 
glaring oversight of the political dimensions of development in policy (Robinson 2010, 
Langford 2010). These critics argue that the lack of a human rights component in the 
MDGs, and the continued political disempowerment of the poor in different countries, 
hampers more holistic, more robust, and more effective development practice. Others 
more plainly wonder whether the capacity of fragile states will ever allow for measurable 
progress (Figure 3).58 
                                                      
57 William Easterly’s the Tyranny of Experts (2014) builds on his previous work highly critical of the role 
of foreign aid in development, and cements his place among a vocal community, which includes Dambisa 
Moyo (2009), author of Dead Aid, who actively challenge any connection between multilateral assistance, 
foreign aid and development progress.  
 
58 Figure 3 was tweeted by Laurence Chandy of the Brookings Institution on December 18, 2013 
(https://twitter.com/laurencechandy/status/413329238998011904) 
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If there is an element of unity among the different camps, however – whether small 
NGOs, think tanks, donor agencies or heads of state from the Global South – it is that 
everyone wants (or claims to want) measurable impacts with minimal waste from foreign 
aid or development investment, and that poor countries need to be involved more in 
international development policymaking and development design.59 
Despite calls for “local ownership,” however, and however vague, much of the debate 
surrounding a revised development paradigm continues to dwell on either the 
international or national dimensions of poverty reduction and development (the “good 
governance” paradigm most notably), or legal-formal, policy instruments that overlook 
the prevalence and weight of informal institutions.  
 
 
Figure 3. MDG Progress in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (via Laurence Chandy) 
 
                                                      
59 “Local ownership” has become arguably the normative cornerstone of international development policy 
over the last decade – rhetorically through myriad UNDP, OECD and countless NGO policy papers, but 
also enshrined in the OECD-brokered 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (see, for example: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm). Poor countries have 
more recently taken at least symbolic steps in demonstrating leadership – though the advent of the g7+, or a 
loose intergovernmental organization of some of the world’s most conflict-affected and poor states 
(http://www.g7plus.org/introduction), their work with the International Dialogue to craft a so-called “New 
Deal” for aid and development, and now efforts by the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-
2015 Development Agenda to solicit input directly from citizens and civil society that will theoretically 
inform the drafting of Post-2015 goals (see http://www.myworld2015.org/). 
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A diverse, only-just-emerging community has begun to explore the implications of 
community level dynamics60 on development specifically (Alexandre et al. 2013, IDS 
2010, Pugh 2010) including the role of locally-relevant informal institutions (Unsworth 
2009, Hyden 2006). Much of this work remains anecdotal, however, or demonstrates 
more the resilience and robustness of a given informal governance mechanism (Owusu 
1992, Ake 1996, OECD 2009) rather than an analytical, or explicit, exploration of either 
their influence on development outcomes, or how formal state entities and informal 
institutions can be reconciled for more effective development governance. As Goran 
Hyden writes about African countries, generally (though in this case he could be writing 
about virtually any developing country), many are “caught between state and 
community,” and that, “finding the right pathway to governance is not easy in such 
circumstances” (Hyden 2006: 18). Indeed, the crux of reconciling informal with formal 
institutions is oft-evoked, but rarely explored. 
Given this crucial yet understudied, and indeed poorly understood dimension to the 
conundrum of poverty and human development – combined with an acute desire by 
international actors to develop more impactful, pro-poor development programming – 
empirical research is essential to informing the current policy debates, as well as critical 
for addressing a key, overlooked, knowledge gap in our understanding of the persistence 
of poverty and poor human development at the local level. At the same time, a thorough 
examination of local-level political dynamics also provides important insights into local 
perceptions of, and/or active resistance to, the state – adding nuance to what “state 
                                                      
60 Or what some might label “sub-state fragility.” 
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fragility” means in rural communities, with implications for development outcomes 
nationally.  
This project is designed in order to address these specific knowledge gaps and begins 
here by first reviewing the vast array of literature that considers governance, local 
governance, and state-society relations – tying them to questions of development 
whenever possible – before isolating the most resonant findings and situating this project 
amongst previous contributions. I ultimately draw most from literature, written 
principally as a critique of post-conflict peacebuilding operations, that questions the 
preeminence of the unrivaled state as the most viable, durable, and legitimate actor in 
development governance. While this project does not go so far as to argue for a “post-
Westphalian” conception of development, discussed below, it does arrange the state 
horizontally alongside other actors – including informal, non-state actors like indigenous 
leaders, church leaders and local government officials – as only one element constituting 
local development governance, or the process through which key decisions are made and 
implemented. The state’s influence, authority and local legitimacy, from this perspective, 
can vary, as will the influence of more locally situated actors. However, the agency of 
local actors, increasingly noted as influencing crime and violence in different contexts,61 
is still limited with respect to human development. In order to analyze the literature 
efficiently, I have organized the following review of scholarly contributions along three 
dimensions – from state-centric schools of thought to state-society relations literature, 
and finally, “society-centric” orientations. 
                                                      
61 From semi-formalized community policing efforts in Jamaica, supported by USAID, to ad-hoc civil-
defense brigades in southern Mexico tackling drug violence, community members have been increasingly 
cited as previously overlooked, but important, variables in influencing crime and violence at the 
community level. This is increasingly reflected in scholarly literature as well, discussed in more detail 
below. 
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2.1 State Centric Theories  
2.1.1 State Strength, Weakness and Development: State Actors Rule 
A contemporary understanding of statebuilding among scholars and practitioners in 
the peacebuilding and development field is most often in reference to the phenomenon of 
“failed,” “fragile” or “vulnerable” states. These states, it is argued, have either been 
dismantled or otherwise ravaged by civil conflict to a degree that their internal capacity to 
conduct essential operations like collect taxes, or deliver even basic services – including, 
especially, the provision of physical security – is undermined (Ghani, Lockhart and 
Carnahan 2005). The diminished capacity of fragile states erodes the legitimacy of state 
actors, instigating a negative cycle that, unless reversed, reinforces fragility (OECD 
2010). In the aftermath of civil conflict, therefore, it has been increasingly accepted that 
“statebuilding” is needed to complement otherwise minimal peacekeeping interventions 
in order to establish a more sustainable peace, foster long-term development, and to 
construct lasting institutions that help consolidate the central government’s popular 
legitimacy.62 
Thus despite direct challenges, the conventional wisdom surrounding development 
(and even more specifically post-conflict reconstruction, development and peacebuilding) 
remains a push to (re)constitute a viable “Weberian” state. In essence, according to Max 
Weber, a modern state is a “political organization … [that] successfully claims a 
monopoly over the legitimate physical coercion necessary for the implementation of its 
laws and decrees” (as quoted in Kalberg 2005: 222). Though Weber, himself, never 
                                                      
62 These ideas are evident, for example, tin hen Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace 
(1992) which first evoked the term “peacebuilding,” to more recent calls for multidimensional 
peacebuilding and “whole of government” approaches to state fragility (Patrick and Brown 2007) 
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ascribed to his ideal-type of a modern nation-state any normative implications, it has been 
taken by contemporary international agencies, and bi-lateral donors/advisors, to be the 
desired endpoint for which to strive.  
Specifically, a capable, or “strong” state will, apart from monopolizing violence, 
cultivate an efficient public administration that “discharges official business precisely, 
unambiguously, continuously, and with as much speed as possible” (Ibid: 199). The 
“technical superiority” of a rational, legal-formal state apparatus facilitates the 
functioning of the free-market economy, and crucially, conveys authority and, ultimately, 
legitimacy. 
Weber’s conception of the modern state also implies that the state – including “its 
laws, statutes and legal procedures – possesses autonomy, despite the perpetual 
influences exercised upon it by arrays of groupings with economic interests” (Ibid: 223, 
emphasis added). This also implies that public and private spheres are mutually exclusive 
and distinct: “States are embedded in society and can shape social relations in ways that 
are supportive of state rule,” notes the OECD (2010), “but they are separated through a 
relatively clear differentiation between the public domain of the state and the private 
domain of the market, family and civil society, with different rules applying to each” 
(2010: 17). Theda Skocpol (1979) and Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol (1985) defend 
the necessity of studying the state as a critical, autonomous actor in social science 
analysis, noting that, “the state properly conceived is no mere arena in which 
socioeconomic struggles are fought out. It is, rather, a set of administrative, policing and 
military organizations headed, and more or less well coordinated by, an executive 
authority” (1979: 12). These attributes – including the conception of the state as an 
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autonomous actor with robust agency, coupled with an increased demand by donors and 
donor policy for the delivery of basic services throughout the state’s territory (Milliken 
and Krause 2002) – make the (re)construction of the state an essential component of 
development programming – whether economic, industrial, human, or social. 
A focus on state capacity stemming from a Weberian concept of the state also 
requires an analysis of rule of law and the use of state force to guarantee citizen security 
and promote development. Either high rates of criminal violence, as we see in Guatemala, 
or non-state actor use of violence, inherently reflects diminished state capacity, which 
necessarily undermines state legitimacy. This leaves some observers to default to what 
others call a “security first” perspective of statebuilding and development – whereby, 
under conditions of state fragility, “statebuilders can secure a social order simply by 
establishing a coercive presence within a fragile state that can protect people, defend 
property and adjudicate disputes” (Lake 2010: 40). In fact, though Robert Rotberg argues 
that state “strength” and “weakness” can be measured by a state’s ability to provide 
crucial “political goods” across a range of dimensions,63 no political good “is as critical 
as the supply of security, especially human security…The state’s prime function is to 
provide that political good of security” (2003: 3).  
Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan (2005), who concern themselves principally with aid 
and development, wholeheartedly embrace the most basic tenets of Weberian-based 
statebuilding, including their implications for citizen security, noting that “the ultimate 
marker (of state fragility) is a loss of the legitimate use of violence by the state and the 
                                                      
63 These include inter alia how states: “organize and channel the interests of their people, often but not 
exclusively in furtherance of national goals and values. They buffer or manipulate external forces and 
influences, champion the local or particular concerns of their adherents, and mediate between the 
constraints and challenges of the international arena and the dynamism of their own internal economic, 
political, and social realities” (2003: 2). 
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emergence of armed groups that through recourse to violence openly mock the authority 
of the state and gain control of various areas of the country” (2005: 1).64  
Slightly more nuanced interpretations understand statebuilding outcomes as the 
interconnection between state capacity in the realms of rule of law, public finance and 
security, and the legitimacy of the state (which, in a circular fashion, depends in turn on 
the capacity to adequately provide the above services) (Call with Wyeth 2008). From this 
perspective, however, legitimacy varies only in accordance with the ability of the state to 
effectively deliver on a range of public and “political” goods, including, more recently, 
the provision of “legitimate representation” and “wealth and welfare” (Milliken and 
Krause 2002: 754). Indeed from this perspective, the Guatemala statebuilding project 
scores quite poorly, which is confirmed by quantitative indicators of state capacity.65 
Capacity, however, is but one attribute of the “developmental state” concept of 
statebuilding – a dimension of statebuilding in which Guatemala also scores poorly. 
Political will, is also essential. The developmental state and its state apparatus, most 
obviously embodied by Japan (Johnson 1982), first, and later the East Asian “Tiger” 
countries before enacting liberal reforms, marshals resources and coordinates finance in 
order to develop a competitive industrial base. It also marries industrial development and 
employment growth with human capital investments in education and job training 
(Leftwich 1994, Onis 1991, Evans 1995, Woo-Cummings 1999). The developmental 
                                                      
64 In the most dire circumstances, the conventional wisdom of statebuilding as presented thus far motivates 
some scholars to defend what they perceive to be the significant benefits, if temporary, of the most overt 
forms of external assistance including “neotrusteeships” (Fearon and Laitin 2004) and a “shared 
sovereignty” (Krasner 2004) of failing states, in order to provide both the security and capacity of state 
institutions during what are imagined to be temporary episodes of state weakness. 
 
65 These include the 2009/2010 UNDP Human Development Report on Guatemala, Inter-American 
Development Bank statistics and the World Bank’s “Worldwide Governance Indicators” for Guatemala 
(1996-2010). Metrics largely reflect the institutional capacity and effectiveness of the central government, 
including scores of corruption, rule of law and regulatory capacity. 
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state in any sense – between an economic oligarchy, demonstrated unwillingness to pass 
land or economic reforms and a violent social cleavage – is utterly absent in Guatemala, 
and major source of the country’s ongoing development failures (Schneider 2012).  
Despite minor amendments, however, statebuilding for development continues to 
hinge on assumptions that conflate state capacity with legitimacy and citizen security. A 
narrow conception of the Weberian state, in fact, continues to dominate policymaking 
and practice. From the DRC, where the UN continues to strengthen the offensive 
capabilities of regional peacekeepers while explicitly calling on the government to reform 
its security sector for development purposes,66 to Guatemala, where the current 
government has invested heavily in armament and vehicles for its police force, and 
military helicopters for drug interdiction, state security remains at the center of 
development policy, and state capacity the telos.67 
2.1.2 Decentralization and Development: The State Goes Local 
Another important element of statebuilding concerns institutional and state design, or 
“organizational arrangements.” For example, “whereas capacity refers to the ability of the 
police or the government’s tax collectors to discharge their responsibilities, state design 
refers to where and how these state powers are allocated or arranged” (Call with Wyeth 
2008: 9). This has special resonance in Guatemala, where, as in much of Latin America, 
                                                      
66 See: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2098.pdf (accessed December 5, 2013). 
 
67 UNSC resolution 2098 created the “force intervention brigade” for DRC in the most recent effort to 
increase the offensive capabilities of peacekeeping forces there, and to encourage security sector reform by 
state forces. Language in the resolution directly links these efforts to long-term human development. 
Similarly, Guatemala’s recent state purchases of arms (see: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-
briefs/guatemala-to-invest-$28-million-arming-national-police) and vehicles (see: 
http://www.centralamericadata.com/en/article/home/Guatemala_Announces_Purchase_of_700_Police_Car
s) is at the core of its country’s development policy. 
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strong “centralist” systems of state authority have been increasingly decentralized, either 
in hopes of perceived fiscal efficiency, or more effective democratic governance (Brink-
Halloran 2009, Escobar-Lemmon 2001, Torres-Rivas and Cuesta 2007). 
Decentralization, in fact, has been as fundamental to the global contemporary 
development paradigm as free-market reforms or secular-democratization, with it now 
having been implemented in a diverse array of countries simultaneously throughout the 
1980s and 1990s (Badhan and Mookherjee 2006, Manor 1999, Brosio 2000).68 
Decentralization’s contemporary roots69 are in public economic thinking and fiscal 
federalism literature,70 which theorizes public goods being distributed more efficiently 
based on comparative social welfare functions, or the diverging needs of citizens from 
different sub-regions. From a democracy-building and fragile-state perspective, 
decentralization should additionally “promote a sense of autonomy in citizens, enhance 
social order by promoting the legitimacy of the state, and limit pressures for separatism 
by diverse regions or ethnic groups” (Badhan and Mookherjee 2006: 4).  
With respect to human development policy, specifically, strengthening local 
governance71 is at the cornerstone of UNDP practice because “it enhances people’s 
                                                      
68 The World Bank has regularly cited decentralization as a fundamental component of effective pro-poor 
governance and improved service delivery to the poor. Examples include Chapter 5 of the 1999/2000 
World Development Report (WDR), titled “Decentralization: Rethinking Government,” as well as Chapter 
10 (“Public Sector Underpinnings of Service Reform”) in WDR 2004 and Chapter 7 of WDR 1997, 
“Bringing the State Closer to People.”  
 
69 Arguments in favor of devolving power to subnational authorities can be found as early as Montesquieu’s 
The Spirit of the Laws (1748) and The Federalist Papers (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1788). 
 
70 This includes the seminal work of Tiebout (1956), which models fully-informed agents with 
heterogeneous tastes assessing variations in public good provisions between communities. Subsequent 
work building on Tiebout includes Oates (1972, 1985), Elinor Ostrom and co-authors (Ostrom and 
Whitaker 1973, 1974; Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne 1993), and Dowding and John (1994). 
 
71 In this paper, strengthening “local governance” can be both an explicit goal of decentralization, or an 
independent goal, for the purposes discussed above. These ideas are discussed concurrently in this section.  
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capabilities to participate in decision-making” and is “instrumentally significant because 
of the contribution improved local governance can make to service delivery and standards 
of living” (UNDP 2010: vii, UN Millennium Project 2005). This link between human 
development and decentralization has been supported by empirical studies as well. Habibi 
et al. (2003) explain improvements in infant mortality rates and educational retention 
with devolution of power to Argentine provinces. Shankar and Shaw (2003) observe a 
decrease in regional inequality across 26 countries after decentralization allowed for 
increased political competition. Johnson, Deshinkgar and Start (2005) find evidence that 
regional decentralization efforts in India empowered the local poor through specific 
programs including rice subsidies and micro-credit.  
Jean Paul Faguet (2012) builds on over a decade’s work in Bolivia in his especially 
thorough analysis of decentralization there. Faguet utilizes an econometric analysis, 
combined with in-country, qualitative case studies in order to compare across Bolivian 
communities after the implementation of dramatic decentralization reforms in 1994. His 
findings are nuanced (discussed more below), but demonstrate a dramatic difference in 
the nature of government spending after decentralization, including a “massive shift of 
resources in favor of smaller, poorer districts” (2012: 25). He also finds that, following 
the landmark reform, “local governments’ investment decisions were far more responsive 
to local needs than central government’s had been before” (2012: 45).  Numerous other 
studies find a positive relationship between decentralization and varied outcomes 
including pro-poor and democratic governance.72 
                                                      
72 These include Parker’s (1995) examination of Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, Rowland’s (2001) and 
Blair’s (2000) documentation of improvements in democratic governance after decentralization in Bolivia, 
Honduras, India, Mali Mexico, the Philippines and Ukraine. Campbell (2001) goes so far as to argue that 
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Much of the literature is critical of decentralization’s ability to affect desired 
outcomes, however. Local communities, for instance, need to meet basic prerequisites in 
order for decentralization to benefit the poor. These include a “well-educated, politically 
aware citizenry,” an absence of high inequality, “law and order” and the presence of both 
formal (constitutional) and informal (civil society) oversight mechanisms that prevent 
excessive advantage accruing to select electoral candidates (Bardhan and Mookherjee 
2006: 9, Olowu and Wunsch 2004) – yet these criteria are rarely met at the local level in 
developing countries (Saito 2008). Moreover, in the absence of any one of these 
conditions, “the outcome of decentralization can be inferior to that of corrupt and 
inefficient central bureaucracy” (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006: 9, original emphasis). 
Francis and James (2003) argue that decentralization in Uganda facilitated elite capture 
rather than responsive governance. Porter (2002) argues much the same for sub-Saharan 
Africa more broadly. Several authors have argued that a lack of human capital and 
technical capacity, along with local conditions including inequality, facilitate such elite 
capture after decentralization (Crook and Sverrisson 1999, Smith 1985, Montero and 
Samuels 2004). Thus even within decentralization literature, which does not 
fundamentally challenge the authority, nor conception, of state actors as the principal 
agents affecting development, the influence of local, informal dynamics on outcomes, 
diverging from their theoretical script, emerges. 
Faguet (2012), who as noted above demonstrates a positive relationship between 
decentralization and local pro-development expenditures, generally, also observes how 
                                                                                                                                                                 
decentralization throughout Latin America has revolutionized local governance, resulting in increased 
political participation and more capable local leadership. 
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local actors and political grievances can negatively influence governance in individual 
municipalities. Specifically, based on extensive field work in two different communities, 
he puts forth a theory of local governance distinguishing between “good” and “bad” cases 
of local governance after decentralization, which he attributes to the quality and vibrancy 
of each the local economy, local politics and local civil society. These factors are in part 
influenced by historical trajectories and geography as well.  
By explicitly demonstrating diverse outcomes across different Bolivian municipalities 
from a single, national policy, Faguet raises (and indeed, entertains) the possibility that 
local political dynamics affect national outcomes. He argues, in fact, that “the ‘outputs’ 
of decentralization within any given country are largely determined by local-level 
political and institutional dynamics,” and that decentralization “sets into motion a 
substantial number of largely independent processes” (2012: 200). His conclusions from 
this, however, are unsurprising, and even tautological: that in essence good outcomes are 
the result of good local conditions, and that bad outcomes result from bad governance.  
Faguet’s study is nevertheless an important reference point for this paper, given its 
explicit acknowledgement of how local political dynamics influence centrally directed 
initiatives, and by acknowledging state limitations at the local level. The project 
described in this dissertation, however, differs from Faguet’s in important ways:  
First, where Faguet compares two very different communities, and subsequently finds 
very different outcomes, the influence of potentially unobserved variables is not 
explained, nor explored. This dissertation explicitly compares across similar communities 
to more rigorously control for endogeneity. Second, whereas Faguet’s econometric 
analysis uses local spending as its dependent variable, comparing the nature of spending 
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before and after decentralization, this project relies instead on development indicators 
themselves, or those reflecting the well-being of citizens – given skepticism of both 
spending statistics themselves, and the indirect, sometimes erroneous, conflation of 
money-spent with real development outcomes. Faguet’s insistence, however, that “within 
a given country, some local governments are more responsive or effective than others,” 
and that we lack a robust theoretical explanation for these differences (2012: 200), 
provides one justification for the work pursued in this study. 
To summarize thus far, both development theory and policy remain rooted in the need 
to (re)construct strong, viable states – or those that most efficiently deliver basic 
resources and provide security and safe environments for its citizenry. Even 
decentralization is less a critique of the state capacity notion per se, but instead extends 
the reach, territorial penetration and predominance of the central state, crowding out the 
influence and legitimacy of non-state actors, if in theory responding to the needs of local 
citizens more efficiently.  
Indeed, states do matter for development, and Guatemala’s state apparatus is in need 
of reform, but scholars have begun to question both the theoretical and practical 
implications of a Weberian state for development – under the context of globalization on 
the one hand, but also given the persistence, durability and influence of non-state actors – 
from organized criminal networks to tribal leaders – in diverse settings. The notion that 
states can be outmaneuvered by local actors was hinted at above, in literature that 
nevertheless conceptualizes the state as an autonomous agent with direct influence over 
sub-national outcomes. The following literature challenges this conception more 
profoundly, with important implications for the research described in this paper. 
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2.2 State-Society Relations 
Migdal, Kohli and Shue (1994) explore the nature of state-society relations explicitly, 
arguing that local vectors of domination, and local conditions – whether religious, illicit, 
or violent – shape the state as much as the state shapes society. They underscore both the 
mutually constitutive component of state-society relations and introduce the key elements 
of time and history in the statebuilding process. In demonstrating how social forces can 
act upon the state, communities and individuals are also assigned agency, with which 
they can influence outcomes. 
2.2.1 Bringing State-Society Back In: Influencing State Outcomes From Elites to 
Villages 
The state, in this depiction, is neither a black box, nor the autonomous Skocpolian 
institution that coerces or redistributes resources unilaterally. Instead, states grapple with 
diverse social forces inconsistently while they attempt to establish authority and 
domination. State-society relations, according to Migdal, Kohli and Shue (1994), fall 
somewhere between two extreme ideal types – total domination by the state on one end 
of a spectrum, to “disengagement,” or when the state altogether fails to penetrate local 
social forces and civil society. 
Scholars have since documented how complicated state-society relations operate 
empirically.  Kenneth Menkhaus, for example, describes “hinterland” state failure, or the 
phenomenon of “ungoverned” peripheral regions that a strong central authority might 
intentionally neglect for fear of the political cost of imposition (Menkhaus 2010). 
Elsewhere, Menkhaus (2008) describes a “mediated state” in northern Kenya, where 
peace and security was informally (but with Nairobi’s blessings) sub-contracted to a local 
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women’s organization that had previously brokered a cease-fire between warring clans.  
The notion that the state might informally devolve power to non-state actors is further 
substantiated by Acemoglu, Santos and Robinson (2012), who observe an electoral 
symbiosis between political parties and paramilitaries in Colombia, whereby preferential 
policies are targeted at paramilitaries in hopes that they will help deliver votes from their 
controlled territory.  
In a post-conflict statebuilding context, Zürcher et al. (2012) demonstrate the 
limitations of externally-led democratization efforts. The extent of a transition to 
democracy, these authors argue, is less about outside expenditures and capacity-building, 
but hinges instead on the in-country “demand for democracy” among local political 
actors and elites. Though stopping short of calling for “local ownership” as much 
development literature ambiguously demands, the authors nevertheless demonstrate that 
local demands, and context, can overwhelm the resources and programming of external 
interventionists. Other scholars have repeatedly argued that the intrusive nature of 
externally-programmed statebuilding discredits local officials, undermines development, 
and inhibits more legitimate outcomes (Chopra 2002).  
State-society relations have been conceptualized altogether differently, however – 
from North et al.’s (2007) “limited access orders” to DiJohn and Putzel’s “political 
settlements,” which in essence depict the state not as an autonomous and largely 
unrivaled actor, but rather “founded on a historically determined balance of power 
between contending interests” (2009:14). DiJohn and Putzel, in fact, explain stark 
differences in the developmental trajectories of Costa Rica and Guatemala since 1948, 
including their contemporary welfare and tax bases, based on political settlements – in 
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Costa Rica between a revolutionary political party and a newly empowered countryside 
which disbanded an oligarchic elite, versus an alliance of landed elites in Guatemala 
which continues to hamstring the state’s taxing powers and inhibit a social welfare policy 
(Schneider 2012).  
Development, and even state fragility itself, from this conceptualization of 
statebuilding, depends on the quality and durability of foundational “elite bargains.” 
These underpin political settlements and are frequently “durable and adaptable to 
challenges over time, allowing the state to establish and maintain control over coercive 
power, administrative authority and popular allegiance (e.g., state resilience)” (Ibid: 15). 
Additional research suggests that when bargains are “inclusive of the major contending 
elites and protect their shared economic interests,” they have the best chance to endure 
over time (Wood 2000, Acemoglu et al 2003). These broad trends that determine 
statebuilding trends regionally, or sectorally, however, do not address the micro-
variations under investigation in this study. 
Another conception of state-society relations also characterizes statebuilding and the 
institutions that result as being highly tense political processes. Catherine Boone (2003), 
for example, employs a choice-theoretic model in rural Africa in order to explain 
institutional choice, or “variation in state-making patterns” (2003:20). Though Boone 
does not explicitly refer to elite bargains, she does underscore the role of local elites, and 
the legitimacy of communal hierarchy, as being key determinants in what explains 
institutional outcomes. Specifically, “the extent of rural social hierarchy determines rural 
elites’ bargaining power vis-à-vis the state: the more the hierarchy, the greater the rural 
elite’s bargaining power” (Ibid: 23). In addition, greater dependence upon the state (or 
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the degree of economic autonomy of said rural elites) “creates structural conditions 
conducive to collaboration between rural elites and the center” (Ibid). These factors in 
combination, according to Boone, help explain institutional outcomes across time and 
space, from power-sharing at the local level to “usurpation,”  “administrative occupation” 
or “non-incorporation” (Ibid: 32-33). 
For the purposes of this paper, Boone’s focus on formal and informal relations 
between governmental and non-governmental entities is essential. Though her work, 
along with that of DiJohn and Putzel’s, focuses squarely on the role of elites, she also 
recognizes more generally that “decisive struggles take place within rural society, and 
between rural interests and the state.” Borrowing from Mahmood Mandami (1996), she 
also argues that the state-society approach has overlooked political tensions within the 
countryside, that state authority depends upon everyday village politics or uneven 
distributions of power within rural society, and that previous assumptions of state 
autonomy have overestimated the capacity of outsiders to shape local politics  (Boone 
2003: 32). Boone strives to explain variations in state-society relations across space in 
Africa, but she also helps underscore the value and necessity of studying community-
level politics in order to understand national-level developments, while beginning to blur 
the otherwise neat distinction between state and society.  
2.2.2 Governance and Post-Westphalian Development 
Increasingly, in fact, scholars are questioning both the conception of the modern state 
as a “democratic and capitalist state governed by the rule of law” on both normative and 
analytical grounds (Risse 2011, Migdal and Shlichte 2005). Thomas Risse, for example, 
argues that “such conceptualizations of statehood … obscure what we consider the most 
 
 
58 
 
relevant research question: Who governs for whom, and how are governance services 
provided under conditions of weak statehood? (Risse 2011: 4). Indeed, reconceptualizing 
the problematique as one of governance under conditions of “limited statehood,”73 versus 
state fragility or state failure, per se, is more analytically fruitful at the local level, in 
particular, where “various combinations of state and nonstate actors ‘govern’ in areas of 
limited statehood” (Ibid: 11). This has significant implications with respect to 
development studies given that projects and resource delivery is ultimately tested at the 
village level. The concept of limited statehood, and the governance thereof, has particular 
relevance to this study and its cases under investigation. 
 Governance, or the “interactive processes of multi-stakeholders (including 
government) in order to resolve common problems” (Saito 2008: 6), acknowledges, but 
otherwise de-emphasizes the exclusive role of the state in coordinating or producing 
binding rules, or collective goods – the “governance without government” conception of 
coordination and decision-making (Risse 2011: 9).74  
A “governance approach” thus discards the dichotomous depiction of strictly state 
and society, or public and private, incorporating into the analysis, instead, the influence 
of “different constituent members including public, private, and civil organizations in 
order to resolve common political, economic and social issues” (Saito 2003: 6, Risse 
2011, Ladwig et al. 2007). This approach also underscores the interactive processes 
                                                      
73 By Risse’s definition: “While areas of limited statehood still belong to internationally recognized 
states…, it is their domestic sovereignty that is severely circumscribed. Areas of limited statehood concern 
those parts of a country in which central authorities lack the ability to implement and enforce rules and 
decisions…” (Risse 2011: 4). 
 
74 Though Risse rightly notes that governance can, even under conditions of limited statehood, include 
“steering by the state” (“governance by government”) and governance “via cooperative networks of public 
and private actors” (“governance with government”) (2011: 7). I am intentionally highlighting how a 
“governance approach” opens the door for analyzing the role of a wider set of actors, especially at the 
community, or village, level. 
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between stakeholders – which include semi-formal and informal actors, as well, as this 
study demonstrates – that constitute decisionmaking. 
A governance approach can cause analytical problems, however. First, as Risse 
(2011) points out, and as is already suggested above, implicit assumptions of a “public-
private” distinction are less meaningful under conditions of limited statehood, where non-
state actors, for example, can simultaneously provide public services and undermine 
security.75 Risse calls on researchers, therefore, to “investigate empirically who serves as 
a governance actor – irrespective of a formal position in the political system or in 
society” (2011: 15). This provides yet additional justification for the empirically-based 
investigation this study pursues. 
Second, a “governance approach” under conditions of limited statehood assumes that 
governance actors are working for the collective good, when frequently public services 
are transformed into club or private goods, or steered towards certain groups – ethnic, 
tribal, religious, or for vote buying in the cases detailed below in this project – while 
others are excluded. Risse argues that the more inclusive the social group for which 
goods are provided, the more that this is “governance” and not “racketeering” (Chojnacki 
and Branovic 2007, 2011). By isolating, in this paper, how communities and governance 
actors respond to a well-documented and pressing public need – high local rates of 
chronic hunger, poor schooling and poor basic health services in this case – this project 
again accounts for this potential conceptual challenge.  
Finally, Risse frets that a governance approach overlooks the fact that, under 
condition of limited statehood as in Guatemala, non-state actors frequently substitute for 
                                                      
75 Risse uses the example of Hamas. 
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government’s absence – by providing security or vaccines, etc. – rather than compliment 
for them under a consolidated state’s “shadow of hierarchy” (or the implicit threat of 
regulation and sanction by a strong, capable state, which is mostly absent under 
conditions of limited statehood). Risse’s answer is to suspect that a “functional 
equivalent” of the shadow of hierarchy – from international norms, legal standards and 
even international or weak state presence – helps explain why we nevertheless see 
governance in areas of limited statehood.  
In the case studies detailed below, however, such factors are largely absent at the 
village level, and indeed the state’s coercive influence is minimal. Though state offices 
and clinics exist in each community, there is virtually no international presence that 
might constitute a functional equivalent of the “shadow of hierarchy.” This makes the 
following case studies yet more important, as exploring the scope and nature of 
governance without such a “shadow of hierarchy” should thus augment our analytical 
insights into the influence of non-state and informal actors on local governance for 
development. 
This section strongly suggests that “governance with a small-g” exists in remote 
territories where state influence is lacking. In contrast to an assumption of anarchy in 
conventional statebuilding wisdom, with clear implications for development, local 
communities can instead actively “forge systems of security, law, deterrence of crime, 
conflict management and mutual support” (Menkhaus 2010: 182-183). Local norms, 
customs, perceptions and history can mandate outcomes at the local level that frequently 
resist, or otherwise complicate technical statebuilding “formulae.”  
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This realization has lead certain scholars to advocate for a yet broader understanding 
of the plurality of institutions, communities and overlapping perceptions of authority and 
legitimacy that complicate statebuilding as conventionally conceived (Albrecht et al. 
2011). The following section builds on Risse, Saito and the governance approach, and 
explores how “society-centric” literature informs this study, before the paper turns 
specifically to the puzzle under investigation. 
2.3 Society-Centric Perspectives on Development: Agency, Resistance, Social Cohesion 
and Outcomes 
Departing from a post-Westphalian concept of statehood, which questions the 
autonomy of states in local contexts, a diverse set of literature has increasingly refocused 
the level of analysis to social groups, communities and even households and individuals.  
Burris, Drahos and Shearing (2004), for example, prefer an analysis of governance 
“networks” that better captures the plurality of actors, variety of mechanisms, and 
temporal dynamism in determining governance outcomes:  
“The venerable and conveniently simple notion that 
governance is the province of the independent state and its 
subdivisions operating through formally established, 
universal and reasonably stable legal modes is plainly 
insufficient to deal with the practical and conceptual tasks 
associated with good governance” (2004: 3).  
 
“Nodes” of governance are entities where ways of thinking about governance 
(“mentalities”), methods (“technologies”), resources and structure coalesce to form a 
somewhat unavoidable conduit through which governance is conducted.  
“It need not be a formally recognized or legally constituted entity,” the authors note, 
but it must have enough durability and structure to channel resources, mentalities and 
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technologies and effect outcomes. Through diverse cases studies,76 the authors contend 
that nodal governance better explains outcomes than top-down legal-formal regulation, 
state coercion, or market efficiency. Governance can therefore take place separately from 
the state, though at times interacting with the state as noted above, or by channeling 
certain state resources through a more powerful node. Nodal governance helps underscore 
the complexity of interactions and actors that produce governance outcomes, including at 
the local level. But the variability of capacity, power and influence that nodes exhibit 
over time and space makes using “nodal governance” as a theoretical explanation rather 
difficult. 
A failure to account for the role and influence of non-state and customary actors in 
post-conflict statebuilding, specifically, according to Albrecht et al. (2011), will continue 
to result in sub-optimal (or plain broken) state-legal punitive justice systems, fail to 
account for local needs and desires, privilege a normative understanding of the unitary, 
rational state (coupled with an assumption that it will dominate all other political orders), 
and reinforce a dichotomous understanding of the “right” and “true” state, versus the 
“non-state” (Ibid: 14). This perspective does not disabuse the importance of the state. 
Instead, “the challenge is to substitute the notion of statebuilding in the narrow sense of 
building the capacity of state institutions and of centralizing authority in one single unit 
with a more flexible concept that can encompass the pluralism of local norms and 
institutions (Ibid). As applied to Guatemala, Albrecht et al.’s arguments would account 
for at least some of the persistent levels of crime, impunity, poverty and hunger in post-
                                                      
76 One being the agreement on the WTO’s Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
and the other a community level peace committee in South Africa. 
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war Guatemala, 18 years after the Comprehensive Peace Accords,77 and despite 
surprisingly robust foreign assistance and aid flows.78   
Another emerging strand of literature, formed mostly as a critique of the “liberal 
peace” and modern peacebuilding and post-conflict statebuilding operations, explores the 
notion of “hybridity.” Hybridity in political science is borrowed from anthropology, 
where scholars are attempting to understand how different elements of globalization 
impact diverse, non-Western communities (Kraidy 2005, Hutnyk 1997, Bhaba 1994). In 
political science, a “hybrid peace” and “hybrid political orders” incorporate elements of 
customary and indigenous practice and understanding, and are both routine (if 
unanticipated) outcomes of even large-footprint external peacebuilding operations 
(Clements et al. 2007; Mac Ginty 2008, 2010), and preferable outcomes (Richmond 
2010, Pugh 2006). Routine – because as already observed – history, local agency, and 
understanding is not passively paved over by liberal statebuilding or centrally-located, 
standardized legal-formalism; preferable – because liberalism has failed to deliver 
adequate peace and development, and because the inclusion of local “rights, needs, 
customs and kinships” brings with it the potential to “enable political mobilization to deal 
with everyday issues (and) to build representative institutions and locally-resonant forms 
of statehood” (Richmond 2010: 668-669). In the best cases, hybridity is an uncontensted 
order of governance that blends locally resonant forms of traditional leadership (chiefs 
for example), with formal-legal systems of representation and legislation that provides 
sustainability and durability (Brown 2006, Boege et al. 2008). 
                                                      
77 See footnotes 6 and 7. 
 
78 See footnotes 11 and 12. 
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Whether scrutinizing the relationship between external statebuilders and the “liberal 
peace,” or the plurality of local actors and their overlapping customs, traditions and 
power, hybridity considers the degree and capacity to which local  actors can resist, 
control, or adapt to exogenous statebuilding projects and the emerging central (formal) 
authority that is being constructed. This is both context-specific, and depends in part on 
the degree to which the autonomy of local agents survived civil conflict – an important 
consideration for this project as it investigates governance in Guatemalan  communities 
with varying experiences during the civil war (Mac Ginty 2010: 402).  
The “institutional plurality” and “hybridity” revisions of modern statebuilding after 
civil conflict, therefore, refer implicitly to qualitative differences in state-society 
relations, but crucially, endow local actors (at the village-level) with greater levels of 
agency than other conceptions of state-society relations, even as they endure tremendous 
pressure to conform and embrace alien forms of authority and regulation.  
The customs, traditions, and locally-based understandings of authority and legitimacy 
can, even unintentionally, thwart the most well-funded and well-implemented, 
internationally-assisted statebuilding projects from achieving their objectives of 
establishing a unitary state that dominates politics and security throughout its territory.  
It was hybridity literature that first informed this project in its early stages, in fact, 
because of its thorough re-thinking of state-society relations, and its emphasis on “the 
local.” Hybridity, however, remains largely theoretically-inspired – borrowing especially 
from critical theory in order to deconstruct the motives of Western powers in peace 
operations, as well as a perceived over-reliance on both market and electoral reforms for 
stability in post-conflict states (Pugh 2010). As illustrated above, hybridity literature is 
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also principally concerned with the interaction between national and international actors, 
reducing differences between regions or communities to a rather superficial discussion of 
the “everyday” political practices across post-conflict countries like Kosovo, or East 
Timor for example, as a whole (Richmond 2010). Moreover, while hybridity focuses on 
peacebuilding, and the quest for an “emancipatory” rather than liberal peace, it says little 
about human development, and improving the living conditions of the world’s poorest – a 
trait curiously in keeping with the wider “post-conflict reconstruction and development” 
literature that frequently bundles “post-conflict reconstruction” with “development,” but 
with little substantive follow-through on the development dimension of post-conflict 
society. Indeed, as seen above, the literature, and empirics, has steadily complicated the 
notion of a unitary state in complex settings, but curiously, only with respect to peace and 
conflict, with virtually no connection between this emerging consensus and its 
implications for sustainable human development. 
This paper takes from hybridity the notion that local customs, and resistance to state 
encroachment, can be incredibly durable, and that the modern state will frequently lack 
credibility and authority in a village context where competing values persist.  
The durability of resistance is taken up by other scholars not bound by the goals of 
hybridity literature specifically. James C. Scott (2000), for instance, has long examined 
why modern states have consistently failed, historically, in some of their most strategic 
plans to simplify, codify and impose order on otherwise complex natural and civic 
ecologies. Specifically, when state efforts at “legibility” combine with high-modernist 
ideology, an authoritarian state and a “prostrate” civil society, hegemonic social ordering 
projects – from agricultural projects to village resettlements – are doomed to failure, 
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largely because they “exclude the necessary role of local knowledge and know-how” 
(2000: 5).  
In the context of modern Guatemala, in many respect Scott’s four conditions remain 
intact!  Between its conscious effort to dam northern rivers, sell controversial mining 
rights and subsidize heart of palm plantations, the Guatemalan state continues to 
commodify natural resources that local indigenous groups find sacred. Guatemala’s 
steadfast adherence to the most ardent laissez-faire social policies reflects the state’s 
ideological commitment to market economics. Guatemala, despite consolidation in terms 
of elections, remains semi-democratic at best. Finally, civil society, while symbolically 
robust, remains marginalized in the wider policymaking discourse. Moreover, the state’s 
values clash diametrically with the traditional values in many Mayan communities, 
explaining in part the gulf in trust that separates state and society.  
In The Art of Not Being Governed, Scott (2009) convincingly argues that the historic 
“hill peoples” of Burma – long stigmatized as “primitive,” “backwards,” and “stateless” 
by the state itself – are in reality “’barbarians’ by design.” “Most, if not all, the 
characteristics that appear to stigmatize hill peoples,” Scott writes, “… far from being the 
mark of primitives left behind by civilization, are better seen in a long view as 
adaptations designed to evade both state capture and state formation” (Scott 2009: 9). 
From this historical perspective, resistance to the state, or a fervent and entrenched 
distrust of state, is in fact the “real” and natural disposition of rural populations, whose 
culture and values clash diametrically with state goals of usurpation and order.  Indeed 
even the subsistence farming and religious practices that characterize so many of the 
indigenous communities of Guatemala today are, according to this perspective, long-
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standing and conscious practices – however discredited by the rhetoric of state authorities 
past and present (Lovell and Lutz 1996). 
Alas, only recently has empirical work attempted to embrace these society-centric 
notions and tie them to development policy specifically. Contributors to Cammett and 
MacLean’s (2014) The Politics of Non-State Social Welfare, collectively catalogue the 
diversity of actors, and the myriad contexts, in which non-state actors, from oil 
companies to terrorist organizations, provide health and other basic services. Their work, 
however insightful and crucial, does not examine the impact on well-being of individual 
populations, however, outside of a public policy-like considerations of equity. In An 
Upside-down View of Governance, the Institute of Development Studies (IDS 2010) 
argues in favor of a recasting of the analysis of state-centric governance for development, 
much in line with Risse’s views above, or what they call a “public authority” approach. 
“In short,” the report argues that, “‘public authority’ focuses on functions rather than on 
form, and is more neutral about the processes and actors involved – inside or outside the 
formal state, and across the public-private divide” (IDS 2010: 10). 
Drawing from comparative work in Pakistan and India, a chapter dedicated to the 
affect of “Informal Local Governance Institutions” (ILGIs) on local development 
outcomes finds that ILGIs are “persistent and influential,” that they can provide goods 
and services, but also that they can “entrench the interests of dominant groups and 
perpetuate poverty” (IDS 2010: 51). ILGIs themselves vary in form and function – 
ranging from informal village councils to an elected officer of land-owning elites – and 
perform differently based on their historic origins, iterations, as well as their interactions 
with state actors (an observation substantiated in Guatemala by Klick 2013). More 
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generally, however, “their relations with the formal state are ambiguous, variable and 
often contested” (Ibid).  
The Institute of Development Studies therefore embraces the Risse notion that diverse 
actors influence governance, with implications specifically for the well-being of citizens, 
but while also recognizing the potential diversity of local informal arrangements 
including potentially detrimental ones for the poor – dispensing with a tendency to over-
romanticize the local while also further justifying the need for further research into the 
influence of ILGIs on development. As the report itself concludes: “The research moves 
the discussion away from the emotive issues associated with ‘traditional’ institutions, and 
offers a more neutral approach to thinking about the bewildering diversity of informal 
local governance” (Ibid). 
Finally, acknowledging the local institutional and customary influence on governance 
underscores both the potential for variability in outcomes when formal rules confront 
different local contexts, and the necessity of compatibility between formal rules and 
informal institutions for development effectiveness (de Soysa and Jütting 2006). As de 
Soysa and Jütting observe, “the point here is that changing formal (macro- and micro-
level) institutions that might be compatible with particular structural forms might yet not 
fit very well with informal institutions given underlying cultural factors that remain 
resistant to change” (2006: 5). Specifically, development may depend greatly “on how 
informal institutions moderate formal ones as they affect outcomes” (North 2005, as cited 
in de Soysa and Jütting 2006).  
This notion has been converted into a typology of informal institutions by Helmke 
and Levitsky (2004), which depicts plausible outcomes from formal-informal institutional 
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interactions (see Figure 2.3.1). As Figure 2.3.1 indicates, informal institutions can 
augment the performance of formal institutions, as well as accommodate, substitute, or in 
the worst cases, “compete” with formal institutions. 
 
 
Figure 4. Helmke and Levitsky's (2004) Typology of Informal Institutions 
 
As discussed in the Introduction, this project borrows the notion of competition and 
complementarity between informal and formal rules in order to frame the interaction 
between state and local forces at the community level. This notion is adapted in order to 
understand development outcomes. 
Specifically, this project demonstrates that state-local complementarity – or when 
local-level institutions, both formal and informal, are able to cooperate with state actors 
in order to meaningfully distribute resources – is a crucial determinant in improving local 
human development outcomes. 
2.4 Additional considerations – Political Culture, Trust and Geospatial approaches to 
development 
Other literature does not fit neatly into the rubric of state or society-centric 
approaches to development, but are nevertheless relevant to the research question. This 
includes questions of political culture, trust and, finally, geospatial analyses. 
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2.4.1 Political Culture and Trust 
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba ushered in the behavioral revolution with The 
Civic Culture, which endeavored to explain differences in levels of democracy and 
industrial development across countries with respect to the “degree to which cooperative 
interpersonal behavior” is valued (1963: 284). Almond and Verba were widely criticized 
for assuming that a supposed “culture,” based on rudimentary surveys, operated 
unidirectionally on institutions and politics (Pateman 1970, Barry 1978). Inglehart (1990) 
has since revised this position within political culture theory, allowing for the causal 
pathway to operate in both directions, however analytically unhelpful this might be 
(Johnson 2003). In contrast to what is under investigation in this study in Guatemala, 
political culture theory even in its most modern iterations79 uses sample surveys from 
which to draw conclusions about entire countries and prevailing attitudes. Raw data from 
culture surveys in Guatemala were unhelpful for this study, given the small samples from 
each community that were utilized to draw conclusions regarding the whole of 
Guatemala. 
More directly related to this project, given its within-country comparisons, is Robert 
Putnam’s Making Democracy Work (1993). Putnam argues that varying levels of 
democratic performance across twenty different Italian regional governments is best 
explained by social capital – or the collective influence of civic values, local norms, and 
crucially, informal networks. The robustness of these networks relies on levels of 
interpersonal trust, which in turn, according to Putnam, lower transaction costs and 
“facilitate cooperation.” But, again, without a clear causal pathway connecting “broad 
                                                      
79 Including the World Values Survey, for example. 
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social benefits” from a social practice, the value of trust as an explanatory value is 
undermined, and even lacks “intellectual merit” (Farrell 2009: 7). Moreover, social 
capital as a social science enterprise lacks definitional clarity and scope, too frequently 
“explaining-away” the otherwise unexplained (Fine 2010). Indeed as this study 
demonstrates as well, perverse forms of complementarity are also possible, breaking the 
overly-simplified notion that ‘all things good hang together.’ 
Trust, nevertheless, remains an important element of development literature, 
particularly with respect to industrial development (Burchell and Wilkinson 1996, Lane 
and Bachman 1997). Farrell (2009), after contrasting competing Italian industrial clusters 
and the Sicilian mafia, argues that “thicker” forms of trust grow out of a context of robust 
informal rules, which themselves proliferate in the absence of formal institutions. Others 
argue that such a tidy correlation between informal institutions and trust overlooks a 
more dynamic interplay between formal and informal institutions, and that “good” versus 
“bad” governance is a more appropriate starting point (Rothstein 2011, Rhodes 2011). As 
Rhodes notes (citing Rothstein 2011), “social trust and quality of government institutions 
‘hang together’” (Rhodes 2011: 4). 
A plausible argument could be made that, between the “good” and “bad” cases under 
examination in this study, either trust in local government or between state and local 
actors explains differences in development outcomes. But if, as Rothstein notes, trust is 
more the result of the interplay between informal rules and formal institutions, which 
ultimately result in either “good” or “bad” governance, we are no better equipped, 
analytically, to interpret what is happening in Guatemala. It remains unclear from where 
trust emerges, nor the sequential steps linking trust and development. In essence, each of 
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the communities investigated in this study operate under conditions of “bad governance” 
– with distrust in local government pervasive everywhere.80 Expectations, however, 
which are key component of trust, and the result of more robust informal institutions 
(Farrell 2009), might indeed help us understand the effect of emerging norms in certain, 
more “successful” communities. As is discussed later in this chapter and in Chapter Four, 
an indicator of “social cohesion” is included in the quantitative component, though the 
order of cause and effect remains uncertain. 
2.4.2 Geospatial Analyses of Within-Country Development 
In 1889, Charles Booth (1902) created a map depicting the relative prosperity of 
Victorian London by city block, color coding each block on a scale ranging from “vicious 
poverty” to “wealthy,” or the “servant keeping class.”81 But contemporary work on sub-
national variation in development and its drivers is generally limited. Possibly the most 
ambitious effort has been conducted by Gennailoi et al. (2011), who analyze a database 
of 1569 subnational regions spanning 110 countries. In a cross-regional analysis of 
geographic, institutional, cultural, and human capital determinants on regional 
development, the authors find that human capital, in particular education, is most 
associated with “regional development” – which is unfortunately reported as GDP per 
capita. Among their more interesting findings, the authors note that,  
                                                      
80 Or, there is a disconnect between social values and development outcomes. In Guatemala, raw data from 
the LAPOP survey revealed some very positive responses regarding local government, even in 
communities that demonstrate, according to my fieldwork, very bad governance and development 
outcomes. The results from each community are too few to make any reasonable conclusion, and are 
subsequently aggregated to yield a national-level “political culture” synopsis (which I find misleading, 
given the wide spatial variability in experiences across space in Guatemala). 
 
81 See http://booth.lse.ac.uk/static/a/4.html  
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“We do not find that culture, as measured by ethnic 
heterogeneity or trust, explains regional differences. Nor do 
we find that institutions as measured by survey assessments 
of the business environment in the Enterprise Surveys help 
account for cross-regional differences within a country.” 
(2011: 4) 
 
While the results of this study are useful in underscoring the high returns on 
investment in human capital, they shed no additional light on how governance affects 
outcomes, nor why some communities within a sub-national region would, as we see 
within Guatemala, diverge. Moreover, as has already been discussed, income per capita is 
an inadequate proxy for development per se. Within equally poor sub-regions of 
Guatemala, certain communities have made striking improvements in health and 
education that would not be predicted by income.  
Other examples of efforts to understand spatial variation in outcomes include 
Bollens’s studies of peacebuilding in urban environments (1999, 2007), though his results 
mostly result in cross-national comparisons in urban planning (between Spain and 
Bosnia) rather than the individual cities. Bollens (2007) nevertheless underscores how 
local governance is a crucial determinant of national outcomes. While cities, as key 
economic and cultural hubs, will be more essential to influencing national trends, 
Bollens’s argument that “challenges regarding identity, citizenship, and belonging need 
to be addressed and worked through most immediately at the local level,” and that, “our 
degree of progress at this grassroots level will either fortify or confine the ability to 
address these issues at broader geographies,” (2007:250) is an essential justification for 
this project. 
Finally, and more recently still, work deriving from global mountain regions, 
frequently driven by geographers drawing explicit links between environmental 
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conditions and socio-economic well-being, have begun to influence development 
thinking. Examples include UNDP’s most recent human development report for Nepal, 
Beyond Geography (UNDP 2014), which explores the links between caste, isolation, 
environmental change and human development. Herman Kreutzman (2001) had already 
isolated mountain and highlands communities as requiring unique development 
indicators, and using Nepal again, demonstrates dramatic variation in human 
development between even mountainous regions there. Burken (2010) suggests that the 
resiliency of mountain communities, with a focus on those in Mexico, will depend on 
local institutions and their relative autonomy. Within-country spatial variation remains 
relatively underexplored then, but utilizing this approach provides important insight into 
how differing governance conditions influence development outcomes. Finally, it also 
complicates what are too frequently cultural and political generalizations of entire 
countries which, as this literature review demonstrates, are diverse, and whose sub-
regions experience vastly different state-society relations and development outcomes. 
2.5 Summary: New Directions for Local Governance and Development 
This chapter highlights literature that challenges what has been the conventional 
wisdom behind post-conflict statebuilding and statebuilding-for-development: that human 
development requires “stronger” states with the capacity to provide security and 
coordinate basic service delivery. Beginning with decentralization literature, which 
otherwise adheres to the core concepts of a “state-centric” logic, both theoretical and 
empirically-grounded literature simultaneously justifies shifting the level of analysis from 
states and state institutions to village-level and informal (non-state) institutions, while 
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also underscoring the need for more empirically informed studies of governance, and 
specifically, how locally-based governance influences development outcomes.  
That a state with the capacity to administer its basic functions efficiently, including 
raising sufficient revenues to supply the most basic public goods equitably, would be 
welcome – in Guatemala or in any post-conflict context – is not in question here. Instead, 
this paper challenges the premise that conventional state building is sufficient for 
development purposes. It also challenges the persistent notion, joining myriad literature 
already undermining it, that the state will be perceived uniformly across its territory. 
Implicit in statebuilding logic is an assumption that its “society” counterpart is 
monolithic, and in essence waiting to be governed for its betterment. As the above 
literature clearly demonstrates, the empirical reality of many communities, spread across 
the developing world, is that the state is a force of usurpation, extraction, and 
homogenization, whose values are anathema to local customs, and thus distrusted, and 
resisted. 
“Society-centric” approaches bring us closer to understanding the persistence and 
empirical reality of limited statehood, as well as the breadth and depth of governance that 
occurs in the state’s absence. The process of governance can be messy, and involve a far 
greater number of stakeholders, or de facto governors that are arranged horizontally, 
rather that hierarchically, as predicted by legal-formal institutions. Indeed, the process 
itself might be governed by unwritten rules, which may themselves be in flux as political 
parties or state actors challenge local norms. This opens the door for a spatial variation in 
the form and function of local governance under, again, conditions of limited statehood. 
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But even society-centric literature is fraught with analytical gaps that limit its usefulness, 
particularly with respect to development studies. 
First, much of society-centered literature consists of either individual cases – 
examples from Kenya, Somaliland or small island nations states, and individual 
communities within, most notably. Much of the rest consists mostly of theoretically-
based work challenging the notions of the Weberian state. Finally, almost none of what 
this project labels society-centric literature, with the exception of the recent IDS report, 
examines development outcomes specifically. This is a glaring gap in development and 
local governance literatures – particularly given the policy world’s proclivity to co-join 
post conflict “reconstruction” with “development.”  
Hybridity literature, in particular, which has done much to challenge standard 
conceptions of the “liberal peace” and its implications for local communities, fails to 
adequately capture community dynamics while all too frequently glorifying, and 
romanticizing, “the local” and its capacity for change. This paper embraces hybridity’s 
challenge to the key liberal pretenses of an otherwise helpless local citizenry in need of 
rescuing, and in ready acceptance of foreign, wide sweeping political and economic 
reforms. This paper also embraces the core hybridity tenet that communities resist these 
changes through daily, informal, and even invisible practices. But hybridity’s reverence 
for the local’s strength and resistance overlooks the social divisions, competition, and 
petty grievances that dominate local political dynamics in some communities under 
limited statehood. These dynamics have meaningful impacts on daily lives, and the 
prosperity of local people, but hybridity, along with much of state-society and society-
centric literature, is incapable of processing this reality. Moreover, when human 
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development becomes the dependent variable in question, as is the case in this paper, 
hybridity’s starkly dichotomous state-local conception loses analytical value entirely.  
This project therefore adds important empirical rigor to the exploration of local 
governance under conditions of limited statehood, including the role of informal actors, 
and crucially, how these factors influence the well-being and quality of life of citizens 
from community to community. The following section introduces how this study is 
organized in order to draw out its key findings. 
2.6 Research Design and Guatemalan Case Studies 
This project is designed in order to specifically investigate whether there is a causal 
relationship between the nature of village-level governance arrangements and both 
human development outcomes based on HDI scores as well as other development metrics 
including illiteracy, chronic hunger rates and changes in each over time. In order to do 
this, this project unfolds over three overlapping, complimentary stages. They are 
introduced below and then expounded upon in following chapters. 
2.6.1 Quantitative Dataset 
 The project begins with a quantitative overview of each of Guatemala’s 332 
municipalities. When available,82 data has been compiled at the municipal level across a 
range of variables including descriptive variables (mean elevation, population, etc.) as 
well as variables reflecting the state of development at the municipal level (poverty and 
                                                      
82 Data at the municipal level – which is the smallest administrative level for which data is ever reported – 
is reported inconsistently, and irregularly. For example, despite obtaining HDI scores for 2000 and 2005, it 
was not reported below the department level thereafter. National reports change with changing 
administrations and thus include different statistics over time. I obtained data from myriad national reports, 
UNDP country reports, and received the generous assistance of experts in Guatemala data and their sources 
from the Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales (the Central American Institute of Fiscal Studies, 
ICEFI) after meeting with them in Guatemala City (November 2013).  
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extreme poverty rates; chronic hunger from 2002 and 2008; infant mortality, illiteracy 
and homicide rates; and human development index scores as well as HDI scores 
disaggregated into their respective health and education components). The original 
dataset includes additional values from individual national reports on “unsatisfied basic 
needs” as additional development metrics. 
This component also includes data for potential explanatory variables. These include 
an index score from 2009 representing “state density,” a binomial “electoral alignment” 
variable (where “1” reflects alignment in party affiliation between the local mayor and 
president – or Partido Patriota (Patriot Party) currently, and “0” reflects a discrepancy 
between local and national level party rule, based on the 2011 statewide elections. Other 
potential explanatory variables include a “conflict intensity” variable, which has to my 
knowledge never been calculated before at the municipal level. This score is the result of 
summing the total number of violent events – murders, tortures and kidnappings most 
notably – recorded in the landmark 1999 Guatemala, Memoria del Silencio report issued 
by the Historical Clarification Commission (CEH 1999) after the signing of the Peace 
Accords, for all 332 municipalities. This report is the most detailed account of specific 
violent events that occurred throughout the armed conflict, and identifies the nature of 
each event, the perpetrators (the army or guerillas for example), victims’ names if 
available, and the specific location of the event. This required many hours of diligent 
coding, but ultimately permits a more fine-grained analysis of “conflict intensity” at the 
municipality level. This is important because departmental trends suggest that, for 
example, Totonicapán was generally unaffected by the war, while Quiché was 
disproportionately, and negatively, impacted. Municipal level data, however, reveals a 
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more variegated pattern where some communities in Totonicapán indeed suffered above 
average levels of violence, mostly perpetrated by the state on civilians. Similarly, some 
communities in Quiché were left relatively unaffected directly. These outliers include 
some of the case study communities, so this data is critical for analysis. 
Finally, from the 2012 Procurador de Derechos Humanos (Human Rights 
Ombudsman for Guatemala) annual report, the database records the number of 
“denunciations” per 100,000 citizens across each municipality. This variable, however 
crude, is the best and only option representing municipal levels of “social cohesion.” 
Despite several studies examining civil society in Guatemala (ICA/FLACSO 2006, 
NORAD 2008, Falise and Sanz-Corella 2009), there is no index of civil society at the 
local level. Stemming from fieldwork observations, however, the number of registered or 
operating NGOs does not correlate with social cohesion. Certain communities had many 
civil society actors, but they were severely curtailed in their scope of influence, while the 
community itself was increasingly divided between new and old religious orders as well 
as politics – discussed in more detail below. A hypothetical “civil society density” score 
therefore would not necessarily reflect social cohesion in any meaningful way. 
Denunciations, at the same time, might reflect either a level of frustration with public 
officials and the police (and thus social discord) or the freedom/organization of 
individuals to protest (and thus a level of social cohesion). This component of the project 
operates under the assumption of the latter, or that a high level of denunciations on some 
level higher social cohesion.83  
                                                      
83 I made this conceptual leap, for the purposes of interpreting my quantitative data, based on observations 
in Guatemala. For example, the well-documented and highly-organized community of Totonicapán 
registers much higher in denunciations (548) than surrounding communities, and even for rural 
communities throughout Guatemala. Chichicastenango, however, where local, relatively less organized 
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The variable that is not available for analysis in my quantitative component is the one 
explicitly representing the principle independent variable under investigation – or the 
complementarity between local, non-state and informal institutions with state actors – 
which would indeed be difficult to construct. Exploring and testing the strength of any 
relationship is instead reserved for the fieldwork described below. What the quantitative 
component does instead is underscore is the nature of the puzzle itself – the spatial 
variation in development and hunger across similar communities, and the independence 
of HDI and hunger from state density – while, crucially, justifying my case selection as 
well, as discussed in the Introduction. 
2.6.2 Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
With the six case study communities identified, it is then possible to begin the process 
of coding the presence or absence of theoretically-informed conditions, as well as 
outcomes, through a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA).  
QCA, as developed by Charles Ragin (1987), is intended to correct for some of the 
core concerns plaguing John Stuart Mill’s qualitative methods that remain the 
cornerstone of much social science research. In a sense, this project utilizes Mill’s 
method of difference by isolating similar communities (each rural, overwhelmingly 
Mayan, and poor) but which differ across the main dependent variable, or “human 
development.” I do this in order to control, as best as possible, for the macro-structural 
determinants of development – from access to basic resources including schools, public 
resources and airports (as might exist in Guatemala City for example) to prevailing 
                                                                                                                                                                 
indigenous groups have been in a volatile and highly public dispute with the mayor registered a scant 56 
denunciations per capita. As is demonstrated later, denunciations are also inversely related to other crude 
metrics of social discord, like homicide rates for example. 
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industries (whether export-oriented palm production or light manufacturing, etc.) and 
even climate (all communities are considered “Western Highland” communities and 
reside between 5456 and 7545 feet above sea level, or within one standard deviation of 
elevation based on the country’s mean, calculated in Chapter 4).  
For the purposes of isolating causation, however, Mill’s methods requires strict 
adherence to three fundamental assumptions – that of the “deterministic regularity” of a 
causal relation, that all causally relevant variables be identified prior to analysis, and that 
cases represent the full range of all possible paths (George and Bennett 2005: 165), which 
amount to overly strict, unrealistic assumptions. Mill’s comparative method thus relies 
exclusively on the logic of causal inference and does not account for equifinality – or the 
possibility that outcomes can result from altogether different, unobserved mechanisms. 
The QCA method, most importantly for the purposes of this project, acknowledges 
and accounts for equifinality. This method allows the investigator to more finely detect 
the presence of not only multiple causal conditions (or independent variables), but 
configurations of causal conditions and even multiple configurations and how they 
interact. Using QCA to reveal otherwise unclear configurations of causal conditions also 
provides insight into the more nuanced and relative influence of individual conditions, 
including the presence or absence of conditions that are necessary, sufficient, both or 
neither, and still more complex combinations (or INUS causes – insufficient but 
necessary parts of a configuration that is unnecessary but sufficient).84  
QCA does not obviate methodological concerns entirely, however (George and 
Bennett 2005: 165-166, Bennett and George 1997). It still requires that all causally 
                                                      
84 As noted here: http://betterevaluation.org/evaluation-options/qualitative_comparative_analysis (accessed 
4/28/2014).  
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relevant conditions are included in the set of cases under study in order to minimize the 
likelihood of spurious inferences. As George and Bennett note, “the logic of causal 
inference for small-n comparisons is highly problematic if the phenomenon being 
investigated has complex, multiple determinants” as is the case for local variations in 
human development across rural Guatemalan communities (Ibid: 156). For this reason 
QCA is considered “unstable,” in that the addition of a new case, or the dropping of a 
single condition, can dramatically change the implications of QCA results (Ibid: 166). 
Crucially, as well, in this project I make binary decisions regarding the presence or 
absence of the theoretically and purposefully-chosen, potential causal conditions 
influencing development outcomes across each case. This leaves open the possibility that 
more nuanced interpretations of the causal conditions, and their presence/absence, could 
influence initial results based on the QCA.  
This concern is at least partially accounted for though the use of strict coding 
parameters that guide the completion of a “truth table” (see Table 2, page 80) that in turn 
informs the initial findings derived from this component of the investigation. The specific 
explanatory variables under investigation in this section are discussed in length in the 
following chapters, but consist of principally the long-term effects of localized conflict 
intensity, the observed level of either social discord or harmony, and institutional 
questions – in the form of social spending by municipal governments and the capability 
of locally-based civil society. I also code for my theorized driver of change – state-local 
complementarity.  
Coding for either the presence or absence of these characteristics is based on a 
combination of available quantitative metrics, as well as the results of in situ observation 
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and key informant interviews in each community. Specifically, I conducted interviews 
with key elites in public office (from mayors and their councils to the heads of individual 
government administrations), in party offices, churches, civil society organizations and 
with other informal or semi-formal leaders and organizations. I also attended key 
monthly meetings between stakeholders in which important decisions were made 
regarding policy and practice – most often with respect to a centrally-organized program 
intended to reduce hunger and malnutrition (El Pacto Hambre Cero, discussed below). 
 
Table 2. QCA Coding Criteria 
Presence of:  Coding Criteria: 
Social Spending? 
(A=high, a=low)  
ICEFI/USAID “Atlas del Gasto Social Municipal”: % of total 
budget per inhabitant  spent on “social functions”  = above (high) 
or below (low) mean (234.54 Quetzales/person) 
“Strong” local 
civil society? 
(B=high, b=low)  
Qualitative observations and interviews: What is the presence and 
density of locally-resonant forms of civil society or traditional 
authority? How effectively can they mobilize popular issue support 
Social discord? 
(C=high, c=low)  
Qualitative observations and interviews: What are the extent and 
nature of social divisions within a community, if any? How do they 
manifest? 
Conflict affected? 
(D=high, d=low)  
Historical experiences with the civil war: Above (high) or below 
(low) the mean conflict intensity “score”(96 victims/community) 
Complementarity 
(E =high, e=low)  
Process tracing: Observation of lead civil society actors working, 
or not, with government officials to implement anti-hunger 
program elements. 
 
For the reasons stated above, the QCA component of this project is integral to my 
methods, and to the investigation of conditions influencing human development 
outcomes in rural Guatemala. This component, by design, reveals complex relationships 
between conditions and key insights into how a range, and combination, of variables – 
from structural and historical to epiphenomenal – relate to outcomes. At the same time, 
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however, the QCA is only a rough sketch of potentially causal relationships, and the risk 
of endogeneity – or that of either unobserved variables or an unseen causal link between 
explanatory variables themselves – remains relevant.  
In order to account for endogeneity and omitted variable bias, this project ultimately 
hinges on an additional methodological component: a process-tracing stage with the 
express purpose of observing the sequences and processes that constitute local 
development governance. This stage naturally overlaps with fieldwork that informs the 
QCA, and the coding of different variables.  
2.6.3 Process-Tracing 
As David Collier writes, “process tracing … is an analytic tool for drawing 
descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence – often understood 
as part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena” (2011: 823). In this vein, I 
expressly visited three of the six original communities – each still demonstrating 
variation in my dependent variable – in order to trace the sequential steps, and processes, 
of implementing a shared, government-backed anti-hunger program in each locale.  
Process-tracing requires significant time and dedication in order to appropriately 
document the micro-level, or “agent-to-agent” linkages, in a potentially vast series of 
events in a causal chain that connects independent and dependent variables (Checkel 
2005). Identifying, or at least clarifying the links in such a chain, however, reduces the 
dependency on drawing potentially erroneous causal inferences. When, additionally, the 
observable implications of competing theories are taken seriously – in this project it 
could be either the toil of more dedicated mayors, the absence of past violence or the 
entrepreneurship of civil society that better explains development outcomes in my 
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selected communities – the theory of state-local complementarity is tested more robustly, 
and must withstand verification through process-tracing.  
No communities are perfectly similar, however, despite my efforts to control for 
macro-structural and even climactic and geographic differences. As Bennett and George 
note, nevertheless, “process tracing can test whether each of the potentially causal 
variables that differ between two closely but imperfectly matched cases can or cannot be 
ruled out as causal” (1997). Finally, process tracing diminishes the inherent degrees of 
freedom, or the “too many variables, too few cases” conundrum of small-n qualitative 
research. “These many predicted observations,” write George and Bennett (1997), “may 
provide sufficient ‘degrees of freedom,’ or many more observations than variables, even 
when the researcher is studying a single case and using several independent variables.” 
For these reasons, I explicitly incorporate process-tracing in order to complement the 
quantitative overview and QCA components of this project, and in order to try to correct 
for their respective methodological gaps in causal analysis. Though on some level 
process-tracing is incorporated in all of the six communities visited, in order to make 
judgments informing the QCA component for example, and in order to understand 
chronological linkages in development decision-making and implementation, I scrutinize 
three communities more closely still.85  
This step required attending meetings in which diverse development stakeholders 
interacted, and utilizing interviews in order to build a chronological timeline, and a 
picture of the mechanics, of policy implementation at the village level. In order to 
increase observations, I visited remote aldeas (even smaller villages that, along with the 
                                                      
85 These include Santa María Chiquimula (Totonicapán department), Zacualpa (Quiché department) and 
San Pablo la Laguna (Sololá). See Table 3. 
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“urban center,” constitute the municipio). In these remote locations I interviewed 
“ordinary citizens” (including, for example, agricultural workers, subsistence farmers and 
homemakers – or those most targeted by government programs) and conducted focus 
groups when more feasible, in addition to conducting the usual key informant interviews 
described above. The focus groups and “citizen” interviews provide rich material for 
description as well as a decisive opportunity to test the observable implications of state-
local complementarity, and the competing implications of social discord, harmony, 
legacy of conflict and civil society (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Summary of Non-Elite Interviews and Rural Focus Groups 
Community Name, and aldeas in each 
municipality 
Number of non-elite interviews and/or 
focus group participants 
Santa María Chiquimula (SMC) n=54 
Xecaxelaj 7 
Xesana 10 
Xesana I 10 
Pajojchiyats 12 
Joesefina 5 
Centro 10 
Zacualpa n=81 
Pasajoc I 25 
Chuchuca (Chuchuca is site location, with 
attendees from the following: Xejoc, 
Xextorian, Xemosche, Chojiomquiej) 
56 
San Pablo la Laguna n=27 
Center* 27 
Total n=162 
*Note: San Pablo has no aldeas, largely because of topographical constraints, and is condensed into one “urban” zone. 
 
Organizing these focus groups and gaining access to the villages themselves, and then 
conducting interviews/focus groups in a safe environment, with ready access to accurate 
translation (from the Mayan dialects of K’iche and Tz’utujil into Spanish), required 
diligence and persistence, but also patience and tactfulness. Given either pre-conceived 
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notions of the intentions of foreigners – as well as the potentially sensitive nature of my 
questions concerning local political dynamics and basic service delivery – particularly in 
remote, poor villages with little to no regular outside visitation, it was essential that I 
partner with local actors already conducting work in these areas in order to be welcomed, 
and in order to assemble community members.86 
Table 4 lists my local partners in each municipality. In two out of the three localities I 
was able to partner with, in my judgment, impartial actors. In Santa María Chiquimula, 
for example, I accompanied volunteers from the local Jesuit diocese on their semi-weekly 
visit to rural aldeas distributing food, weighing and measuring children, and conducting 
short classes on reproductive health. Though I stated my role as an independent 
researcher, by arriving alongside Church volunteers, I was warmly received, and was able 
to conduct many, small focus groups (from 3-10 women at a time) across multiple 
communities. Of course, I was unable to reach non-church affiliates in this sample. 
Participants – all women I should note in Santa María Chiquimula (SMC) – were very 
forthcoming in sharing their experiences concerning local political actors and the 
implementation of Hambre Cero. The volunteers provided regular translation help, and 
shared their own perspectives on separate occasions as well.  
In San Pablo la Laguna (San Pablo hereforth), which is largely a singular, urban87 
community on the shores of Lake Atitlán, I worked with a young, local tuk-tuk88 driver 
                                                      
86 All interviews were conducted in a safe environment that guaranteed confidentiality, without coercion, 
and only after securing permission for participation with the interviewee’s right to end the interview at any 
point. This study was granted authorization to conduct interviews by the University of Denver’s 
Institutional Review Board, and was conducted under its provisions (Protocol # 2013-2552). 
 
87 “Urban” in this context refers to a central community with organized streets and plaza. Each municipality 
has an “urban center,” where the municipal offices and main church are located, and where weekly markets 
are held, and where some small businesses might exist. San Pablo given physical restrictions between the 
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who, with the help of his uncle, helped organize a focus group of 12 women, followed by 
individual interviews over following days with 10 men traveling between town and 
surrounding coffee plantations. I exchanged grape or orange sodas for the participant’s 
time, and occasionally relied on my acquaintance to translate from Tz’utujil to Spanish. I 
paid my tuk-tuk driver for his transportation services as per usual, but padded these 
haggled-for fees for his generous assistance. 
 
Table 4. Field Work Partners 
Community (Municipality) Partner Organization or Individual 
Santa María Chiquimula 
Local Catholic (Jesuit) dioces – 
specifically its organized women’s health 
and nutrition outreach programs 
Zacualpa NutriSalud via the local Woman’s Office (OMM) 
San Pablo la Laguna “Felipe” the teenage tuk-tuk driver 
 
In Zacualpa, surrounding villages were very remote, and access was difficult via very 
bad, mountainous roads. Here I took advantage of a formally independent nutrition and 
health program organized by NutriSalud,89 with partial funding from USAID, which 
consisted of conducting workshops in certain remote aldeas. Concerting my efforts with 
theirs again provided me transportation to remote villages, and local partners that 
enhanced my personal safety, credibility and access (as well as translation help and the 
ability to speak with large groups of local citizens in an organized setting).  
                                                                                                                                                                 
lake and steep hillsides, does not have the usual aldeas surrounding its urban center. “Urban,” however, 
does not resemble the more familiar, densely-populated, sense of the word. 
 
88 Tuk-tuks are three-wheeled motorized taxis typically driven by teenage boys, ubiquitous in town centers 
throughout Guatemala. 
 
89 See: http://www.urc-chs.com/project?ProjectID=243  
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In Zacaualpa, however, the NutriSalud organizers partnered, themselves, with the 
local Oficina de la Mujer, or “Woman’s Office” (OMM) that by law now exists in each 
municipality. But the OMM, under the direct control of the mayor, meant that the villages 
chosen to receive the NutriSalud programs were not arbitrary, but intentional. This 
reality, on the one hand, arguably interfered with my goals of impartiality for the purpose 
of qualitative investigation. On the other hand, this process itself was informative, and 
OMM personnel were surprisingly forthcoming about their own selection criteria 
(communities which are considered mayoral strongholds), and my experiences and 
insights into governance in Zacualpa were in some ways enhanced by this experience, 
though I was unable to meet with groups from villages that do not support the mayor. 
2.7 Conclusions 
From daily insecurity to extreme rates of poverty and hunger, rural Guatemalans 
continue to struggle under much of the same conditions that promulgated a civil war 
lasting 36 years. Since the Peace Accords, however, local, informal authorities have 
confronted a semi-democratic central authority and ill-articulated and muddled 
statebuilding project with peculiar results. The persistence and legitimacy of local, 
informal actors sometimes mixes, and other times clashes, with formal systems of 
governance. This process is different across space, and might explain peculiar differences 
in development outcomes across communities.  
With the express purpose of testing this hypothesis, I have articulated a research 
design that combines a quantitative analysis of Guatemalan municipalities with a 
qualitative comparative analysis, determined largely by field work in six communities, in 
order to explore how theoretically informed variables relate to one another, as well as 
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with the dependent variable – human development. Finally, and critically, I spent 
additional time in three of the six communities, meeting with both key informants and 
“ordinary citizens” in order to trace the implementation of the current government’s 
marquee social welfare program – a globally-recognized anti-hunger program (Hambre 
Cero) – in order to identify stakeholders, their influence and role, and the processes 
involved that determine the actual delivery of basic resources to citizens in need. 
This design is intended so that each component overlaps but also complements one 
another, and in such a way as to robustly test the observable implications of my theory, 
and identify causal mechanisms that influence variation in development rather than rely 
on only inference. The following chapters proceed through these methods systematically, 
beginning with a chapter devoted to the statistical analysis, and a discussion of the 
relationships detected between variables and their implications for this project.
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 CHAPTER THREE: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
IN GUATEMALA 
This chapter is a “first glimpse” into the relationships between possible drivers of 
human development across Guatemala, and variations thereof. Utilizing a novel database 
that combines data from the municipal level across all 332 communities – which 
originates from highly dispersed and sometimes obscure sources90 – this component 
utilizes ordinary least square (OLS) regressions in order to explore the relationship 
between a diverse set of variables and different dependent variables that represent a range 
of human development indicators.  
The explanatory variables under investigation in this chapter are in essence rival 
hypotheses to my theoretical proposition – that better development outcomes are the 
result of state actors working in harmony and coordination with more legitimate local 
actors at the village level in order to deliver basic services more equitably. They also 
reflect state-centric, state-society and society-centric theories of development, and thus a 
combination of theoretical propositions discussed in the previous chapter, but also factors 
specific to the Guatemala context – like the lingering influence of the armed conflict91 as 
                                                      
90 Many indicators required coding from pdfs and assorted reports, where data was otherwise unavailable. 
 
91 The “Conflict Intensity” variable is possibly the first time that violent events from the civil war have 
been tabulated for the municipal level. I coded conflict intensity based on the number of victims tied to 
each community as recorded by the 1999 Memoria del Silencio report, published by the Historical 
Clarification Commission which was established by the 1996 Peace Accords, and which is still the 
authoritative source on civil-war related violent events. I counted all victims, regardless of perpetrator 
(guerilla or army) or crime (whether arbitrary execution, torture, or sexual violence) that took place or 
originated in each community.  
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well as an effort to capture how variation in local organization across space relates to 
development. In essence, the model under investigation is reflected by the following 
equation: 
 
Yi (human development) = ai + β1x1(state presence) +  β2x2 (local spending) + β3x3 
(conflict intensity) + β4x4 (local social organization) +  ei 
 
 
Where ai = the intercept and ei = the residual error. 
Importantly, both dependent and independent variables can be measured and 
represented differently. Human development, for example, is represented in the 
quantitative component of this study by HDI scores at the municipal level, first. But 
hunger and illiteracy rates, as well as positive and negative changes in each over time, 
help reflect different elements of the more rich sense of human development that this 
project seeks to explore. Regressing against an array of human development indicators 
also provides a robustness check for the relationship between independent variables and 
my greater goal of exploring development from a more holistic perspective. Similarly, 
independent variables can be captured through different metrics, with different 
implications. A summary of the different metrics is listed in Table 5. 
This chapter compares five (5) models that vary in their deployment of predictor 
instruments in order to weigh the competing explanatory power of different variables. For 
example, elevation is a geographical instrument, yet simultaneously captures on some 
level the degree of remoteness, and likelihood that state presence is minimal (Callel 
2014).  A model that incorporates both SDI and elevation might diminish the respective 
explanatory power of each, and thus different models incorporate different explanatory 
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indicators in an effort to find a “best fit.”92 These same models are then run against a 
series of different indicators for human development (or the explained variable), 
beginning with HDI and progressing to changes in hunger and illiteracy over time. 
 
Table 5. Municipal Level Data Utilized for Regression Analysis 
Human 
Development 
State-Influence Local Authority 
/ Spending 
Legacy of 
Armed Conflict 
Locally-Based  
Social Forces 
§ HDI 2011 
(extrapolated) 
§ ΔHDI 
§ HDI sub-
indices 
§ Illiteracy 
§ Infant 
Mortality 
§ Chromic 
Hunger 
§ Δ Chronic 
Hunger 
§ State Density 
Index (as 
reported by the 
UNDP’s 2009 
Human 
Development 
Report for 
Guatemala) 
§ Elevation (from 
fallingrain.com) 
§ Electoral 
Alignment 
Municipal 
Spending on 
“social services” 
(in local currency 
/ municipal 
population) 
Conflict Intensity 
(based on the 
number of 
victims from 
violent events 
recorded by the 
1999 Memoria 
del Silencio 
report). 
§ 2012 
Denunciations 
(as reported to 
the Guatemalan 
Human Rights 
Ombudsman) 
§ Homicide rates 
 
The results of OLS regressions, discussed below, yield some puzzling relationships. 
In so doing they also elucidate both the puzzle under investigation, as well as the gulf that 
exists between the state and local development outcomes.  The results, finally, open the 
door for the role of still unobserved mechanisms influencing outcomes, which are 
explored in subsequent chapters.  
3.1 Global Model One: Testing Variation in Human Development 
The quantitative component of this study begins by regressing key variables against 
2011 HDI levels (HDI_extrap), which is a figure extrapolated from HDI scores from two 
previous years (2000 and 2005) as calculated by Microsoft Excel, but which has not been 
                                                      
92 For example, regressing municipal elevation (elev, as reported by www.fallingrain.com) against 2009 
State Density Index scores (SDI_2009) reveals a significantly negative relationship (N=330, P=.006). In 
other words as elevation increases state density decreases (though by a somewhat unimpressive -4.44x10-6). 
Incorporating both into a single model, therefore, will diminish respective explanatory powers, and thus 
apart from Model 2, are not run together in regressions. 
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reported at the municipal level since.93 A first “global model” therefore tests the 
relationship between human development (HDI_extrap) and state density (SDI_2009), 
local government spending (the level of local spending on social services per inhabitant, 
Gasto_Mun), conflict intensity (Conf_Intens), social organization (as represented by 
official denunciations of public officials and police by citizens in each community 
according to the Guatemalan Human Rights Ombudsman, relative to population, 
Denperpop) and finally electoral alignment (Elect_Align, or whether a municipal mayor 
is from the same party as the President as of the 2011 elections, where 1=alignment and 0 
= no alignment). Before running the regressions, I first log transform SDI_2009,94 
creating the variable log_SDI in order to more normally distribute the otherwise clustered 
nature of state density figures (see Figures 5 and 6 for comparison). The following 
figures also illustrate the degree of variation in HDI across communities with similarly 
low state presence. 
 
Figure 5. Extrapolated HDI (2011) Scores Plotted Against State Density Scores 
                                                      
93 This was done in order to overcome the potential endogeneity when regressing 2009 state density figures 
and 2005 HDI levels. The extrapolated HDI figures represent approximate 2010 numbers.  
 
94 Log transforming consists of multiplying all SDI_2009 scores by 100, then taking the log of these new 
values and creating the new variable log_SDI using Stata. 
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Figure 6. HDI plotted Against the Log-Transformed State Density Variable 
 
 
Table 6. Ordinary Least Square Regression: Variation in HDI_extrap 
Predictor 
Variable 
Model 1 
(N=278) 
 
Coefficien
t 
(Standard 
Error) 
Model 2 
(N=277) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Model 3 
(N=277) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Model 4 
(N=325) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Model 5 
(N=325) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
log_SDI .0497943* (.0229995) 
.0562005* 
(.0233884)  
.046398* 
(.0218491) 
.0587264** 
(.0212306) 
Gasto_Mun .0000268 (.0000237) 
.0000287 
(.0000212) 
.0000314 
(.0000239)   
Conf_Intens -.0000918** (.000217) 
-.0000953** 
(.0000225) 
-.0000919** 
(.0000226) 
-.0000884** 
(.0000224) 
-.0000903** 
(.0000192) 
Denperpop 1.867374* (.9201119) 
1.805071* 
(.9214902) 
1.956041* 
(.9274082) 
2.644132** 
(.7782323) 
2.475925** 
(.0086536) 
Elect_Align .0054443 (.0130069) 
.0060596 
(.0130156) 
.0095903 
(.0130458)   
Elev  3.48x10
-6 
(2.35x10-6) 
2.44x10-6 
(2.34x10-6)   
Hom_Diff    .0009367* (.0004267)  
Constant 
F(df) 
.5011801 
7.28 (5) 
.4670603 
6.44 (6) 
.6401602 
6.46 (5) 
.510152 
13.10 (4) 
.4770062 
15.67 (3) 
Adjusted R2  .1018 .1507 .1570 .1300 .1196 
    Note: p<.01**; p<.05* 
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This first model, as a whole, is statistically significant (p=.000), but otherwise 
substantively insignificant, or at least limited in substantively explaining variation in HDI 
across communities (Table 6). For example, though several variables in this model 
(log_SDI, Conf_Intens and Denperpop) are statistically significant, coefficients in general 
are very small (Model 1). Subsequent models add elevation (Model 2), leave elevation 
but drop SDI (Model 3), and then key in on the most significant variables – state density, 
conflict intensity, denunciations and the changes in homicide rates in Model 4, while 
Model 5 regresses only SDI, conflict intensity and denunciations. These models are each 
significant and progressively more robust. But they only tinker with the strength of each 
explanatory indicator, as coefficients remain generally quite small. It is worth noting that, 
for the moment, state density is positively correlated with HDI, and significant, across all 
of Guatemala, though again the effect is quite small. It is also worth noting that 
Conf_Intens is negatively correlated with HDI (and statistically significant with 99 
percent confidence in each of the models). Local social spending is never a significant 
variable. 
Finally, Denperpop – or the officially recorded denunciations of public officials and 
police officers submitted to the Procurador de Derechos Humanos (Human Rights 
Ombudsman), relative to population size – has a positive effect on HDI which is both 
statistically significant (p<.05 in Models 1, 2, and 3, p<.01 in models 4 and 5) and by far 
the strongest of any variable.  
It is my contention that denuncias indicate on some level an element of “social 
organization.” I argue this, first, based on the logic that in a culture of fear and distrust, as 
is widely reported to permeate Guatemala (Azpuru 2012), higher reported denuncias 
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represent more the determination of local actors to organize and protest rather than actual 
levels of official abuse (which is arguably high everywhere).  Secondly, a simple 
bivariate regression reveals a negative correlation between denuncias per capita 
(Denperpop) and the difference in homicide rates between 2003 and 2012 (Hom_Diff). 
As the number of denunicas per capita increase across communities, in other words, 
homicide rates decline slightly (Coefficient = -.034), though this not a statistically robust 
relationship (n= 331, p=.8253). Nevertheless, denunciations are not related to violence, 
and are thus a response to something other than crime.  
Denuncias are an imperfect reflection of social organization, certainly, and open to 
different interpretations, but there is no instrument or data at the municipal level that 
better represents this concept for the quantitative component, and it is therefore included 
in the study. Finally, the strong, positive, statistically significant relationship between 
denuncias and HDI is a noteworthy observation. 
3.1.1 Accounting for Population Size 
In Model 4, an increase in homicide rates is robustly correlated with higher HDI 
scores (n=277, p=.012) – a result which more likely than not reflects the effects of urban 
areas, where access to services and markets improves HDI generally, even if crime is also 
higher (Table 6). This realization means that, when regressing variables across all of 
Guatemala, the relative size of a community may disguise effects that influence results. 
The same models as above are therefore run again, but this time only after excluding 
larger municipalities (or those municipalities with a population greater than 25,000 
inhabitants). The models are again significant, but important changes take place (Table 
7).  
 
 
98 
 
First, a climbing homicide rate is indeed no longer significant. But other more 
peculiar relationships emerge: Municipal spending, for example, becomes significant 
within a 90% confidence interval in Models 1 and 2, suggesting its greater influence in 
smaller, likely more remote communities, though its significance drops below this in 
Model 3. Meanwhile both the Conf_Intens and Denperpop variables remain statistically 
significant, with conflict intensity particularly robust (p<.01 in each of the models) if 
small, while the effect of denunciations remains the most dramatic – with coefficients 
raging from 1.77 – 2.59 (Table 7). After excluding the most populated communities, 
therefore, the most dramatic relationships with human development (at least as 
represented by HDI) are the negative legacy of conflict, even if subtle, and more 
positively, some element of social organization and protest as suggested by the amount of 
official denuncias. 
Also important – if puzzling – is that the state density sign changes from positive to 
negative in this test while becoming dramatically stronger as well, though it no longer 
remains statistically significant. In the very least, the density of state offices and 
resources has no bearing on the human development outcomes of smaller municipalities 
in Guatemala – upending the most basic premise of statebuilding and forcing a 
reexamination of just what does influence local outcomes. 
The same tests are repeated yet again, across all municipalities as well as only smaller 
communities, but only after changing the explained indicator – from 2011 HDI levels as 
above to changes in HDI over time from 2005-2011 – in order to capture any dynamics 
effects of the local characteristics under investigations. The models as a whole, however, 
are not statistically significant and are thus not reported here. 
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Table 7. HDI_extrap When Population<25,000: Ordinary Least Square Regression 
Predictor 
Variable 
Model 1 
(N=138) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Model 2 
(N=137) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Model 3 
(N=137) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Model 4 
(N=138) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Model 5 
(N=163) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Log_SDI -.0829566 (.051696) 
-.0855112 
(.0535125)  
-.0195352 
(.0425373) 
-.0094573 
(.042135) 
Gasto_Mun .0000533* (.0000279) 
.0000525* 
(.0000282) 
.0000401 
(.0000272)   
Conf_Intens -.000218*** (.0000685) 
-.0002169*** 
(.0000693) 
-.0002148*** 
(.0000697) 
-.0002142*** 
(.0000664) 
-.0002174*** 
(.0000666) 
Denperpop 1.894503* (.000142) 
1.908834* 
(1.012271) 
1.767816* 
(1.014379) 
2.57166*** 
(.900458) 
2.594271*** 
(.9036133) 
Elect_Align .0090263 (.0188681) 
.009434 
(.0190546) 
.0067685 
(.0190937)   
Elev  -8.21x10
-7 
(3.63x10-6) 
5.09x10-7 
(3.55x10-6)   
Hom_Diff    .0029894 (.0020327)  
Constant 
F(df) 
.88775961 
4.65 (5) 
.8987034 
3.83 (6) 
.6421548 
4.04 (5) 
.7081681 
5.99 (4) 
.680653 
7.21 (3) 
Adjusted R2  .1497 .1111 .1412 .1096 .1031 
  Note: p<.01***; p<.05**; p<.10* 
3.2 Global Model Two: Testing Against Basic Development Indicators – Illiteracy 
In this section, the same procedure is followed, but variables are instead regressed 
against illiteracy (or lack of literacy, importantly) and infant mortality rates as a 
robustness check of some of the initial findings from Section 3.1. The models for changes 
in illiteracy over time in communities smaller than 25,000, and all models testing 2011 
infant mortality rates, are not statistically significant and are therefore not reported below. 
The effects on illiteracy throughout Guatemala (Table 8), across its smaller communities 
(Table 9) and illiteracy over time (Table 10) are insightful, however. They also reinforce 
the emerging findings that state density and development are disconnected in Guatemala. 
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Table 8. 2011 Guatemalan Municipal-Level Illiteracy Rates: Ordinary Least Square Regressions 
Predictor 
Variable 
Model 1 
(N=256) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Model 2 
(N=256) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Model 3 
(N=256) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Model 4 
(N=300) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Model 5 
(N=163) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
log_SDI -.5.173085 (2.697058) 
-4.376848 
(2.734088)  
-5.835469** 
(2.741042) 
-5.769269** 
(2.5465) 
Gasto_Mun -.0013705 (.0028065) 
-.0011194 
(.0028021) 
-.0012666 
(.0028093)   
Conf_Intens .0140844*** (.0025791) 
.0135695*** 
(.002591) 
.0133564*** 
(.0025957) 
.013121*** 
(.0022661) 
.013117*** 
(.0022615) 
Denperpop 
-
429.5074*** 
(112.2958) 
-
440.3999*** 
(112.1504) 
-
445.6105*** 
(112.453) 
-
430.4998*** 
(100.0088) 
-
430.9649*** 
(99.59223) 
Elect_Align -.2216438 (.0188681) 
-.1373022 
(.0002789) 
-.3689073 
(1.544989)   
Elev  .0004472 (.0002789) 
.0005283 
(.0002751)   
Hom_Diff    .0044964 (.0681496)  
Constant 
F(df) 
48.65554 
11.95 (5) 
44.42661 
10.45 (6) 
30.86702 
11.96 (5) 
50.70989 
16.92 (4) 
50.524 
22.63 (3) 
Adjusted R2  .1768 .1820 .1680 .1756 .1783 
  Note: p<.01***; p<.05**; p<.10* 
 
Much like with HDI scores, for example, 2011 illiteracy rates across Guatemala are 
most strongly correlated with high conflict intensity and denuncias per capita (p<.01 
across all models for both variables) (Table 8). As before, the level of denunciations is 
inversely related to illiteracy. Specifically, an increase of one denunciation per capita is 
associated with a stunning 446 percent decline in illiteracy (Model 3). Both state density 
and local spending are for the most part uncorrelated with illiteracy, though in models 4 
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and 5 state density is significant (p<.05) and associated with 5 percent declines in 
illiteracy when testing across Guatemala as a whole. 
 
Table 9. 2011 Illiteracy Rates where Population < 25,000: Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
Predictor 
Variable 
Model 1 
(N=128) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Model 2 
(N=128) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Model 3 
(N=128) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Model 4 
(N=151) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Model 5 
(N=151) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
log_SDI 3.433755 (5.612491) 
6.370267 
(.5.717079)  
2.762708 
(4.771261) 
.4567894 
(.4.792278) 
Gasto_Mun -.0010112 (.0029575) 
-.0004693 
(.0029302) 
-.0002829 
(.0028542)   
Conf_Intens .0310563*** (.0071164) 
.0297665*** 
(.00705) 
.0295369*** 
(.007054) 
.028844*** 
(.0070779) 
.0293737*** 
(.00072238) 
Denperpop -354.5368*** (.000142) 
-356.4175*** 
(109.9833) 
-354.3001* 
(110.0757) 
-337.0204*** 
(104.0205) 
-347.3542*** 
(106.1332) 
Elect_Align .9415009 (2.007523) 
.761388 
(7.982922) 
.8456734 
(1.983439)   
Elev  .0007952 (.0003841) 
.0006891 
(.0003724)   
Hom_Diff    -.5853974*** (.2175466)  
Constant 
F(df) 
20.65968 
6.96 (5) 
8.326414 
6.67 (6) 
27.62416 
7.74 (5) 
23.71136 
10.00 (4) 
30.13987 
10.47 (3) 
Adjusted R2  .1901 .2114 .2098 .1935 .1593 
  Note: p<.01***; p<.05**; p<.10* 
 
When, as before, the potential effects of population size are accounted for by omitting 
all municipalities with populations greater than 25,000 inhabitants before running 
regressions, state density again becomes irrelevant (Table 9). In fact, its sign changes (to 
positive, suggesting a direct relationship with illiteracy) but nowhere is it statistically 
significant. Again, only conflict-afffectedness and denunciations have significant 
relationships with illiteracy at the municipal level (p<.01). 
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Table 10. Change in Illiteracy (2000-2011): Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
Predictor 
Variable 
Model 1 
(N=256) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Model 2 
(N=256) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Model 3 
(N=256) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Model 4 
(N=300) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Model 5 
(N=300) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Log_SDI 4.909495*** (.9064128) 
5.295933*** 
(.913693)  
4.484826*** 
(1.111933) 
5.160828*** 
(1.037826) 
Gasto_Mun -.0002808 (.0009432) 
-.0001589 
(.0009364) 
 
   
Conf_Intens .0018427** (.0008668) 
-.0015927* 
(.0008659) 
 
 
.0017159* 
(.0009193) 
.0016749* 
(.0009217) 
Denperpop 2.614085 (37.73978) 
-2.672386 
(37.47907)  
37.26648 
(40.56965) 
32.51798 
(40.58879) 
Elect_Align -.406909 (.5212248) 
-.3659755 
(.5169728)    
Elev  .000217 .0000932    
Hom_Diff    .0459143 (.0276456)  
Constant 
F(df) 
.88775961 
6.96 (5) 
-18.70969 
6.81 (6) 1.28 (5) 
-15.67795 
8.04 (4) 
-17.56895 
9.74 (3) 
Adjusted R2  .1046 .1202 .0055 .0861 .0806 
 Note: p<.01***; p<.05**; p<.10* 
 
Finally, when the independent variables are regressed against changes in illiteracy 
over time (across all of Guatemala again), and assuming, as is appropriate, that state 
density has been largely static over the same time,95 the role of state forces in 
development becomes even cloudier (Table 10). The log-transformed state density 
variable (log_SDI) is in fact statistically significant (p<.01), but is now directly 
                                                      
95 As noted earlier, interviews with Guatemalan public policy experts – including Jonathan Menkos, 
Director of the Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales (ICEFI) – confirm that such an assumption 
is indeed plausible and/or appropriate. 
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associated with increases in illiteracy over time. In this case, state density is statistically 
correlated with negative development results – only further undermining the premise of 
statebuilding for development in this instance. 
3.3 Global Test Three: Testing Against Chronic Hunger 
 Testing our same predictor variables against changes over time in chronic hunger 
rates only further undermines the basic premise that a transfer of state resources will 
benefit community health levels, at least from this more narrow proxy of health. Chronic 
hunger rates are based on government statistics that are the result of two different reports 
– the 2002 and 2009 Censo Nacional de Talla en Escolares de Primer Grado (or the 
second and third National Height Censuses of Primary School Students).  
Chronic hunger in these studies is measured by the severity of stunting (or height 
retardation) in schoolchildren between the ages of 6 and 11 years old. Stunting is 
determined by whether a student’s height falls below two standard deviations of the 
World Health Organization’s (WHO) recommended mean height for a given age. A 
student between two and three standard deviations below the mean is classified as 
suffering from “moderate” chronic hunger, while students with heights below three 
standard deviations are classified as suffering from “extreme” chronic huger.96 The 
national censuses report both cases, as well as a total level reported as a percentage of 
students per municipality. This is what is recorded in the database, and then separately 
                                                      
96 Chronic hunger, as implied, refers to sustained nutrient deficiency over time which results in stunting – 
or a negatively skewed height/age ratio. Acute hunger is the result of hunger emergencies that result from 
distribution breakdowns, or seasonal patterns that affect harvests and local supplies. It is more commonly 
measured by plummeting weight/age ratios, or weight/height ratios (so-called “wasting”). Some regions of 
Guatemala (including coffee growing regions and regions with two distinct growing seasons) are arguably 
more affected by acute hunger, though chronic hunger, as already discussed, is prevalent throughout 
Guatemala. Chronic hunger is discussed in more detail still in Chapters 4 and 5, when comparing 
experiences across case studies. 
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changes in reported percentages between reports were calculated with Stata, creating the 
variable “Cron_Hun_Diff.” I begin by regressing the same models against this new 
dependent variable (see Table 11). 
 
Table 11. Difference in Chronic Hunger (2002-2008) 
Predictor 
Variable 
Model 1 
(N=279) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Model 2 
(N=278) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Model 3 
(N=278) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Model 4 
(N=326) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Model 5 
(N=326) 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
log_SDI 2.362724* (1.286329) 
1.956537 
(1.305827)  
1.974551 
(1.234109) 
2.057491* 
(1.190307) 
Gasto_Mun -.0019976 (.0013256) 
-.0021079 
(.0013267) 
-.0020133 
(.0013282)   
 
 
Conf_Intens .0024055*  (.0012494) 
.0026269** 
(.0012544) 
.0027448** 
(.0012548) 
.0027783** 
(.0010797) 
-.0027659** 
(.0010771) 
Denperpop -169.8314*** (.51.45253) 
-166.0358*** 
(51.46353) 
-160.728*** 
(.51.45882) 
-180.5699*** 
(43.94241) 
-181.6888*** 
(43.66712) 
Elect_Align .4716094 (.7269776) 
.4320683 
(.7263941) 
.5565181 
(.723793)   
Elev  -.0002198* (.0001311) 
-.0002554 
(.0001292)   
Hom_Diff    .0062565 (.0241011)  
Constant 
F(df) 
-.13.53678 
5.86 (5) 
-11.37744 
5.36 (6) 
-5.355074 
5.96 (5) 
-12.54552 
7.14 (4) 
-12.76723 
9.52 (3) 
Adjusted R2  .0804 .0863 .0987 .0702 .0729 
  Note: p<.01***; p<.05*, p<.10* 
 
 
Though these regressions cannot capture the effects of the current Hambre Cero 
program under study in following chapters, myriad other government interventions were 
introduced in the period between the two hunger censuses – including Mi Famila 
Progressa (My Family Progresses, now Mi Bono Seguro), which was designed with the 
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express purpose of addressing childhood hunger, maternal health and school attendance – 
and the Bolsas Solidarias program (now Mi Bolsa Segura) which was a direct transfer of 
cash and basic foodstuffs directed at the poorest families.  
     
 
 
 
 
 
As indicated in the text box above (Figure 7), chronic hunger rates decreased on 
average by 7 percentage points in this age group, but significantly different experiences 
with chronic hunger, like development more broadly, have persisted across communities. 
As Table 11 illustrates, state density is inversely proportional to improvements in chronic 
hunger (the positive coefficient of SDI_2009, which is significant with 90 percent 
confidence in Models 1 and 5, suggest that an increase in one unit of state density is 
correlated with increased hunger rates of as much as 11 percent).97 Though I am careful 
to not draw causal inferences from these relationships, the above tests further underscore 
a persistent disconnect between state resources, state presence, and desirable public 
health outcomes, which is generally unexpected. 
Conflict intensity, again, is statistically correlated with those communities that have 
regressed, or which, more specifically, have had the most difficulty in tackling chronic 
hunger – possibly demonstrating the lingering influences of conflict intensity on social 
organization, and coordination for the purposes of development. Denuncias, for example 
                                                      
97 Not displayed is a model that drops electoral alignment. In this model, SDI_2009 has a coefficient of 
20.56 that is significant within a 94th percent confidence interval (p=.060). 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Cron_Hun_Diff 331 -7.05 5.83 -31.1 9.8 
 
Figure 7: Difference in Childhood Chronic Hunger Rates, 2001-2008 
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(which I argue reflect an element of social organization), are inversely related to conflict 
intensity from 30 years before, though this is not statistically significant, and this 
relationship is also weak (see Figure 8). More simply, however, it is likely that the most 
conflict-affected communities remain Guatemala’s most isolated, and marginalized, 
underscoring the country’s failed post-war reconstruction progress, even if open-conflict 
in no longer likely. 
 
 
 
 
 
Denuncias themselves are also statistically significant again (p<.01 in each of the 
models) and their effect is robust – with one additional denunciation per capita associated 
with a decrease in chronic hunger rates by as much as 180 percent (Table 11) – a 
surprising result that is now consistent across various human development indicators. 
3.4 Conclusions 
The quantitative component of this study serves an important function. First, it quite 
strongly suggests that state density has no bearing on local development outcomes, even 
as the state has expanded its development programming and expenditures. In some 
instances, state density appears to have a negative impact on local development 
outcomes. Though it is unlikely that increased state presences causes negative 
 
Denuncias_2012 Coef Std. Err t P>|t| 
Conf_Intens -.0098382 .0178614 -.55 0.582 
cons 84.55076 5.473345 15.45 0.000 
 
Figure 8: The Effect of Conflict Intensity on 2012 Denuncias: Bivariate 
Regression 
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development, the finding certainly underscores the limitations of the state on local 
development.98 
Local spending on social services, curiously, was also irrelevant. “Social services” are 
but a grab bag of potential projects ranging from water and sanitation projects to “gray” 
projects that include street surfacing and other small infrastructure projects. It is widely 
noted that small communities favor these latter types of projects which cost-effectively 
demonstrate “action” and “pro-development” thinking on the part of local mayors, even if 
their impact on well-being in the context of hunger and illiteracy is limited.99 The 
accuracy of reporting is also questionable, as the transparency of both local income and 
spending priorities could engender local protest. Assuming a relative degree of accuracy, 
however, then the utter lack of a correlation between local spending and development 
outcome forces further examination into what, more precisely, accounts for differences in 
development across similar communities. 
Finally, two factors that routinely demonstrate statistically significant, and often 
strong, positive influences on development outcomes – whether the broad spectrum HDI, 
illiteracy or hunger – are conflict intensity and the level of denunciations per population. 
In the case of conflict intensity, which has not been calculated at the municipal level 
before,100 the violence associated with the civil war clearly precedes contemporary 
development outcomes. Nevertheless the direction of causation is unclear, and its 
                                                      
98 Theoretically the relationship could be reflecting endogeneity, where the state is now present in those 
communities with the most need. Based on all accounts from development actors and analysts in 
Guatemala, however, this is highly unlikely. 2009 state density figures are more likely to reflect both past 
and current state densities per community, which are believed to be quite static overall.  
 
99 Interviews. 
 
100 Steinberg et al. (2003) did map massacre-events and municipios before drawing broad correlations. 
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influence is, speculatively, either direct – confirming the work of many that the civil war 
eroded civic capacity and long-term well-being – or indirect – correlated simply with 
what remain the most peripheral communities in Guatemala, which were among those 
agitating during the armed conflict. Even in the latter case, the robust relationship at the 
community level between conflict and development is striking, and starkly underscores 
the inequality that characterizes the country’s post-war development trajectory.  
The influence of denunciations is more puzzling. It is consistently significant, and at 
times correlated with positive development gains with incredibly strong effect. 
Denunciations, as noted earlier, are also not a response to local levels of violence, and are 
thus capturing other local dynamics. Though the quantitative analysis is unable to 
determine in what way, if any, denunciations relate to development, the consistent 
strength of the relationship does suggest that an element of community organization, or 
enfranchisement, at least facilitates conditions under which pro-poor development 
advances. Appendix F includes post-estimation tests for marginal effects, 
multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity per model, which were negative. Appendix G 
summarizes all variables. 
Alas, this chapter unearths dramatic relationships (and a lack of relationships) 
between key explanatory variables and multiple development indicators. The results are 
generally surprising and in principle eliminate the role of the state in explaining spatial 
variation in development. This alone forces further examination into what forces do 
influence good and bad outcomes. The following chapters utilize qualitative methods, 
discussed in detail, in order to more accurately determine what those factors are. First, 
however, the case studies are explored in detail.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: PROFILES IN GOVERNANCE OF SIX HIGHLAND 
COMMUNITIES AND DEVELOPMENT TRAJECTORIES 
 
This chapter details each of the six communities that form the basis of a qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA), which is expanded upon in Chapter 5. The six communities 
span three different but adjoining departments that collectively account for much of 
Guatemala’s “Western Highlands” – a mostly rural, indigenously populated region west 
of Guatemala City where towns and villages lie between elevations of 1500 and 3000 
meters. I profile two paired communities from each department – on the one hand 
accounting for ethno-linguistic differences over space (the communities span traditional 
K’iche, Kaqchiqel and Tz’utujil Maya territories), but on the other hand controlling for 
environmental and even macro-economic conditions that vary from the sugar and palm 
plantations of the coastal lowlands to export-oriented industry near Guatemala City (See 
Figure 4.1). The highlands economy, outside of the urban centers of Quetzaltenango and 
Sololá, and some tourism near Lake Atitlán, is dominated by subsistence milpa 
farming101 and some forestry. There is some coffee cultivation near the lake as well. 
Tourism and coffee in some ways impact two of the communities under investigation, in 
Sololá department, distinguishing them from the more remote communities of Quiché 
and Totonicapán where subsistence dominates. The implications of this are discussed in 
                                                      
101 Traditional corn farming, endowed with elements of spirituality and Mayan mysticism as well. 
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more detail when analyzing the QCA in Chapter 5. The paper proceeds first with a case 
selection discussion.  
4.1 Case Selection 
The six communities were initially chosen from afar, based on the earliest available 
data, gathered remotely, reflecting variation in development and after attempting to 
control for obvious factors that might explain such discrepancies (see Table 12). I first 
controlled for elevation, for example, by including only highlands communities that 
varied in their respective heights above sea level within one standard deviation.102 
Elevation can drastically affect climactic and thus growing conditions over a short 
distance in Guatemala, which could possibly be reflected in health or living condition 
indicators.  
 
Table 12. Initial Selection Criteria, Summary 
Location (elev in ft) HDI (2005) SDI (2009) Δ Health HDI (2000-2005) 
Sololá Department 
Santa Catarina Palopó 
(5456) 
.504 .15 -.26 
San Pablo la Laguna (6861) .506 .22 +.45 
Totonicapán Department 
Santa María Chiquimula 
(6975) .380 .16 -.024 
Santa Lucía la Reforma 
(6013) .427 .16 +.118 
Quiché Department 
Patzité (7545) .489 .16 -.453 
Zacualpa (4875) .494 .21 +.083 
 
 
                                                      
102 Based on 333 individual observations, the country’s mean elevation is 4197.141 feet above sea level 
(ranging from 0 – 10,898 feet) with a standard deviation of 2690.849 feet. The spread between the highest 
(Patzité) and lowest (Zacualpa) communities selected is 2,670 feet, or just within one standard deviation.  
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This paper does not intend to diminish the daily struggles or difficult experiences of 
lowland Guatemalan communities, which indeed are increasingly precarious, but it is the 
highland communities under study here that struggle most with poverty and chronic 
hunger. As the Guatemala’s Third National Height Census (2009: 10) notes, the three 
departments that are represented in this study – Sololá, Quiché and Totonicapán – are the 
worst perfomring in the country overall, with rates of chronic hunger, for example, that 
affect in excess of 60 percent of schoolchildren.103 One community profiled below, Santa 
María Chiquimula, reports a staggering rate of 75.5 percent. 
Despite the findings from Chapter Three, “state density” is controlled for as well. I 
again limit the spread between lowest and highest to within one standard deviation.104 
Though it is already clear that there is no correlation between development outcomes and 
state density in Guatemala, I nevertheless wanted to minimize the possibility of its 
influence in the case studies, and in order to more robustly compare across only the most 
“similar” communities.  
Finally, communities were chosen that vary across the dependent variable (human 
development, as initially indicated by 2005 HDI scores at the municipality level). Based 
on initial data, I chose communities that ranged from high to medium to low. In an effort 
to control based on the criteria above, however, several communities were rejected 
because, despite low state density and unusually high HDI scores, they were either tourist 
destinations, regional economic hubs, or communities well populated by wealthier North 
                                                      
103 Quiché (63.9%), Sololá (65.2%), and Totonicapán (69.4%) are listed as suffering from “very high” rates 
of chronic hunger officially. 	  
104 State Density (or the SDI_2009 variable) ranges from .11 to .75 (based on 331 observations) with a 
mean of .218 and a standard deviation of .079. The spread between San Pablo la Laguna (.22) and Santa 
Catarina Polopó (.15) is .07. 
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American ex-patriots near Lake Atitlán (or all three). After finding 1994 HDI scores, also 
reported at the municipal level, I used the difference in HDI scores over time as a more 
robust criterion for determining variation in my dependent variable (Table 12). 
 
 
Figure 9. Guatemala Field Site Locations 
 
Despite careful efforts to control across communities as best as possible, however, the 
two Lake Atitlán communities arguably benefit in absolute terms from access to 
resources and services (as indicated by higher HDI scores, and later, by performance in 
combating hunger). This is likely because of their proximity to tourist destinations and 
local economic hubs.105 I separately try to control for this phenomenon as well, however, 
by dividing the six communities into three nested pairs – or two communities from each 
department, but which themselves diverge with respect to development outcomes – 
                                                      
105 Santa Catarina Polopó, on the east side of the Lake, is only a 15 minute pick-up drive away from 
Panajachel, a popular tourist destination with far more services and income generation than most lakeside 
communities. San Pablo la Laguna, on the west side of the Lake, is far grittier, remote, and poorer 
compared to other lake communities, but is nevertheless a cheap tuk-tuk ride away from San Pedro, another 
regional tourist hub and source of employment. Coffee is also a source of income for Magueyense (what 
San Pablo residents call themselves, based on a local plant that grows only around their town) – a cash crop 
mostly unavailable to the other communities under study. 
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providing both a regional-geographical control while continuing to get variation across 
the dependent variable. 
After sorting through the selection criteria discussed above, six communities are 
isolated that fall within each of the parameters. The result is a collection of case studies 
(Figure 7) that, despite their similar elevations and low state densities, have very different 
development outcomes according to initial data (Table 12). This chapter profiles each 
community, with a special focus on levels of social discord, the role of informal actors in 
each community and, more generally, the state of local governance for development. 
4.2 Profiles in Governance: Santa María Chiquimula, Totonicapán 
Santa María Chiquimula (SMC) is located at 6975 feet (2100 meters) above sea level 
in the interior of Totonicapán Department – a remote and infrequently visited region with 
a population 98% indigenous (K’iché Mayan). Though it has a population of 35,000, it is 
one of the larger municipios area-wise (211 km2) and is therefore largely rural, apart from 
a mostly sleepy urban core where the Spanish-built Cathedral dominates the landscape, 
and where the municipal offices are located. SMC is both one of the poorest communities 
in Guatemala and one of the “hungriest,” making it in essence one of the communities 
most affected by chronic hunger in the entire Western hemisphere. 
In SMC, or “Chiquimula” as locals frequently abbreviate it, social discord is 
increasing, with profound implications. It stems, according to interviews, from two 
principle sources: newly generated sectarian religious divisions, and political divisions, or 
divisions between party affiliates vying for mostly local offices, and subsequent control 
of state-dispersed resources, from money to seeds. Chiquimula is somewhat unique 
among my cases in that these two drivers of social discord overlap. The locally dominant 
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Unidad Nacional de Esperanza party (National Unity of Hope party, or UNE) and its 
leaders are generally Evangelical Protestant, while the affiliates of the President’s party, 
Patriota (or PP), remain loyal to the more traditional Catholic church. 
 
  
Figure 10. Map of Santa María Chiquimula Municipality (as published by USAID as part of a local Peace 
Corps Project) 
 
Evangelical Christianity has been steadily gaining in popularity in Guatemala for 
decades, according to some thanks to a systematic campaign of recruitment that 
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capitalized on mass communication and entertainment, if tinkering with doctrine in the 
process (McClearly and Pesina 2011, Kevin O’Neill 2010, Schultze 1992). Evangelical 
Christianity has itself been divided from within, however, between Pentecostals and 
“Neo-Pentecostals.” Though the division among traditional and new religious sects is the 
most obvious, multiple interview participants volunteered that emerging splits between 
Evangelical sects have created tensions between families and the community as a whole 
as well.  The overlap with political identity, it was regularly affirmed, exacerbates these 
divisions, and has contributed to increasingly tense community relations and an inability 
to collectively address community concerns. 
For example, several community events organized by the “Muni” (short hand 
terminology for the municipal authorities, which in essence is dominated by the mayor  
and his closest compatriots), were intentionally skipped by some families. These people 
were less motivated by making a political statement, however, as they were simply 
unwilling to associate with people with different religious practices. This practice has 
since extended to more mundane events – from community celebrations to sporting 
events – that are otherwise apolitical.  The Muni, in turn, has increasingly monopolized 
the political process of decision-making as best it can.  
Formerly influential figures, historically - from alcaldes comunitarios (village 
mayors), the respective COCODES of different villages, long-standing NGOs with a 
development focus, and even the Tzolojche, or council of elders – have had their power 
either systematically usurped by the Muni’s “power of purse,” or have been steadily 
squeezed out of the decision-making process. The Muni, itself, and potential jobs in its 
various offices, are used increasingly for patronage and to empower family members and 
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political supporters at the expense of merit-based practices. One Muni worker I 
interviewed was asked to either leave his post, or pay what amounted to several month’s 
salary. He was ultimately replaced by a family friend of the Mayor’s, with less education 
and experience, according to several witnesses. Meanwhile, the most prominent local 
NGO, which had been running a successful maternal education program with help from 
the Muni, was bypassed in favor of the Mayor’s daughter, who was given an ad-hoc title 
and responsibility for the Muni’s own maternal health program.  
Though patronage in local government is common and generally unsurprising, the 
increasingly delimited battle lines drawn in SMC have disintegrated traditional patterns 
of governance by disempowering formerly influential figures, traditional authorities, and 
even the legal systems of decentralization, like the COCODES, designed intentionally to 
empower citizen influence over development governance. The result is a Muni that 
resembles a mini authoritarian, or “cult of personality” regime, in which dissent is rather 
nakedly met with retribution, sometime violent, but more frequently through exclusion. 
Underscoring the tensions that exist within SMC, and further undermining 
development governance at the local level, key social welfare offices that had been 
overseen by the Muni have since been “captured” by Patriota officials, and programs are 
now administered unilaterally by a single political party rather than by the local 
government. Following Patriota’s electoral loss in SMC in 2011, but simultaneously 
bolstered by the party’s presidential victory, the Ministry of Social and Economic 
Development (MIDES), and agricultural development ministry (MAGA), in particular, 
moved their respective headquarters from the municipal building to different corners of 
the town.  According to unanimous feedback from citizens in subsequent focus groups, 
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basic resources designated for the neediest, and hungriest, families are systematically 
distributed with the express purpose of vote-buying and an anti-mayor smear campaign.  
Finally, several focus group participants argued that new disparities in income, 
largely the result of uneven access to remittances, were further complicating social 
divisions in Chiquimula. Newly “prominent” families, and even former residents living 
abroad, were said to be using money to influence politics and decisions regarding where 
to upgrade roads or access to electricity. On a more basic level, new three-story mansions 
with opulent edifices now tower over huts that house large families with few resources. 
In contrast to the deep social divisions, Chiquimula arguably has a robust civil 
society, at least on the surface. The Development Association of Santa María Chiquimula 
(ADESMA), for example, is now twenty years old. The Paroquía runs a popular school, 
is well staffed by dedicated Spanish volunteers, and runs its own maternal health and 
anti-hunger program.106 Separately, village elders had only one year earlier openly 
chastised state officials for their mishandling of a direct transfer program.107 When I 
asked the director of ADESMA to list all the organizations that worked in SMC with the 
purpose of improving social welfare, she penned a list of over 15 organizations. 
But as ADESMA’s own experience demonstrates, the mere existence of different 
organizations does not constitute a strong civil society. ADESMA itself had been unable 
to find a new foreign donor after the former director was accused of mismanagement and 
corruption. It currently glides on the faintest of resources, running a small micro-loans 
program, while its core work, including women’s empowerment, has been steadily 
                                                      
106 It was through this program that I was able to visit the more remote aldeas. 
 
107 “Gobiernos indígenas contra alcaldes electos en Totonicapán,” El Periodico, 
http://www.elperiodico.com.gt/es/20120725/pais/215555/ (accessed 7/2013) 
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usurped by the Muni, or has been discarded altogether given limited resources. Other 
organizations have since folded, or exist only on paper. Finally, the local indigenous 
leaders are struggling to find traction among the young (in a country experiencing a 
massive youth bubble), and are increasingly squeezed out by the political parties and their 
money, which dominates all decision-making.108 Thus SMC’s civil society, despite its 
proximity to Totonicapán’s capital, and the highly visible 48 Cantones,109 is minimal, and 
ineffective at either mobilizing citizens, or influencing key decisions. 
Finally, Santa María clearly does not demonstrate state-local complementarity. Its 
internal divisions, authoritative local government, and now the fallout of the 2011 
elections which resulted in Patriota-staffed social welfare offices breaking from, and 
actively working against local authorities, has obliterated state-society relations. At the 
same time, the diminishing influence of traditional authorities – succumbing to youth 
disinterest, limited funds, and the pull of Evangelism, in particular – has negated the most 
likely opportunity for coherent, coordinated protest of patronage and dysfunctional 
governance of development. 
                                                      
108 Unofficially, a young, energetic local youth had managed to begin studying political science in 
Quetzaltenango, several hours away. On weekends, he was running a civic leadership course for teenage 
boys and girls from the region, and was receiving support and guidance from an influential former 
president of the 48 Cantones – the well-financed and capable group centered in Totonicapán, but which had 
failed to captivate their fellow K’iché in Chiquimula. As the former president explained to me with a wink, 
he was in essence grooming the young man for Mayor, and the would-be start of a revolution from within 
that would take back politics for the people, and for the indigenous.  
 
109 The 48 Cantones deTotonicapán is the highly visible and well-organized indigenous group based in 
Totonicapán’s capital city. They have national clout, and made international news after some members 
were shot in a protest in October 2012. But as discussed elsewhere, they have not been effective at 
improving development outcomes closer to home. 
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4.3 Profiles in Governance: Santa Lucia la Reforma, Totonicapán 
Santa Lucía la Reforma (SLR) is located at 6013 feet above sea level (1833 meters) in 
Totonicapán department, though its urban center is more easily reached from the 
department capital of El Quiché and, given difficult travel, is on the one hand tied more 
to Quiché than to the other communities in Toto. However, Santa Lucía is still rather 
remote, and was in fact once part of Santa María Chiquimula municipio itself, and thus 
shares much in terms of historical, cultural and even familial ties with neighboring 
Chiquimula – making this nested pair a particularly compelling case. 
In fact, several participants in SMC interviews wondered aloud why smaller Santa 
Lucía, a rugged four-hour pick-up truck drive away from SMC’s center, despite 
bordering one another, was doing “better” than SMC. They had heard that people in need 
there were getting important help, that government was responsive, or at least more so, 
and that conditions were improving. It was hard to know what sort of credibility to give 
such accounts. But despite higher rates of poverty (an astounding 94.5% according to the 
latest figures, versus 87.5% in SMC), extreme poverty (55.4%, versus 35% in SMC), and 
equal rates of state density (a very low .16), Santa Lucía has outstripped its neighbor in 
every development metric besides income – whether illiteracy, infant mortality, HDI 
scores, chronic hunger and even homicides. This has occurred, moreover, despite it 
recording four times as many victims of conflict and violence during the civil war (a 
statistically significant drag on development as demonstrated in Chapter 3), and more 
recently, spending half as much (officially) on social services per inhabitant than its 
neighbor.  
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These two communities alone underscore the puzzle under investigation, and so I 
took the more reliable, if nevertheless touch-and-go option of a bus from SMC to Cuatro 
Caminos, another to Totonicapán’s city center, another through its sacred forests and over 
mountain passes on the landslide-prone road to Santa Cruz del Quiché, and finally 
another micro-bus – jammed to the gills as always – into Santa María’s town square.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Totonicapán Department, scanned from Guatemala's National Geographic Institute. Note the 
prximity of Santa María Chiquimula and Santa Lucía la Reforma (center and top right) 
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After a series of interviews with the heads of each different government ministry 
represented in town,110 Church leaders, indigenous leaders from around the municipio 
fortuitously gathered in the center, the municipal Mayor himself, and finally after 
participating in a monthly meeting111 organized by the mayor as part of his 
responsibilities under Hambre Cero – the anti-hunger program discussed more in Chapter 
Five – which included civil society members, it is clear that SLR is indeed operating 
under different conditions than Chiquimula.  
Several different experiences during my visits indicate that SLR experiences far less 
social discord than SMC. In all of my interviews, participants described how they were 
working in conjunction with other offices in order to accomplish specific targets. In a 
contentious meeting between village leaders, organized ahead of the main market day and 
the monthly COMUSAN meeting with the Mayor and others, leaders hammered out their 
position regarding certain policies, and their respective roles in each community vis-à-vis 
state actors.  
More telling, both the mayor and village leaders described cordial relations, but also 
relative independence from one another, compared with SMC where the Mayor had 
cowed village leaders in his effort to secure his authority.  
Finally, the mayor, and separately the lead Hambre Cero coordinator, Roni Morales, 
described very similar experiences in working hard to actively bridge the gap between 
traditional church followers and the emerging Pentecostal movement that had permeated 
                                                      
110 MIDES, MAGA, and El Comité Nacional de Alfabetización (CONALFA, the National Literacy 
Committee). 
 
111 La Comisión de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional, COMUSAN, is held monthly and chaired by the 
Mayor in each community that receives Hambre Cero assistance. SMC held COMUSAN meetings as well, 
but I was consistently told that the Mayor dominated events and resisted outside input. As I will discuss 
later, COMUSAN meetings are not regularly held in other communities.  
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even remote Santa Lucía. Cuesta, each told me separately, cuesta mucho… “It’s been 
very challenging”… “But,” the mayor added, “there really is no other option.” 
It is important to note that the mayor of Santa Lucía is affiliated with Patriota, and so 
no conflict arises between those running Hambre Cero, for instance, and local 
government, as exists in Chiquimula. In fact a large banner covered the second story of 
the municipal offices during my visit, celebrating the mayor’s administration and 
declaring him “The Mayor that Works for His People” (El Alcalde que Trabaja por Su 
Pueblo), with a photo of the mayor and the President in one corner. Given the degree to 
which political parties have exacerbated tensions in Chiquimula, as well as in other 
communities, this factor should not be diminished. At the same time, however, the 
Totonicapán departmental director of SESAN,112 while acknowledging the challenges he 
faces in coordinating events community-to-community, cites SLR as by far the 
community in which Hambre Cero had been best received, and where it is making the 
most impact.  
Indeed, key differences exist between Chiquimula and SLR. Though the number and 
influence of locally-based organizations is limited in both places, as is the role of elders 
or indigenous organizations, alcaldes comunitarios in SLR are active and invested in 
development questions. Alcaldes comunitarios are semi-formal village leaders, from the 
aldeas, that represent local interests before the mayor. In one meeting, they discussed 
exactly how best to work with the local Hambre Cero coordinator in order to identify 
crisis situations, and the families most in need. In another, the local director of RENAP, 
or the government entity in charge of registering citizens and issuing new IDs (that are 
                                                      
112 La Secretaría de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional de la Presidencial de la República (SESAN) 
oversees Hambre Cero. 
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then used for voting as well), visited the alcaldes and implored them (a truly astounding 
site after a month in Chiquimula and Toto) for their help in mobilizing citizens, 
alleviating people’s fears, and even helping arrange transportation to the office where 
they were digitizing registrations and issuing new identification cards. In subsequent 
interviews, it was clear that this was an established role of the alcaldes, who had already 
been bringing people to the local health clinic for vaccinations and ante-natal checkups, 
and working with state officials in order to build trust. 113 
 
 
Figure 12.  Variation in Total Poverty Levels in Totonicapán (Source: UNDP Guatemala) 
                                                      
113 For the sake of transparency and full disclosure, I should also note that, while they were in attendance at 
the COMUSAN meeting, several were very intoxicated, even by 9 am, and were admonished by the Mayor 
and others for their poor judgment – a reality check before over-romanticizing their influence. They were, 
whether reluctantly or not, nevertheless seen as key agents in SLR.  
 
 
124 
 
 
In stark contrast to Chiquimula, Santa Lucía illustrates a version of state-local 
complementarity. Both Mayor Don Francisco, and Roni Morales, the central 
government’s representative, remarked separately that they have been actively working in 
order build trust and identify key obstacles to implementation.114 The mayor, who again 
is Patriota affiliated, dismisses the idea that the state is an object of distrust in his 
community, or to be avoided, despite its history of violence during the conflict and more 
recent arrests made in the area for marijuana production. He identified, instead, three 
contemporary threats to community cohesiveness and effective governance, including 
sectarian divisions, political party rivalries and comités, or ad-hoc groups that organize 
around single-issues in an uncoordinated fashion. Both the mayor and Roni underscored 
the hard work it has taken to try to overcome community divisions, or respond to the 
more obstinate local actors. Other state actors, meanwhile – from MAGA and 
CONALFA – described a “development-oriented” mayor who had their best interests in 
mind, and who was generally supportive of their respective missions.115 
The CONALFA representative, for example (who was in fact from Chiquimula 
originally), argues that, despite the influence of churches, and no obvious influence by 
principals (traditional elders), the community’s well-grounded Maya tradition of 
“service” (voluntario institucionál) partly permitted more congenial relations in SLR. 
While this concept had frayed in neighboring Chiquimula, he asserted that its influence 
remained intact in SLR. 
                                                      
114 Based on interviews (October 10th and 11th, 2013) 
 
115 Interviews (October 9, 2013) 
 
 
125 
 
Crucially, not everything is perfect. Two of ten villages in the municipio had refused 
CONALFA’s overtures, and the administrator lamented being unable to set up his 
programs there. Arguably, this is a state failure to penetrate remote corners of its 
territory. On the other hand, the representative told me that, without the support of the 
local leaders, it was meaningless for him to impose himself. This echoes my experience in 
a meeting of the village mayors described earlier, in which the RENAP representative 
pleaded for their assistance in mobilizing people in order to register, and to coordinate 
transportation (an obvious constraint in the rural, rugged countryside). This degree of 
deference to local authorities is highly unusual and highlights differences in de facto 
governance practice across two neighboring communities.116 
Finally, in the COMUSAN meeting several days later, the mayor and Roni spoke at 
length, as did many others about their respective challenges, while the village leaders sat 
in attendance, making occasional comments. The meeting was conducted in Spanish and 
K’iché, interchangeably (not simultaneously). The key agenda item was how to make 
Hambre Cero useful to the locals, by addressing questions of literacy and accessibility. In 
this setting, the most traditional, informal actors were in the background, and had no 
observable influence over decision-making and implementation (though the semi-formal 
role of local leaders was highlighted in the meeting as crucial on separate occasions). In 
comparison to the other communities, state actors in SLR are deferring to local wishes 
and working thoughtfully through local interlocutors in unprecedented ways. 
                                                      
116 In the COMUSAN meeting several days later, however, the CONALFA representative was taken to task 
for not doing more to include these communities in his campaign, which on the other hand demonstrates 
the unusually high motivation on the part of the governance actors in the room to make positive impacts. 
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4.4 Profiles in Governance: Zacualpa, El Quiché 
Zacualpa (4875 feet, or 1485 meters, above sea level) is located in the southern flank 
of the department of El Quiché. In a sense, it is rather easily reached by bus from the 
regional capital of Santa Cruz. Its legacy, however, is one of tragedy. During the civil 
war, the army was very active in bombing the hills between Zacualpa and neighboring 
Joyabaj in an effort to demolish rebel hideouts. The army also commandeered Zacualpa’s 
church grounds, converting them into a detainment and torture center, while 
unceremoniously dumping the bodies of victims into the church’s wells. The church 
today is in part a shrine to the many victims. 
Zacualpa also represents the most divisive community in my study. It is here that an 
angry mob attempted to burn down the municipal building after the current mayor, Sr. 
Ernesto Calachij, won a contentious third term in 2011. Even before this incident, 
tensions turned into violence when pro-mayor and Patriota supporters openly clashed in 
the streets of this otherwise out-of-the way and quiet community, resulting in burned cars 
and many injured.117 On my visit, many interview participants quietly noted that 
unreported incidents of retribution stemming from the election-related violence have 
taken place. Meanwhile the Patriota candidate at the time has since been jailed and 
convicted for his role in the torture and murder of two opponents, who were also 
COCODE members.118 
 
                                                      
117 http://elperiodico.com.gt/es/20110310/pais/192181  and http://www.prensalibre.com.gt/noticias/Turba-
quema-edificio-edil_0_553744644.html (accessed September 2013).  
 
118 http://www.prensalibre.com.gt/noticias/justicia/Condenan-prision-excandidato-alcalde-
Zacualpa_0_860914131.html (accessed October 2013). 
 
 
 
127 
 
 
Figure 13. Quiché Department, with field site locations identified (Source: Scanned from National 
Geographic Institute) 
 
Zacualpa municipio, 
with its urban center 
located at the 
bottom. 
Patzité 
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These overt and headline-grabbing events have largely given way to more subtle and 
daily acts of criminality that underscore the divisions plaguing Zacualpa. A religious 
leader from the Catholic Church – whose cathedral faces the Muni across the square in a 
seemingly symbolic squaring off of opposing camps – described how she and others from 
the paroquía have been stopped by machete-wielding thugs when traveling through 
communities widely known to be “pro-Mayor.”119 Her consistent and outspoken position 
on what she perceived to be abuse of authority by the mayor has, in essence, made her 
persona non grata in “pro-mayor” territory. The Church’s subsequent efforts to support 
schools in certain aldeas have been rejected by COCODES under the thumb of the 
mayor. She further accused the mayor of violently replacing the staff of certain 
government offices with his supporters, and actively drawing battle lines between those 
aldeas that supported him electorally, and those that did not – depriving the “opposition” 
aldeas of basic resources. Finally, she accused the mayor of recruiting enforcers through 
his network of former PAC120 colleagues, further dividing the community along lines that 
evoke the civil war, which resulted in over 600 casualties here and egregious human 
rights abuses. She concluded our lengthy interview – which was a tragic litany of stories 
demonstrating the community’s current turmoils – succinctly: “our social fabric (tejido 
social) is broken.” 
I witnessed many of these phenomena myself on trips to surrounding aldeas. People 
in the Muni, other than the Mayor, were also surprisingly forthcoming about how only 
select communities were privy to assistance, and how the Muni’s relationship with 
                                                      
119 Interview with Sister Ana María Alvarez Lopez (October 15, 2013). 
 
120 Patrullas de Autodefensas Civiles (PACs, or “civil defense patrols”) were utilized by the army during 
the civil war in order to recruit supporters within communities, and in order to divide communities, 
weakening rebels and diluting their base of support.  
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Patriota and government offices like MIDES and MAGA were cantankerous, if not 
downright toxic.121   
 
Figure 14. Variation in Total Poverty In Quiché Department. Note: Zacualpa and Pachalum are mislabled, 
and reversed in this image. 
 
Finally, I watched as poor families lined up outside the MIDES office on the outskirts 
of Zacualpa’s center, receiving their basic bonos (basic transfers of rice, beans and 
                                                      
121 This is based on multiple interviews with various Zacualpense Muni staff, especially in the Women’s 
Office (OMM), and subsequently confirmed by the workers in each government office, who confirmed that 
relations with the mayor were very bad (October 2013).  
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Incanparina122). Multiple people from the neighborhood confirmed that these were 
Patriota supporters/supported, who could never expect assistance from the Muni. 
Nowhere that I had visited in Guatemala, or would visit yet, were social divisions so 
obviously entrenched, daily, and openly acknowledged.  
Zacualpa, like Chiquimula, has a superficially robust civil society. Small NGOs, like 
ASODINZA123 or ASODEZA,124 work independently to provide resources to farmers and 
water to citizens respectively. Others, however, have become part of the wider schism 
that affects the community. People at ADIZ,125 for example, which works throughout El 
Quiché but has its headquarters in Zacualpa, told me that “the doors at the Muni are 
closed to us – they want nothing to do with us.” What they did not tell me initially was 
that its director had run for mayor and lost, assuring its place as opposition. In contrast, 
trips to aldeas organized by the Woman’s Office126 were funded by NutriSalud127 and 
USAID. These groups are independent but rely on local interlocutors to help disseminate 
their maternal health education package, which includes a video and presentation. The 
OMM, openly hostile to communities seen as in opposition to Mayor Calachij,128 
provided the local Nutri-Salud coordinator the means with which to reach rural hamlets. 
                                                      
122 A cheap high-protein food made of cottonseed, sorghum flours, maize, yeast, etc. used to prevent 
protein-deficiency diseases. See: http://www.incaparina.com/  
 
123 Asociacion de Desarrollo Intergral Zacaulpense 
 
124 Asociacion  de Desarrollo de Zacualpa 
 
125 Asociacion de Desarrollo Integral Zacualpenese 
 
126 Oficina de la Mujer (OMM) 
 
127 http://www.urc-chs.com/news?newsItemID=295 
 
128 In multiple interviews with the OMM director, I was candidly told that the Mayor’s office, and its 
resources, won’t be wasted on ungrateful communities. “If they won’t help us, then why should we help 
them,” she told me in English (she lived in Rhode Island for 10 years).  
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The OMM then invited additional groups, like ACOMQUI (or the Quiché Association of 
Comudronas, or birthing assistants) to attend and nominally support the program.  
The program itself was deftly run by a young Nutri-Salud coordinator, and was both 
well attended and engaging. But separately the program became a mini-rally for the 
mayor, his party, and even his church, and of course actively excluded the participation 
of some community members. The mayor made a surprise visit to one presentation, 
extolling his administration, party and even his evangelical church (though he also made 
a point to present and welcome me). 
Though partly inadvertent, some local civil society groups had hitched their wagon to 
the mayor’s and are now perceived as being on one side of the divide that increasingly 
divides the community. More remotely, even well-regarded, internationally funded NGOs 
and aid agencies, despite sophisticated monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems, are 
funding a campaign of political division and exclusion at the local level.  
Finally, though Zacualpa does have an alcadía indígena, with headquarters only 
blocks from the Muni, its influence is limited and generally relegated to questions of 
culture and identity, not development policy or distribution of resources. También, 
también, the distinguished elder who is the current Alacdía Indígena told me – “we also 
do that” – when I asked if the Alcadía concerned itself with hunger, or poverty, or 
worked with the COCODES.129 But in the villages themselves, people mostly smiled at 
my naïveté, and explained that, “sure we have an alcadía…but this is not what he’s 
for…he cannot affect these matters…” 
 
                                                      
129 June 2013 interviews. 
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Figure 15. Zacualpa Municipality Map with Local Field Sites Identified (Source: Scanned from map at city 
offices) 
 
Nowhere in this study are the relations between state actors and local government 
officials so transparently toxic. As the local MIDES official told me, “Zacualpa is slowly 
dying because of the mayor.” “The mayor and his reign of terror are causing a sickness.” 
She went on to claim harassment, including death threats, and having been shut out of 
visiting certain communities by the mayor’s supporters. Other government officials were 
not quite as vitriolic, but acknowledged the deadlock. Meanwhile it is clear that Patriota, 
for its part, actively smears the mayor and has stirred the pot, though it is unclear whether 
it is responsible for directly organizing violent protests. 
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Development, meanwhile, outside minor improvements at the health clinic,130 is 
virtually at a standstill in Zacualpa. There are informal actors – including madres guías 
and comudronas (birthing assistants that have slowly gained additional training in recent 
years)131 – contributing to maternal and infant health in the remotest aldeas. But they do 
not coordinate in any fashion with state actors. 
Alas, Zacualpa is void of the complementarity that permeated state-society relations 
in SLR. Its development trajectory, on paper, is positive, but outside the city center, 
hunger and poverty remains widespread. Arguably, incremental increases in health 
service in rural areas, including those by informal actors like traditional midwives, have 
had some impact. More likely, according to interviews both from within and outside 
Zacualpa, is that a somewhat famous influx of remittances to Zacaulpa has bolstered 
livelihoods in and around the city center.132 Indeed, Zacualpa appears on the surface more 
prosperous than either Chiquimula or SLR. But given this prosperity, then, development 
indicators are remarkably low. Governance-for-development, meanwhile, is non-existent. 
                                                      
130 This is based on interviews with physicians at the local clinic (October 18, 2013). They acknowledge 
modest improvements in Zacualpa thanks to improved staffing in the most rural puestos de salud (health 
outposts), increased awareness amongst young mothers, and improved vaccination rates. They largely 
credit previous central governments for these changes and try to stay mostly aloof from local political 
dynamics.   
 
131 A local NGO – La Asociacion de Comudronas de Quiché – has trained 152 birthing assistants over the 
last 12 years, and work with village leaders to convince them to accept their presence. They claim to have 
improved conditions for young mothers and infants in the countryside. They do not, however, coordinate 
with any state actors (October 16, 2013 interviews). 
 
132 Interviewees with policymakers and academics in Guatemala City were aware of Zacualpa because of a 
perception that it has prospered, in a relative sense, especially through remittances. The effects of large 
flows of remittances on northern communities in El Quiché – mostly negative by encouraging household 
debt – is discussed by anthropologist David Stoll in El Norte or Bust (2013). 
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4.5 Profiles in Governance: Patzité, El Quiché 
Patzité, at a temperate 7545 feet above sea level (2300 meters), is an obscure 
destination for visitors in southern El Quiché department, located down bumpy secondary 
roads that climb slowly out of the regional capital of Santa Cruz. It largely avoided the 
worst of the civil war, but unlike nearby communities, like Chichicastenango in 
particular, neither traditional forms of leadership nor indigenous identity play a 
significant role in local politics. Here, the more formal system of COCODES is intact and 
influential, while the mayor’s office dominates.   
This small community has rather quietly grappled with its development questions in 
isolation. In a nested pair with Zacualpa, Patzité would initially appear to be the 
underperformer, with a precipitous drop in its reported HDI scores from the late 1990s to 
2005. But a more systematic look across a suite of indicators muddies the waters. On the 
one hand, Patzité has historically better education indicators (including the disaggregated 
HDI education indicator, as well as better illiteracy numbers, and improvements in 
illiteracy over time). On the other hand, it has higher chronic hunger rates (74.7% versus 
57.4% in Zacualpa), but with much greater improvements in hunger over time (-6.8% 
versus -1.4% in Zacualpa), and far superior infant mortality rates (18 per 100,000 versus 
38 in Zacualpa).  
After surveying more obscure indicators from Guatemala’s National Statistics 
Institute (INE), the development landscape shifts more in favor of Patzité. Despite 
potable water being the hallmark of the Calachij administration in Zacualpa,133 for 
                                                      
133 The Mayor mentioned potable water to me on several occasions as proof that he puts development first 
in his community, citing several projects that he spearheaded. 
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example, far more houses in Zacualpa report lacking permanent access to plumbing than 
in Patzité. These differences occur, moreover, despite almost identical poverty and 
extreme poverty rates between the two communities. Similarly, over three times as many 
houses in Zacualpa report lacking any form of permanent facility for the “disposal of 
excrement.” Finally, the more holistic indicator of “unsatisfied basic needs,” a composite 
index of well-being intended to capture subnational variation in access to basic resources 
(Hyman 2006), is far greater in Zacualpa (83.24 versus 69.33) than in Patzité. Thus in 
most respects, Patzité has demonstrated more robust development performance over the 
last decade.  
Interviews with different actors134 – from the mayor and his volunteer committee 
members to health workers, the justice of peace, and central government actors among 
others – were generally positive about the direction of the most basic programs, even if 
most acknowledged significant challenges still. Though the mayor, when asked, hinted at 
the possibility of periodic political wrangling, most other interview participants 
diminished the influence of political conflict on their respective work. After my time in 
Zacualpa, this was somewhat surprising, especially since the mayor in Patzité is affiliated 
with the UNE party, like Chiquimula’s mayor, rather than Patriota. Overall, despite 
somewhat inevitable tensions between political parties, Patzité has avoided the deep 
social divisions that plague Zacualpa and Chiquimula. 
Relative to these communities in fact, Patzité appears remarkably “development-
oriented,” with a mayor and council seemingly dedicated to improving the conditions of 
local people – with a particular focus on education. But there is limited evidence of 
                                                      
134  November 2013. 
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complementarity as seen in SLR. Emblematic of a more typical disconnect between state 
resources and local needs is the arrival of a used ambulance to the local clinic, but 
inadequate fuel keeps it grounded most days. As well, in interviews with MIDES and 
MINEDUC (Ministry of Education), staff were reluctant but nevertheless hinted at 
tension between their offices and the mayor’s. However, the regional director of SESAN 
in Santa Cruz views Patzité very favorably compared to Zacualpa with respect to his 
efforts at implementing Hambre Cero. In interviews he noted that, despite the Mayor of 
Patzité being from another party, he, himself, is able to work with the mayor effectively 
to help implement Hambre Cero – though I did not witness the active, and purposeful 
degree of cooperation as is evident in SLR. Separately, the director of CORSADEC,135 a 
Guatemalan NGO active in the region, also spoke well of Patzité’s mayor, and his general 
support for CORSADEC programs, and the development trajectory of Patzité more 
generally. But explicit cooperation with, or the use of, local, informal interlocutors by 
either state actors or NGOs is done on only an ad-hoc basis, if at all. 
4.6 Profiles in Governance: Santa Catarina Palopó, Sololá 
Santa Catarina Palopó, or SCP hereafter, is a beautiful village sandwiched between 
steep hillsides and Lake Atitlán, in the department of Sololá (5456 feet or 1663 meters). 
It is a very small, sleepy community with three aldeas. Because of its topography, the 
municipio as a whole is disjointed, even if physically contiguous by map. Steep cliffs 
separate the coastal center and the uphill aldeas, requiring as much as an hour’s drive to 
                                                      
135 http://corsadec.org/actividades-importantes/ 
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connect them. Though hunger emergencies are not uncommon still,136 SCP’s proximity to 
the tourist center of Panajachel has allowed for more steady employment opportunities 
and access to services than the case studies in Totonicapán and Quiché, discussed below. 
This is reflected by a relatively high 2005 HDI score (.504), though this had fallen 
considerably since the initial 1994 calculation and poverty remains high (Table 12). 
 
 
Figure 16. Sololá Department Map (Source: Scan of National Geogrphic Institute map) 
 
The Sololá region in which SCP is located is largely Kaqchikel Maya, and the seat of 
one of the most-well organized and dynamic forms of indigenous leadership in 
                                                      
136 Interviews with local clinic personnel, and further substantiated by interviews with Hambre Cero 
personnel (November and December 2013). 
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Guatemala, the Alcadía Indígena of Sololá municipality (Klick 2013). Sololá more 
generally has been site of some of the most overt resistance to state influence both during 
and after the civil war (centered in Santiago Atitlán, especially, to the West along the 
lake). But despite the relative proximity of these communities to SCP, each lakeside 
community, it is clear, has a distinct culture and unique historical experiences. Likewise, 
the influence of indigenous forms of government, and state-society relations, varies 
wildly across space. SCP, for example, was largely unaffected by the war in a direct 
sense (as measured by my calculations of violent events using CEH 1999). 
With respect to social discord specifically, one phenomenon dominates all others in 
SCP. In interview after interview, everyone told me that if I wanted to know more about 
development, or anything regarding SCP for that matter, I needed to speak with el ex-
alcalde, or the former mayor, Mariano Lopez. Even the current mayor seemed at a loss 
during our interview with how to govern SCP – expressing frustration as leaned far back 
in his chair and covered his forehead, broadly admitting to being unable to affect change. 
Hambre Cero, he further told me, simply does not exist. COMUSAN meetings have since 
ended as well.  
Don Mariano, it seems, has a stranglehold on all development resources – including 
official state resources that are owed to the Muni – and uses them, in his own words “for 
the good of my community.” He claims only to be helping the central government 
distribute resources more equitably, while avoiding the “corrupt” current mayor and his 
“gang of thugs” (who were democratically elected only two years previously, but who are 
affiliated with UNE, not Patriota). After a health worker confirmed, unprompted, that 
Don Mariano maneja todos los programas (is in charge of all the assistance programs), 
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and after witnessing the current mayor’s own frustrations, it is clear that this community 
was divided between two distinct, political cleavages. 
Palopó presents a conundrum regarding the complementarity thesis. On the one hand, 
the state is utilizing what is arguably the most influential actor it the community to 
distribute resources. On the other hand, the state is largely absent, with little oversight 
given that it has none of the permanent offices that the other communities have,137 and 
cannot guarantee equitable or appropriate distribution of critical resources (if it is not 
already actively exacerbating the political rift crippling the Muni). Informal leadership in 
Palopó, which consists exclusively of Maya shaman, are largely in the background – 
periodically intervening to urge a family to go to the hospital in the case of a hunger 
emergency, but on other occasions resisting the influence of the state and avoiding health 
officials’ pleas.138 
Santa Catarina Palopó therefore demonstrates a perverse form of complementarity – 
one in which state and local forces merge, but simultaneously undermine official 
governance, and underscore political tensions and discord in the community. This 
importantly demonstrates that complementarity is not simply a function of social capital, 
not always a force for good. Complementarity hinges, as is becoming clear and as will be 
discussed more in Chapter Five, on “brokers” in the community, and their networks, with 
implications for future efforts to cultivate complementarity for development as a policy 
tool. 
                                                      
137 MIDES, MAGA, etc. are based in Sololá and perform site visits, according to the departmental SESAN 
office personnel (multiple interviews over November and December 2013). 
 
138 Interviews with SESAN’s Sololá personnel. 
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Figure 17. Total Poverty Rates in Sololá (UNDP) 
 
4.7 Profiles in Governance: San Pablo la Laguna, Sololá 
San Pablo la Laguna (6861 feet, 2091meters) is on the northwestern side of the lake, 
but set back more than other lakeside communities, perched somewhat precariously on a 
sloping plateau. It is, according to locals, the only place on the lake where the Maguey 
plant (agave) grows, which is used for making ropes and other crafts locally, and now a 
symbol of unity for the community. The local language is Tz’utujil, which is similar but 
distinct from Kaq’chikel as is spoken in SCP. 
San Pablo’s history with social discord is somewhat more peculiar than in other sites. 
Focus groups and interview participants acknowledge, and indeed mostly accept as given, 
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that Patriota workers support party loyalists first, including with bonos and other 
resources intended for the poorest or hungriest. Similarly, the mayor (from the rather 
obscure and partly religiously oriented Victoria party) would naturally help his most 
ardent supporters first. Unlike in Zacaulpa, however, the mayor’s role seems mostly 
symbolic, and is not the focal point of frustration or citizen grievances. Moreover, as 
interviews mounted, the political party–patronage system that is now entrenched in 
Chiquimula and Zacualpa, appears more theater in San Pablo, and more rhetorical, than 
systematic. 
Many interviewees noted that, in an emergency, they would seek the help of either 
family members, or the mayor, first, who has on more than once occasion personally 
driven sick community members to the hospital in Sololá, an hour-plus drive through 
switchbacks and mountain passes. The mayor, himself, after a lengthy explanation of 
how his finances worked (or rather how they did not, given that they largely evaporated 
after paying for the most basic services, salaries and overhead) characterized his own role 
as one of a friendly patriarch, embodying the pride and aspirations of San Pablo more 
than a leader with real levers with which to change its living conditions.139  
Grievances were mostly directed at an amorphous state ideal, over the insecurity of 
employment, and over the relative gains witnessed in nearby tourist communities like San 
Juan and San Pedro at the expense of San Pablo, or so it is perceived. And while 
healthcare seems to have improved for children, with increased access to vaccinations for 
                                                      
139 This, I should note, is a common refrain of people from across the country in their respective villages – 
that things are in some ways immutable, and that life is more a battle for survival under the given 
conditions, in which politicians steal, the rich dominate politics, and where poverty is inevitable. It is a 
cultural reality that, in focus groups in particular (versus with heads of NGOs who are indeed committed to 
change), made my work challenging, as my initial questions were met with a shrug. Even more basic 
questions dominated their lives, whereas political questions were a luxury not yet afforded time. 
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example, the local clinic is otherwise unable to treat adults regularly given limited 
resources. In contrast to every other community, however, interview participants 
routinely evoked the notion of “solidarity” within the community, and then connected 
this directly to the meaning of development.140 
This was striking. Despite their grievances, people from San Pablo fiercely 
distinguished themselves from neighboring communities. Only in San Pablo (and 
Santiago across the lake), I was told, do sacerdotes Mayas (or traditional healers) play a 
visible role in village society. I trekked through coffee fields to visit Santa Ana – a 
peculiar rock outcropping that resembled a pregnant woman that serves as the patron 
saint of comudronas throughout Guatemala, but for which San Pablo residents are 
especially proud. I also visited Mayan altars that are in still regular use, and of special 
significance in the daily lives of residents. Finally, more than one participant 
distinguished the political culture of San Pablo from other communities – especially 
wealth-driven San Juan only a few minutes away – as one of socialismo. “We fight for 
the poor here,” explained my young, local assistant who had helped arrange many 
interviews for me, before dropping me off in front of a large mural dedicated to former 
Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez. 
San Pablo in some ways represents the de-facto model of governance that is 
emblematic of many communities and their experiences. Traditional and informal actors 
have a significant influence over the beliefs and religious practices of citizens, but are 
otherwise not the flag bearers of indigenous resistance that might be assumed. Though 
different in their respective roles – whether environmental stewards, or healers – in each 
                                                      
140 Multiple interview and focus group participants evoked “solidarity” when asked, first, how they defined 
“development.” This response diverged considerably from the other five field sites. 
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community the most traditional forms of authority and leadership have sunk back into the 
shadows, their leaders loathe to take part in petty political wranglings – which is a form 
of resistance in itself, however passive. But in the context of limited statehood and 
limited funding, but immediate need, formal actors like the mayor govern less and 
respond more – taking ad-hoc measures to help community members when they can, and 
meeting with state actors as needed. Governance itself, then, becomes more symbolic 
than productive, with development less the result of any government’s intention, and 
more the temporary fortune of its people – of a good crop, of a motivated NGO, or of a 
new source of income –whether from remittances, work along the Pacific lowland coast, 
or access to a touristic hub.  
4.8 Conclusions: Spatial Variability in Governance and Development 
The purpose of this chapter is principally to introduce the six case studies that 
constitute this study. As is already evident, mostly similar communities – with respect to 
demographics, state presence and local economies – diverge considerably along 
development outcomes as well as in systems of local governance. How these factors are 
linked is the focus of the following chapters, which more systematically explore the 
causal pathways through which governance influences development. 
As was noted earlier, none of the communities are particularly thriving, per se. But 
some communities, like Santa Lucía la Reforma in particular, are making considerable 
progress along basics development indicators, even if poverty rates remain staggeringly 
high, and despite a tragic legacy of conflict. How past conflict continues to affect 
communities today is still uncertain, though Zacualpa provides some insight: There, new 
political divisions and rivalries stem from the mayor’s past participation with civilian 
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patrols – pitting local ladinos (non-indigenous Guatemalans) against indigenous 
opponents, and evoking thirty year old social cleavages formed during the civil war. 
More common across all communities is some element of religious cleavage, between 
traditional Catholic affiliations and the growing wave of Evangelical Protestantism, 
which either overlaps with, or deepens, emerging social cleavages. Much of the local 
social division, however, stems from what is unanimously recognized by citizens as the 
growing prominence of political party affiliation. Political party affiliation has created 
deep divisions within otherwise harmonious communities, and usurped the influence of 
informal indigenous leaders, who only recently retained great influence over local 
decision-making and implementation of development projects. 
Making sense of the above requires a more systematic approach, however. The 
following chapter demonstrates how a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of all six 
communities assists in deconstructing the links between governance and development. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: A QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS of SIX 
HIGHLAND COMMUNITIES 
Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) has been employed in social science research 
as a means to systematically compare across an intermediate amount of cases in order to 
test the necessity and sufficiency of carefully coded causal conditions. Its main purpose is 
to allow for such comparisons, “while at the same time giving justice to within-case 
complexity” (Rihoux and Ragin 2009: xviii, as quoted in Speer 2011).  
Specifically, QCA methods account for multi-causality (or “equifinality”) – the 
possibility of unobservable interactions between explanatory variables, and limitations in 
a researcher’s ability to adequately make perfectly controlled comparisons (George and 
Bennett 2005). Equifinality is of particular concern to social science research, and small 
n-case study research especially, where case selection and omitted variables can skew 
causal inferences, resulting in spurious conclusions. 
QCA allows the investigator to more finely detect the presence of not only multiple 
causal conditions (or independent variables), but configurations of causal conditions and 
even multiple configurations and how they interact. Using QCA to reveal otherwise 
unclear configurations of causal conditions also provides insight into the more nuanced 
and relative influence of individual conditions, including the presence or absence of 
conditions that are necessary, sufficient, both or neither, and still more complex 
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combinations (or INUS causes – insufficient but necessary parts of a configuration that is 
unnecessary but sufficient).141  
 
Table 13. QCA Coding per Variable 
Presence of:  Coding Criteria: 
Social Spending? 
(A=high, a=low)  
ICEFI/USAID “Atlas del Gasto Social Municipal”: % of total 
budget per inhabitant spent on “social functions”  = above (high) 
or below (low) mean (234.54 Quetzales/person) 
“Strong” local civil 
society? 
(B=high, b=low)  
Qualitative observations and interviews: What is the presence and 
density of locally-resonant forms of civil society or traditional 
authority? More crucially, can these organizations affect change, 
mobilize citizens, and spur deference by other actors. 
Social discord? 
(C=high, c=low)  
Qualitative observations and interviews: What is the extent and 
nature of social divisions within a community, if any? How do they 
manifest? 
Conflict-
affectedness? 
(D=high, d=low)  
Historical experiences with the civil war: Above (high) or below 
(low) the mean conflict intensity “score” (96 victims/community). 
This is augmented by qualitative data gained through interviews. 
Complementarity 
(E =high, e=low)  
Process tracing: Observation of lead civil society actors working, 
or not, with government officials to implement anti-hunger 
program elements. 
Improvements in 
Hunger? (DV)  
Beginning with the difference between Guatemala’s 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 
“hunger census” (which measures stunting) scores, differences are 
calculated as a percentage and compared across communities 
Δ Illiteracy (DV) 
Changes in illiteracy rates between 2009 and 2011 based on 
official statistics and compared with mean (-1.6%) and SD (5%). 
Greater than 2 SDs = “High” 
Infant Mortality 
Rates (2009) (DV) 
Compared with mean (36.0) and SD (30.5). Differences beyond 1 
SD are coded as “High,” within 1 SD = “Med”, and below the 
mean = “Low” 
Δ HDI 2005-
2011(DV) 
Using the extrapolated HDI score representing 2011, change in 
HDI is calculated as percentage and, besides direction (+/-), is 
compared with the mean difference (.067) 
HDI 2011 (DV) Absolute values extrapolated from difference between 2000 and 2005 figures. 
                                                      
141 See fn 76.  
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Table 13 presents the key independent variables under investigation in this study’s 
qualitative component, and how their presence or absence was established, 
methodologically. Different proxies for development that serve as dependent variables 
are reiterated in Table 13 as well. 
This strict coding criteria is essential for deciphering the presence or absence of key 
variables. Naturally, variables are present to different degrees, and “medium” cases of 
anything are more difficult to interpret. In these cases, however, the coding criteria allows 
for a firm decision with respect to the presence and absence of variables. Fortunately, and 
in the cases selected here, the coding criteria did not conflict with cases or force a 
(potentially biased) judgment call, and instead allowed for more precise coding and 
subsequent analysis. 
5.1 Communities in Conflict: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Human 
Development in Rural Guatemala 
 
This section systematically analyzes the presence or absence of each independent 
variable, determined by qualitative observations from all six communities with 
quantitative metrics where applicable, in order to build a “truth table” representing how 
different variables correlate with varying development outcomes in each community. 
From field site visits discussed above, and the combination of key-informant interviews 
and focus groups in the most remote aldeas, a combination of thick description and 
process tracing (discussed in Chapter 6) is used to code each variable. The qualitative 
component allows for more exploration into the presence and influence of variables that 
could not be tested in the quantitative component, including “social discord,” and, 
crucially, “complementarity.” 
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5.1.1 – Social Discord 
In the quantitative analysis component of this project (Chapter 3), no clear metric can 
capture the degree to which a community is internally divided, or “cohesive” for that 
matter (though I attempted to at least crudely capture an element of this phenomenon 
through homicide rates and numbers of official denuncias). Yet literature – ranging from 
political science to anthropology and even legal studies – frequently observes varying 
levels of community division in Mayan Guatemala, linking such social breakdown to the 
armed conflict and its legacy, or as the result of a state-dominant (and culturally ignorant) 
punitive legal system. Divisions have also resulted from a clash between traditional 
Mayan values, including concepts of Mayan authority rooted in the cofradía system,142 
and the modern political system that biases the wealthy and educated candidate, and 
which values national priorities over local matters, further undermining tradition and 
traditional governance (Hawkings, McDonald and Adams 2013, International Crisis 
Group 2013, personal interviews in Totonicapán). 
Scholars have since linked social divisions within Mayan communities to a rash of 
extra-legal “lynchings”143 – or cases of violent, sometimes lethal reprisals conducted by 
citizens as punishment for what are frequently minor crimes by neighbors (Godoy 2006; 
Hawkins, McDonald and Adams 2013; Sieder 2010). Certain Mayan communities more 
effectively organize themselves, however, either to deploy a collective system of Mayan 
                                                      
142 This is the now mostly defunct system of a council of elders that elects a single leader based on 
leadership and demonstrated contributions to community well-being. It had, until recently, been a 
significant honor, and came with important responsibilities. It also carried, frequently, far more importance 
at the village level than elected government. 
 
143 Though some would argue that lynchings represent an attempt, however misguided, by communities to 
reclaim what is a constitutionally-recognized local authority of Mayan law over criminal matters 
(Hessbruegge and Ochoa García 2011). 
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law in conjunction with state officials and the national police, or to self-police without 
the use of violence and in pursuit of greater autonomy (Sieder 2010, Hawkins, McDonald 
and Adams 2013, International Crisis Group 2013, personal interviews in Totonicapán 
with 48 Cantones leadership). 
 The most organized – like the 48 Cantones de Totonicapán – can evoke traditional 
indigenous mores, and an entrenched desire for autonomy, to mobilize citizens in protest 
of anything from taxes to electricity prices. The organization’s leadership – generally 
well-educated in legal matters and public policy – has a tense relationship with central 
authorities, who have deferred to Canton leadership in times of crisis, but otherwise 
dismiss their legitimacy. Their legitimacy, nevertheless, grants the organization 
tremendous influence locally, which has been used to stem violence, self-police, and to 
organize mass, peaceful public protest.  
Peculiarly, however, the organization has not been able to convert this authority into 
development gains. The Totonicapán community as a whole has made only minimal gains 
in combating hunger (with current rates of 65 percent). Meanwhile outlying communities 
of the municipality, but still under the purview of the Cantons, were reporting rates of 
acute hunger among schoolchildren of 100 percent as late as October 2013.144  
In the six communities under focus in this study, social discord is widely prominent, 
but varies across space and manifests in different ways. Based on fieldwork described in 
Chapter 4, each community’s experience with social discord is subsequently coded as 
either “high” or “low.” This judgment is based on the degree to which social divisions are 
                                                      
144 This is based on interviews with the department’s head of Hambre Cero, who shared with me original 
data from the program’s monitoring and evaluation program. Small communities were still reporting 
extremely high rates of hunger emergencies, particular amongst the youngest, in Totonicapán municipio, 
which is among the most well-organized indigenous communities.  
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reflected in the distribution of public health resources, violence and electoral violence, 
and more subjectively the degree to which such divisions permeated my interviews with 
participants (ie., participants volunteered an unspecified level, or type, of social discord 
as an important factor complicating development in that community). The results of this 
tabulation, to be incorporated into the greater QCA truth table in Section 5.3, are located 
below in Table 14. 
 
Table 14. Summary Table of Social Discord Across Six Guatemala Field Sites 
Social 
discord? 
What are the extent and nature of social divisions within a community, if 
any? How do they manifest? 
 
 
Presence of  ↓ 
Sta María 
Chiquimula 
(6975’) 
Sta Lucia la 
Reforma 
(6013’) 
Patzité 
(7545’) 
Zacualpa 
(4875’) 
Sta Cta 
Palopó 
(5456’) 
San 
Pablo 
(6861’) 
Social 
discord? High Low Low High High Low 
 
5.1.2 Civil Society 
This section is dedicated to exploring the scope and strength of civil society in each 
community, including locally-based organizations (like development-oriented NGOs) and 
informal institutions like Mayan principales (elders), alcadías indígenas (indigenous 
mayors) and semi-formal community leaders. Foreign NGOs were almost entirely absent 
from these six communities. 
Literature has already noted the influence of different local institutions on violence 
and justice, as well as the ambitions of some more organized institutions to carve out 
local autonomy, or rebuff what is perceived to be an intrusive state and a statebuilding 
Community → 
 
 
151 
 
project that divides indigenous groups and erodes their culture. Theoretically, therefore, 
different organizational capacity should influence development governance. 
In the six communities of this project, however, civil society takes different forms but 
is largely absent from the development discourse. Even the most culturally relevant 
institutions in very remote, conservative communities – which have at times bargained 
with, or confronted, the state – have been relegated in this respect. Most indigenous 
leaders acknowledge their limitations vis-à-vis political parties, while others have simply 
not taken up the pro-development mantle – seeing themselves as keepers of language, 
tradition and leaders on topics including the protection of forests or rivers rather than the 
murkier, state-led questions of education, hunger and development.  
In meetings with various participants, many described a more subtle, behind-the-
scenes influence of indigenous leaders. It may not be systematic, or overt, but from Santa 
María Chiquimula in the highlands to Santa Catarína Palopó on the shores of Lago 
Atitlán, interview participants delicately reminded me that, even if they were not 
necessarily at the proverbial table, indigenous leaders retained important influence at the 
local level – intervening, for example, in order to urge a family to take their sick child to 
the hospital, or to quell a heated political rivalry that threatened to spillover into violence. 
These events, despite my efforts, are harder to catalogue, and systematically code, and 
are a reminder of the mysteriousness that, while drawing me to Guatemala in the first 
place, limit the outside investigator’s task of unveiling the “Truth” behind phenomena in 
a social environment as complex as Guatemala’s, 
Thus despite the lore of traditional leadership, legal plurality, and strong, locally-
resonant informal institutions, these phenomena appear rare, with limited overall affect 
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on development planning or outcomes. Though individual cases – like the 
aforementioned 48 Cantones in Totonicapán, or Solola’s well-established Alcadía 
Indígena – are compelling, and indeed influence local governance and even outcomes,145 
their influence outside of their own community context is limited. Most communities 
(including remote, traditional villages), meanwhile, proceed with a COCODE system that 
is dysfunctional, coopted, or that is disbanded and re-formed by the mayor at his will.146 
In the communities under study here, political parties and electoral competition has 
crowded out more pragmatic discussions of development, and limited the scope of 
stakeholder participation in governance. One exception is Santa Lucía la Reforma, where 
semi-formal community leaders from outlying aldeas meet routinely, and are directly 
involved in the distribution of resources and program implementation, and decision-
making. 
 
Table 15. Civil Society Synopsis From Six Guatemala Field Sites 
“Strong” local 
civil society? 
What is the presence and density of locally-resonant forms of civil society or 
traditional authority? More crucially, can these organizations affect 
change, mobilize citizens, and spur deference by other actors? 
 
Presence of  
↓ 
Sta María 
Chiquimula 
(6975’) 
Sta Lucia la 
Reforma 
(6013’) 
Patzité 
(7545’) 
Zacualpa 
(4875’) 
Sta Cta 
Palopó 
(5456’) 
San 
Pablo 
(6861’) 
“Strong” local 
civil society? Low High Low Low Low Low 
 
                                                      
145 Though this influence does not extend to development matters broadly, as noted (Klick 2013). 
 
146 Several interview participants in government offices in Quiché’s capital, Santa Cruz, shared personal 
frustration with the Zacualpa case, and noted that a bad precedent was set when Guatemala City’s mayor, 
Alvaro Arzú, when he formed additional COCODES in order to circumvent the existing ones that were 
opposing his policies. This tactic was subsequently supported by the Constitutional Court, and is now used 
regularly throughout the country by mayors. 
Community→ 
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I therefore judge civil society not on its “thickness” in terms of registered NGOs or 
supposed “density,” which would likely be misleading in many of these communities, but 
rather on the observed role, scope and influence of community organizations, however 
roughly organized, including traditional forms of collective action. 
5.1.3 Conflict and Municipal Spending 
Both conflict and municipal spending are determined by quantitative metrics, and 
borrowed from Chapter Three. Only in Zacualpa, which was gruesomely impacted, did 
some interview participants draw direct links from events that took place during the civil 
war to the social discord that permeates village life today. I should also note that, despite 
only Santa Lucía la Reforma and Zacualpa being recorded as “highly” conflict affected, it 
is unclear how even a small number of violent events might resonate today. 
Methodologically, communities can receive the same “score” of conflict intensity, while 
suffering differently – either because the nature of the crimes themselves were different, 
or by being the victim of 2 or 3 massacres, for example, versus sustained, low-intensity 
violence, likely influencing perceptions of state violence differently. 
Finally, it is also important to note again that such calculations have likely never been 
done at the municipal level for the entire country, as has been done for this study. 
Therefore while Totonicapán as a department is frequently dismissed as having suffered 
very little from the civil war – which partly explains why conservative, and even 
militaristic groups can still do well there electorally (International Crisis Group 2013), 
this study reveals a more nuanced experience in which some communities in the 
department indeed suffered great violence while others suffered more than is 
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conventionally acknowledged. The results from quantitative metrics have been added to 
Table 16 (below). 
 
Table 16. Spending and Conflict Across Six Guatemala Field Sites 
Social 
Spending? 
ICEFI/USAID “Atlas del Gasto Social Municipal”: % of total budget per 
inhabitant spent on “social functions”  = above (high) or below (low) mean 
(234.54 Quetzales/person) 
Conflict 
affected? 
Historical experiences with the civil war: Above (high) or below (low) the 
mean conflict intensity “score” (96 victims/community). This is augmented by 
qualitative data gained through interviews. 
 
Presence of  ↓ 
Sta María 
Chiquimula 
(6975’) 
Sta Lucia 
la 
Reforma 
(6013’) 
Patzité 
(7545’) 
Zacualpa 
(4875’) 
Sta Cta 
Palopó 
(5456’) 
San 
Pablo 
(6861’) 
Social 
Spending? Low Low High Low High High 
Conflict 
affected? Low High Low High Low Low 
 
5.1.4 Complementarity 
Finally, I attempt to capture through fieldwork whether my proposed theoretical 
explanatory variable has any bearing on development outcomes in these six communities. 
I argue that it does, though its effects are frequently muted by other variables, and that its 
presence is generally rare. Moreover, perverse forms of complementarity can arise, in 
which development at the community level is complicated by the role of actors working 
with the state to undermine local government, though for the QCA I focus on the positive 
forms of complementarity. 
Complementarity, as defined in the introduction, is the process through which state 
actors, with important resources (from food aid and medicine to cash), work in harmony 
Community → 
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with more locally-trusted trusted non-state actors in order to deliver basic services more 
equitably, or to distribute resources (Klick 2013). The idea is borrowed from Helmke and 
Levitsky (2004) who argue that informal institutions – or the unwritten rules of expected 
behavior, or uncodified patterns of behavior – can either accommodate, substitute, 
compete, or complement formal systems of constitutional governance. 
  
Table 17. Complementarity Across Six Guatemala Field Sites 
Complementarity 
(E =high, e=low)  
Process tracing: Observation of lead civil society actors working, or not, 
with government officials to implement anti-hunger program elements. 
 
Presence of  ↓ 
Sta María 
Chiquimula 
(6975’) 
Sta Lucia 
la 
Reforma 
(6013’) 
Patzité 
(7545’) 
Zacualpa 
(4875’) 
Sta Cta 
Palopó 
(5456’) 
San 
Pablo 
(6861’) 
Complementarity Low High Low Low Low Low 
 
 
 
More recently, work has emerged exploring whether “informal local governance 
institutions” (ILGIs) complement or compete with the formal state at the local level, and 
its implications for governance and service delivery, specifically (Mohmand et al. 
forthcoming, Cheema and Naseer 2010, Institute of Development Studies 2010, Klick 
2013). This project continues this emerging trend by attempting to add analytical rigor 
and nuance to our understanding of informal, local governance, while also – in the case 
of Guatemala – exploring the resilience of local institutions under conditions of 
increasing political party and top-down statebuilding pressures. Though I code 
complementarity separately from other variables, it is indeed likely that there is a 
relationship between other indicators – like whether or not there is party alignment 
Community → 
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between local and state offices, or the degree of within-community social discord, for 
example – and complementarity itself. By separating these concepts in the QCA 
component, this project can explore how these factors intertwine or not, and also explore 
the implications of unexpected “types” of complementarity, discussed more below. 
 
5.2 QCA Results: Seeking Causal Links 
When the results from this chapter are tabulated in a “truth table” (Table 18), one can 
begin to decipher whether relationships exist between variables themselves, and whether 
the presence or absence of different conditions correlate with outcomes in each 
community. 
I coded whether each condition discussed above was “high” or “low” in each of the 
six communities, followed by multiple indicators of human development – including 
rates of chronic hunger, infant mortality, illiteracy, the extrapolated HDI scores 
(representing 2010 scores) and changes in HDI between 2005 and 2010. 
Using this version of the truth table (Table 18, page 157), results are somewhat 
ambiguous, with perhaps the exception of local social spending (A), which diverges from 
the quantitative work in Chapter Three and which, here, generally corresponds to the 
better development outcomes. Though even here, the community with arguably the most 
impressive development gains (SLR) has low social spending. Another potentially 
important variable, as discussed earlier, is whether the community experienced high 
levels of conflict intensity (D). Low levels (d) correlate with better outcomes, like 
changes in illiteracy (see Figure 18, page 157). Again, however, Santa Lucía la Reforma, 
which in fact had very high gains in their battle against illiteracy, suffered 
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disproportionately during the armed conflict. In fact a broader view of the ΔIlliteracy 
variable reveals very inconsistent results (Figure 18). 
 
 
Table 18. QCA Truth Table 
Presence of ↓ 
Santa 
María 
Chiquimula 
(6975’) 
Santa 
Lucía la 
Reforma 
(6013’) 
Patzité 
(7545’) 
Zacualpa 
(4875’) 
Sta 
Cta 
Palopó 
(5456’) 
San 
Pablo 
(6861’) 
Social Spending? 
(A=high, a=low) a a A a A A 
“Strong” local 
civil society? 
(B=high, b=low) 
b B b b b b 
Social discord? 
(C=high, c=low) C c c C C c 
Conflict affected? 
(D=high, d=low) d D d D d d 
Complementarity 
(E =high, e=low) e E e e e e 
Δ  Chronic 
Hunger -1.7% (Low) 
-3% 
(Med) 
-6.8% 
(Med) 
-1.4% 
(Low) 
-22.8% 
(High) 
-21.8% 
(High) 
Δ Illiteracy 
Mean=-1.6%, S.D. = 
5.0% 
-9.5% 
(Med) 
-20% 
(High) 
-7% 
(Med) 
-.2% 
(Low) 
-10% 
(Med) 
-2% 
(Low) 
Infant Mortality 
Mean = 36.0, S.D. = 
30.5 
75.8 (High) 53.0 (Med) 
18.1 
(Low) 
38.1 
(Med) 
21.9 
(Low) 
43.7 
(Med) 
HDI (2011 
extrapolated) .403 .486 .371 .523 .439 .705 
Δ  HDI (2005-
2011)(% change) +.023 (6.4%) 
+.059 
(16%) 
-.118 
(-24.1%) 
+.029 
(7%) 
-.065 
(-13%) 
+.199 
(39%) 
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Chronic Hunger 
Low abCde abCDe 
Med/High 
aBcDE 
AbCde 
AbCde 
Abcde 
 
Figure 18. Initial QCA Results, Chronic Hunger and Changes in Illiteracy 
 
This ambiguity arises in part because of confusion over how to interpret absolute HDI 
numbers, conflicting results across dependent variables (like strong improvements in 
huger but low changes in literacy for example), and finally inconsistency in the results of 
the QCA itself, with no clear patterns among variables. 
I thus simplify the QCA (Table 19, page 159) in order to compare across the most 
similar communities in my set and by dropping those dependent variables that are either 
difficult-to-interpret absolute values, or development indicators that include an income 
metric (like HDI and ΔHDI).  
The lakeside communities, for example, far outstrip their counterparts in the interior 
highlands in combating chronic hunger. But it was only after fieldwork that I observed 
the degree to which both enjoy greater access to income opportunities (between tourism 
and cash crops like coffee and chocolate), and even services (particularly for SCP). 
Though my work there still provides valuable observations, their inclusion into the QCA 
complicates interpretations. 
Similarly, since HDI scores include an income component, larger communities like 
Zacualpa, holding all else equal, are likely to have higher absolute HDI values. In sum, I 
have reduced the QCA’s scope to the four communities in Totonicapán and El Quiché, 
Δ Illiteracy 
Low abCDe Abcde 
Med/High 
abCde 
Abcde 
AbCde 
aBcDE 
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which have no viable tourist economies and which further share very similar ethno-
linguistic identities. Relative changes between these communities are more compelling 
and more accurately test my hypothesis. Results are compelling as well (Figure 19, 
below). 
 
Table 19. Revised QCA 
Presence of ↓ 
Sta María 
Chiquimula 
(6975’) 
Sta 
Lucia la 
Reforma 
(6013’) 
Patzité 
(7545’) 
Zacualpa 
(4875’) 
Sta 
Cta 
Palopó 
(5456’) 
San 
Pablo 
(6861’) 
Social Spending? 
(A=high, a=low) a a A a A A 
“Strong” local 
civil society? 
(B=high, b=low) 
b B b b b b 
Social discord? 
(C=high, c=low) C c c C C c 
Conflict affected? 
(D=high, d=low) d D d D d d 
Complementarity 
(E =high, e=low) e E e e e e 
Δ  Chronic 
Hunger -1.7% (Low) 
-3% 
(Med) 
-6.8% 
(Med) 
-1.4% 
(Low) 
-22.8% 
(High) 
-21.8% 
(High) 
Δ Illiteracy -9.5% (Med) 
-20% 
(High) 
-7% 
(Med) 
-.2% 
(Low) 
-10% 
(Med) 
-2% 
(Low) 
Infant Mortality 75.8 53.0 18.1 38.1 21.9 43.7 
HDI (2011 
extrapolated) .403 .486 .371 .523 .439 .705 
Δ  HDI (2005-
2011)(% change) +.023 (6.4%) 
+.059 
(16%) 
-.118 
(-24.1%) 
+.029 
(7%) 
-.065 
(-13%) 
+.199 
(39%) 
 
Utilizing the revised QCA, more distinct patterns emerge from the data than before. 
First focusing on changes in chronic hunger over time (top left in Figure 19), the most 
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obvious pattern is that those communities experiencing high levels of internal social 
discord (C) have made the least progress. Those communities isolated as having made 
medium progress (no communities made high progress on hunger) experience low levels 
of social discord uniformly. Social spending (A) is less obviously important, though the 
only community with high levels of social spending did indeed make greater headway in 
combating hunger. Similar results are yielded by the civil society variable (B), in that the 
only instance of more highly-organized civil society corresponds with better results. The 
role of conflict intensity (D) is unimportant here, as conflict intensity is evenly distributed 
across better and worse cases. Finally, complementarity’s influence (E) is not dramatic, 
but like civil society and social spending, appears only among those communities doing 
better – a necessary if insufficient condition for better outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chronic Hunger 
Low ab  C de ab  C De 
Med/High aB  c DE Ab  c de 
Δ Illiteracy 
Low abCDe 
Med/High 
abCde 
Abcde 
aBcDE 
Chronic Hunger and Illiteracy 
Combined 
Low 
abCde 
abCDe 
abCDe 
Med/High 
aBcDE 
Abcde 
abCde 
Abcde 
aBcDE 
Figure 19.  Combining QCA Results 
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Analyzing the results with respect to changes in illiteracy (top right, Figure 19), 
results are generally similar. Since more communities did better in this respect over time, 
however, results shift slightly. The effects of social spending (A), civil society (B), social 
discord (C) and complementarity (E) all diminish slightly, while the influence of low 
levels of civil war conflict intensity gain in strength.  
Results of the QCA are most compelling when hunger and illiteracy are combined 
(bottom of Figure 19), which creates a truncated, but nevertheless more robust indicator 
of human development by combining both a key health and key education indicator. In 
this instance, the most consistent results are apparent among the worst performing 
communities – where limited social spending (a), an anemic civil society (b) and high 
social discord (C) are each 100 percent consistent across communities. An absence of 
complementarity is also consistent across all poor performing communities.  
Amongst the better performing communities, results are less consistent, but 
nevertheless suggestive. Higher social spending (A) and a “strong” civil society (B) 
reappear (being present in two out of five communities). Only one community, of the five 
doing better across both hunger and illiteracy, exhibits observable social discord (C). 
Conflict (D) is again distributed evenly across both poor and better performing 
communities, making it a surprisingly non-relevant variable in determining current 
development outcomes. Finally, like social spending and social discord, complementarity 
(E) reappears, twice among the five better-performing communities, and only among 
those communities doing well. As well, the only community with a “High” performance 
in any of the development metrics (Santa Lucía la Reforma reports a 20 percent reduction 
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in illiteracy) exhibits clear state-local complementarity, despite higher rates of poverty 
and extreme poverty than any of the other communities. 
5.4 Conclusions 
The QCA component, by utilizing extensive fieldwork in order to code variables that 
are otherwise difficult to capture quantitatively, adds needed nuance to our understanding 
of what influences spatial variation in development across similar communities. This 
chapter has begun to probe the inner-workings of small, mostly remote communities 
operating under conditions of limited statehood in Guatemala. The governance that 
results, and by whom it is captured, affects the likelihood of development progress. The 
process that defines governance, however, is highly contentious, and subject to local 
contestation.  
I initially anticipated that contestation would be largely driven by a local desire for 
autonomy, led by any number of the potential indigenous authority structures, contra state 
actors driven to undermine this authority. As Chapter Four and this chapter demonstrate 
collectively, however, indigenous leaders are only very subtly influencing outcomes, 
while their role in development, specifically, is negligible. This finding clashes with a 
suite of literature emerging from Guatemala citing the importance of traditional values on 
local political outcomes. In reality, informal or indigenous influence over local outcomes 
should be differentiated between questions regarding the “lawful” use of violence and 
policing, on the one hand, to protection of the environment and development matters like 
health and education on the other. The scope and power of indigenous and informal 
institutions vary, in other words, according to the issue, and it is especially constrained 
with respect to development. 
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In most communities, where a strong, well-organized indigenous NGO (like the 48 
Cantones for example) is absent, contestation has increasingly pitted local formal 
authorities, like the mayor, against state actors, with lines ardently being drawn between 
political parties.147 In this scenario the role of indigenous and informal authorities is 
crowded out, as both principle parties in the conflict utilize, and cultivate, patronage 
networks in a battle for votes and control.  
One result is that development fails to materialize in any coherent sense. On the one 
hand, the parties in conflict distribute feeble resources along patronage lines. It is ad-hoc, 
inconsistent and arbitrarily dispersed with respect to need. On the other hand, such 
conflict can create more deleterious outcomes when one party of the conflict “punishes” 
his adversaries by depriving them of critical resources, whether from what Hambre Cero 
might provide, to potable water, or new schools. In this case, political decisions are 
directly influencing the daily caloric intake of children suffering from chronic hunger.  
This chapter, through the use of the QCA component, most clearly demonstrates that 
social discord at the community level limits development possibilities – the mechanisms 
of which are explored in greater detail in Chapter Six. These internal divisions, and 
emerging political rivalries within small, rural, and ethnically-homogenous communities, 
have been largely overlooked by literature, and have virtually no bearing on 
contemporary development policymaking.  
With respect to complementarity, the QCA does not reveal its clear deterministic 
function in bettering outcomes. This is no surprise, however, given the complexity of 
local conditions – whether environmental, social, cultural, or political, and competing and 
                                                      
147 It was confirmed unanimously across my interviews, from Guatemala City to rural hinterlands, that this 
phenomenon has steadily increased over the last 10-15 years. 
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as yet unobserved variables influencing local outcomes. The QCA, after all, is only a 
snapshot that, while adding needed nuance to the quantitative section, is unable to 
demonstrate causality per se (which will be taken up in Chapter Six). Nevertheless, the 
QCA component has teased out the role of complementarity – along with local social 
spending and the strength of locally-based civil society – as a potentially critical 
facilitating condition, or in other words, a necessary if insufficient condition, that results 
in development-oriented governance and improved outcomes at the village level. 
The case of Santa Lucía la Reforma is especially compelling. It is remote, very poor 
and was directly impacted by the armed conflict, and yet it has outperformed its 
immediate neighbor, Chiquimula, across an entire range of development indicators, 
including chronic hunger, despite measurably greater challenges. It is also the community 
with the best gains in illiteracy amongst the four communities of the interior highlands – 
another unexpected outcome. In this case, the complementary between semi-formal 
village mayors and state actors, partly coordinated and “blessed” by the mayor, is 
striking. Its occurrence is harder to explain. Why does Santa Lucía have active village 
mayors, while Patzité does not? Why do state actors, like Roni in Santa Lucía, among 
others, work energetically to unite disparate forces in town, and work with the village 
leaders in order to distribute key resources, while in other communities they do not? 
Party alignment may indeed be one factor, and I cannot dismiss its influence outright. 
But women from more obscure state offices (like RENAP), with little material influence, 
were also engaging the village mayors. Moreover, as the development indicators 
themselves suggest, Santa Lucía has been making these gains consistently for years, 
through different parties and different mayors. These questions are also explored in 
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greater detail in Chapter Six, where I endeavor to uncover the causal chain that links 
social discord, on the one hand, and complementarity on the other, to variation in 
development outcomes. 
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CHAPTER SIX: SEEKING CAUSAL PATHWAYS FROM GOVERNANCE TO 
DEVELOPMENT 
The previous two chapters have, in order, discarded the most basic notions of 
statebuilding for development before then raising suggestive links between key variables 
and development outcomes. Most notably, at the community level, the degree of social 
discord and a lack of viable civil society, along with other potential conditions like local 
social spending, are linked with worse development outcomes in a sample of similar 
communities. Complementarity is rarely observed, but is present in the best performing 
community – Santa Lucía la Reforma. How variables and outcomes are connected, 
however, is still unclear.  
This chapter explicitly examines how the centrally-planned and initiated anti-hunger 
program El Pacto Hambre Cero (“The Zero Hunger Pact”) – which has been lauded by 
external development agencies for its design and scale148 – is implemented at the 
community level. By specifically observing how a single government program is 
implemented across the different case study communities – which were each designated 
“priority communities” by the government and thus privy to the same level of 
government response and resources – this component of the study specifies the causal 
pathways and agent-to-agent linkages that connect governance and development 
outcomes. Though, at the time of fieldwork, Hambre Cero was too young to have 
                                                      
148 See footnote 11, page 6.  
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impacted chronic hunger systematically, interviews with both regional and local directors 
of the program provided early data regarding acute hunger emergencies, as well as the 
intended design and scope of the program at the local level. Comparing differences in 
Hambre Cero’s implementation across communities therefore yields crucial insight into 
the empirical nature of development governance at the local level – including key actors, 
their coordination and oversight roles, and the dispersion of resources like food aid, seeds 
and cash. I interpret these findings as representative of the nature of governance that 
characterizes each community. 
 
Table 20. Interview and Focus Group Summary 
Community Name, and aldeas in each 
municipality 
Number of non-elite interviews and/or 
focus group participants 
Santa María Chiquimula (SMC) n=54 
Xecaxelaj 7 
Xesana 10 
Xesana I 10 
Pajojchiyats 12 
Joesefina 5 
Centro 10 
Zacualpa n=81 
Pasajoc I 25 
Chuchuca (Chuchuca is site location, with 
attendees from the following: Xejoc, 
Xextorian, Xemosche, Chojiomquiej) 
56 
San Pablo la Laguna n=24 
Center* 24 
Total n=159 
 
Process tracing, as noted earlier, is “an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and 
causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence – often understood as part of a 
temporal sequence of events or phenomena” (Collier 2011: 823). The method requires 
significant time and dedication in order to appropriately document the micro-level, or 
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“agent-to-agent” linkages, in a potentially vast series of events in a causal chain that 
connects independent and dependent variables (Checkel 2005). 
As noted before, process tracing is central to field work methodology in each of the 
six field sites, for coding the QCA variables and gauging local governance. In three 
communities, however – Chiquimula, Zacualpa and San Pablo – interviews and focus 
groups with non-elites augment key informant interviews, providing additional 
observations in those communities with respect to how the program influenced the most 
remote households, and to gain the perspective of the recipients of Hambre Cero 
assistance (Table 20). This chapter is organized by theme, highlighting the key obstacles 
to development across space, as well as the drivers of best outcomes based on findings 
from process tracing Hambre Cero implementation.  
6.1 Internal Political Divisions and Development Stagnation 
Political divisions within small, ethnically homogenous communities severely 
handicap the coordination and implementation of government services, including the 
implementation of Hambre Cero. According to interviews in each community, divisions 
based on party affiliation and candidate support have dramatically increased over the last 
ten years, undermining traditional forms of authority and community influence over 
politics and decision-making.149 
                                                      
149 Almost uniformly, this phenomenon took the form of the elevated role of the alcalde comunitario at the 
expense of alcaldes auxiliaries, or more informal, traditional leaders. The alcalde comunitarios are often 
COCODE representatives, and frequently hand-picked by the mayor as well. 
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6.1.1 COCODES 
In rural focus groups, participants widely eschewed political activity themselves, but 
the affiliation of their local development council (COCODE) leaders had important 
consequences nevertheless. In each of the communities, the COCODE system was either 
defunct, or had been nakedly usurped by the mayor to reflect his politics and priorities. In 
Patzité, the COCODE remains the principal outlet for community participation in 
development governance, but this comes at the expense of traditional systems of 
governance, and its role is nevertheless symbolic more than effective. The mayor and his 
voluntary advisory board are in charge of day-to-day decision-making. The mayor in 
Patzité, as interviews revealed, is “development-oriented” and conscientious of local 
needs, which likely explains some of Patzité’s “medium” development gains, compared 
to the worst cases, and even to Zacualpa. But with limited stakeholder involvement, there 
is no coordination between government services and local programs. Interventions are ad-
hoc, and as my interview with government officials in the community suggest, their own 
interventions, and distribution of basic resources, was limited outside the community 
center, or to those who took the initiative to arrive at the offices and file for their bonos. 
The COCODE system, which is the cornerstone of the state’s decentralization efforts 
stemming from the Peace Accords, has been heralded for its potential to augment 
participatory development and citizen oversight of development priorities.150 The 
COCODE system, however, has no bearing on development outcomes in any of the 
communities under study. In fact, in multiple interviews, including those with non-elite 
                                                      
150 For an example, see the World Bank’s programs to promote the COCODE system: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/WBIPROGRAMS/CMUDLP/0,,contentMDK:2076
5268~menuPK:461794~pagePK:64156158~piPK:64152884~theSitePK:461754,00.html  
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community members who most objectively observe its role, the COCODE system was 
isolated as the source of mismanagement, corruption and feeble development response. It 
has also been used to perpetuate growing community divisions. 
In Zacualpa (Quiché department), for example, the mayor has identified which aldeas 
are considered zones of electoral support, and which ones are not, based on previous 
elections.151 Zones of support have received new schools and water projects stemming 
from municipal funds, while opposition zones are intentionally neglected.152 The 
COCODE system has been reconstituted locally to reflect the mayor’s prerogatives, 
rather than community’s. Even foreign-assisted programs, including a health education 
program partly funded by USAID, are controlled and restricted as to where they can 
participate. By deferring to the municipal government and seeking local cooperation, 
externally-funded programs inadvertently (and unbeknownst to their organizers) exclude 
those rural areas now type-cast as “opposition” by the mayor – restricting the program’s 
outreach and impact. In much the same way, but in reverse, Hambre Cero 
implementation is corrupted.  
In the aldeas of Pasajoc I, Chuchuca, Xejoc, Xextorian, Xemosche and Chojiomquiej, 
which are entrenched zones of mayoral support, not one of 84 participants had knowledge 
of Hambre Cero, or had participated in any government assistance program, despite the 
anti-hunger program’s identification of Zacualpa as a “priority community,” and despite 
                                                      
151 This is widely understood and confirmed by many interviews (November and December 2013). 
 
152 I witnessed the recent construction of these facilities, complete with plaques recognizing the mayor. 
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extremely high rates of chronic hunger in these same, hilly, remote aldeas.153 “Aquí, no 
hay,” with a wave of the finger, was a emphatic refrain in all of my visits to remote 
aldeas … “That (government assistance) simply doesn’t exist here!” 
6.1.2 Political and Confessional Divisions 
State actors claim, in contrast, that they are forced to distribute their limited supplies 
– consisting of seeds, flour and vitamin-rich cereal – to whomever they can access, which 
is limited because of the mayor’s anti-(central) government policies in Zacualpa. But 
many citizen interviewees, in private, readily acknowledged the purposeful mal-
distribution of resources, which took place openly at a ramshackle government office on 
the edge of Zacualpa’s city center during my visits. There, poor families amassed in a 
line awaiting a simple package of basic food supplies. Other interviewees confirmed that, 
in turn, the expectation was one of electoral support for Patriota (the current president’s 
party), or for participation in future anti-mayor protests, several of which had already 
rocked the town.  
These divisions – between state actors and their electoral bases, and the Mayor’s base 
– have since become entrenched in Zacualpa. Other non-governmental development 
assistance intended for the poorest families, stemming from the Catholic Church most 
notably, has been turned away by vigilante groups. On more than one occasion, a car 
containing Church officials was blocked by armed civilians who support the mayor in 
rural aldeas, wary of the Church officials who have been openly critical of the mayor and 
                                                      
153 Chronic hunger rates for the whole municipality are approximately 57 percent, with rates in the more 
remote, hilly aldeas that I visited estimated to be 10-20 points higher, as suggested by one area health 
specialist in interviews. 
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his politics, further entrenching the community’s political divisions.154 Political divisions 
are now spilling over and creating social divisions, as evident by the rash of violent 
outbursts in town over the last several years. 
Finally, a central component of Hambre Cero implementation is the holding of 
monthly meetings of the municipal-level Food and Nutritional Security Commission (La 
Comisión Municipal de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional, or COMUSAN). This 
meeting is designed to be coordinated by the mayor, and to include all stakeholders – 
from church leaders and local NGOs to the different state offices responsible for 
distributing food, health, education and agricultural resources (see Figure 20 for a 
blueprint of Hambre Cero’s institutional design). It reflects an attempt at decentralization 
of the national program itself, and an effort to cultivate ownership by local authorities. As 
noted in Chapter Five, Santa Lucía’s anti-hunger, and now wider development discourse, 
is organized around COMUSAN meetings, held in conjunction with local market days in 
order to facilitate the participation of rural leaders. In Zacualpa, the mayor has refused to 
hold the COMUSAN meetings, and at this point, there is no viable Hambre Cero 
implementation.  
There are informal actors in Zacualpa – including madres guías and comadronas (the 
birthing assistants that have slowly gained additional training in recent years)155 – 
contributing to maternal and infant health in the remotest aldeas. But they do not 
coordinate in any fashion with state actors. The local alcadía indígena’s role, meanwhile, 
                                                      
154 Interviews in Zacualpa (November and December 2013). 
 
155 A local NGO – La Asociación de Comodronas de Quiché – has trained 152 birthing assistants over the 
last 12 years, and works with village leaders to convince them to accept their presence. They claim to have 
improved conditions for young mothers and infants in the countryside. They do not, however, coordinate 
with any state actors (October 16, 2013 interviews). 
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has been reduced to a merely symbolic one, with no influence on development decision-
making. Development projects are devised and implemented on an ad-hoc basic, with the 
most basic resources distributed on purely patronage lines, versus need.  
 
 
Figure 20. Hambre Cero Institutional Design 
 
The governance of development, meanwhile, reflects more conflict across political 
divisions than it does coordination and inclusion. The municipalities “medium” 
development performance is difficult to interpret in light of the overt breakdown in 
development governance. Likely factors include the robust flow of remittances to city 
center inhabitants, but any positive outcomes may also reflect some increased access to 
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health services in remote health outposts,156 and the work of the more organized 
comadronas of Southern Quiché. In the delivery of basic services, however, Patzité – 
spared the worst of the political conflict dividing Zacualpa – has far outstripped larger 
Zacualpa in development outcomes as discussed in Chapter Five – from access to clean 
water and sanitation to lower infant mortality rates, even if complementarity is otherwise 
absent. 
In Santa María Chiquimula, as well, where hunger rates are among the highest in 
Guatemala, internal divisions are grievous. Here, party affiliation overlaps with church 
affiliation (Catholic versus Evangelical, broadly), splitting the town in two and making 
even basic governance dysfunctional. Feeling under threat from the well-organized and 
well-funded Patriota Party, the mayor has reacted by attempting to monopolize 
development decision-making – actively shutting out long-standing local NGOs, as well 
as the once important elders (prinicpales or T’zolojche’). Low-ranking government 
officials in charge of Hambre Cero, meanwhile, have isolated themselves across town 
and infrequently, if at all, distribute the designated assistance packages.  
In the aldeas, which suffer from some of the highest rates of chronic hunger 
anywhere in Guatemala, and in turn the Western Hemisphere, not one of 54 focus group 
and non-elite interview participants had received any form of official assistance, at any 
point. Only the local Jesuit diocese provides material assistance in these areas currently, 
though its staff too reports an awkward, tense relationship with the mayor. Interviews 
with church officials in Chiquimula confirmed the divisive splits in town, and the 
                                                      
156 For roughly one year, however, there were no health services in these aldeas because of a dispute 
between the health NGO contracted by the government to provide services, and the central government 
itself. 
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increase in political party activity. Likewise Hambre Cero’s Totonicapán director 
confirmed the increase in religious divisions to be one of his biggest obstacles to 
communicating with local officials, building trust, and implementation more generally. 
On the other hand, government officials charged with Hambre Cero’s implementation in 
the community itself complained that shipments of the life-saving bonos were sporadic 
and inadequate.  
Though social and political rifts are not always so divisive, internal divisions in very 
small, remote communities, stemming from either church or party affiliation most 
frequently, commonly trump an indigenous or a broader community self-identity. This 
pervasive phenomenon, which complicates the conventional narrative of indigenous 
communities pitted against state forces, dramatically inhibits the most basic 
implementation of Hambe Cero in Chiquimula and Zacualpa, in particular. Crucially, 
historically important informal authorities in each Zacaualpa and Chiquimula – whether 
elders or the alcadía indígena – have been undermined by these changes, making their 
influence on outcomes virtually nonexistent. These divisions create greater space for both 
corruption and clientelism, in turn stalling, as in Zacualpa, if not reversing, in 
Chiquimula, human development.   
6.2 Street-Level Bureaucrats 
In individual cases, mayors, ex-mayors, or committed “street-level” state actors in the 
community determine development efficacy.157 In San Pablo la Laguna, for example, the 
                                                      
157 The “street-level bureaucrat” concept originates from U.S. public policy literature (Lipsky 1980, 
Maynard-Moony and Musheno 2003). It assigns special agency and influence to public officials ultimately 
charged with implementing specific programs, arguing that their own discretion influences outcomes more 
than has been conventionally recognized.  
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Hambre Cero coordinator for the community, based in the regional SESAN office 
(Secretaria de Seguridad de Alimentaría y Nutricional) in Sololá city, is from San Pablo, 
and he and the mayor have worked in conjunction to try and secure basic funds and 
resources, which nevertheless remain intermittent and unreliable.158  Regardless, the 
intimacy of the community and informal family networks led to a level of informal 
cooperation between the mayor and the state actor in this case. This cooperation takes 
place, moreover, despite different party affiliations. 
The mayor also took it upon himself to bring sick and injured community members to 
the hospital in the regional capital – a several hour journey through rugged terrain. This 
type of “reactive” governance, in which the mayor acted as more of a symbol of goodwill 
and community unity, differs considerably from Zacaulpa and Chiquimula, but 
nevertheless netted only marginal gains in development. The mayor, himself, in 
interviews, confirmed these limitations: “My job,” he noted, “is to pay the bills. And after 
that, all I can do is help people in whatever way I can, like anybody else.”159 
Across the lake, meanwhile, it is the ex-mayor who, in collaboration with government 
actors, monopolizes development resources including basic supplies. From interviews 
with diverse community actors – whether in the small community health clinic, municipal 
offices, and even with the current mayor – it was confirmed that the ex-mayor had total 
control of any development-related resources, and total discretion with respect to its 
disbursement. The ex-mayor, himself, claims to be more honestly distributing resources, 
and that the central government approached him in order to avoid coordinating with the 
                                                      
158 Indeed, none of the focus group participants had participated in Hambre Cero, or had received any 
governmental assistance. 
 
159 Interview December 12, 2013 (San Pablo la Laguna, Guatemala) 
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“corrupt” current mayor. Santa Catarína, like San Pablo, has made modest, if mixed 
development gains according to official statistics, which likely result in part because of 
its proximity to the major lakeside tourist hub of Panajachel, a short drive away over 
paved roads. On the other hand, raw data obtained from the regional Minister of Public 
Health’s office reveals that six infants from Santa Catarína Palopó had been hospitalized 
(as of November 18th) in 2013 for acute hunger emergencies, as to San Pablo’s one.160 In 
neither case is coherent development governance in place. In Palopó, however, the ex-
mayor’s monopoly of resources and decision-making, reminiscent of the political 
divisions created in SMC and Zacualpa, further erodes responsiveness and oversight.  
In Santa Lucía – the mayor and a very energetic government health worker named 
Roni are key to the program’s success. As principal Hambre Cero coordinator, Roni 
spurs the participation of younger workers from other government offices, works in 
conjunction with the mayor to bring the local churches together, and helps organize the 
monthly meetings of area stakeholders that is required by Hambre Cero, but which, as 
noted above, is rarely fulfilled in the other communities. Critically, these meetings also 
incorporate the participation of semi-formal indigenous leaders from outlying aldeas as 
discussed in Chapter Five. Given that Santa Lucía is one of the least likely cases to 
demonstrate robust governance – given persistently high rates of poverty, and a legacy of 
violence from the civil war that surpasses its neighbors, including SMC – the pivotal role 
of individual actors is a key component of improvements in service delivery there. 
                                                      
160 A data specialist with the Department’s central office emailed me Microsoft Excel spreadsheets of raw 
data on acute hunger emergencies that are otherwise unpublished and unavailable.  
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6.3 State-Local Complementarity 
Roni161 works closely with the mayor to prioritize Hambre Cero. But Roni also has a 
special rapport with local, indigenous authorities, with whom he coordinated family visits 
in the case of a hunger emergency, aid distribution and transportation for families to the 
local clinic (for vaccinations and pre-natal care for example).  
In Santa Lucía, other state actors in fact relied on local, informal leaders for help. The 
local coordinator of Registro Nacional de las Personas (RENAP), which is in charge of 
registering citizens and issuing new, fraud-resistant identification cards, spontaneously 
visited a meeting held by the indigenous leaders on market day, and ahead of the coming 
day’s COMUSAN meeting. She spoke before the small group of mostly middle-aged and 
elderly men, imploring them to help mobilize reluctant or especially remote citizens. She 
conceded, in a subsequent interview, that her scope of influence as a state actor, alone, is 
limited, and that in reality it was only through these informal interlocutors that she could 
make measurable headway with her work.162  
This echoes the experience of the young Comité Nacional de Alfabetización 
(CONALFA) employee, charged with monitoring and improving literacy rates. He 
admitted that two communities within the municipio had held out, and that its leaders 
were reluctant to coordinate with him regarding a new literacy campaign, itself tied to 
Hambre Cero. In turn, the CONALFA worker felt that, without the authority of local 
leaders on his side, he was unable to proceed there. At the next day’s COMUSAN 
                                                      
161 As Hambre Cero coordinator, Roni represents Partido Patriota, which is the same party as the mayor’s. 
Cynically, this would explain the coordination between actors, but not the energy with which Roni 
conducts his work, nor the extent to which both Roni and the Mayor work to overcome church divisions, 
and include informal actors. 
 
162 October 9, 2013 (Santa Lucía la Reforma) 
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meeting, however, he was pressed by colleagues, including Roni, as to why these 
communities were still not enrolled, underscoring the determination with which Hambre 
Cero implementation was taken seriously. 
The very visible and overt display of trust between informal and formal actors in 
Santa Lucía is striking, and in stark contrast to the divisions that plague its neighbor, 
Chiquimula. Both the mayor and Roni argue that these traits are long-standing in Santa 
Lucía – in part explaining the community’s surprising headway among basic 
development indicators, despite low incomes and the history of violent conflict during the 
civil war. Both acknowledged challenges in separate interviews, and remaining 
challenges, from poverty to incipient church divisions like in other communities, but they 
also both thanked the other for their transparency and commitment.  
The CONALFA worker, meanwhile, who is originally from neighboring Chiquimula, 
argues that Santa Lucía distinguishes itself by its lingering commitment to Mayan 
costumbre (customary beliefs and practice), including a commitment to service and 
community. This concept was evoked by leaders in other Totonicapán communities, but 
was simultaneously subverted by political divisions, and otherwise rhetorical at most. In 
the COMUSAN meeting, another state worker referred to this same idea as voluntario 
institucionál, as she committed herself to work more with local leaders.  
Separately, the regional coordinator of Hambre Cero based in Totonicapán city, Esaú 
Guerra Samayoa, confirmed that Santa Lucía is out in front of its regional counterparts in 
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terms of implementation, and positive intervention, based on both internal statistics and 
his personal experience.163 
The phenomenon of state-local complementarity is, as suggested above, incredibly 
rare, and itself rests in part on other factors isolated above, from local trust of state 
authorities to internal political and social divisions. Underscoring its importance, 
however, are the results of additional interviews in government offices from Totonicapán 
to Santa Cruz del Quiché. Officials from the Instituto del Fomento Municipal (INFOM) 
regional offices admitted that, despite their mission to help “modernize” local 
government, political divisions, political parties, truculent mayors and corrupt 
COCODES prevent their engagement with local municipalities. At this stage, INFOM 
has been forced to adapt to local conditions, and has converted itself into an organization 
principally dedicated to assisting communities resolve potable water issues, at least on a 
case-by-case basis, regardless of its original mission.164 Similarly, Quiché’s SESAN 
director, Sergio Gonzales, agreed that, if he is unable to work with a mayor or 
COCODES, as in Zacualpa, he is in essence unable to push Hambre Cero 
implementation in any meaningful way. 
Complementarity is therefore less an independent variable by itself, but the product of 
multiple facilitating conditions that include committed street-level bureaucrats, a 
component of social cohesion – in Santa Lucía’s case by a more robust commitment to 
costumbre and service than was evident in other communities, and a growing two-way 
                                                      
163 Based on multiple Interviews with Don Esaú in both Quetzaltenango and Totonicapán (September and 
October 2013). 
 
164 Interviews with Freddy Argueta and Gilberto Barrios. November 14, 2013 (Santa Cruz del Quiché). 
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trust between rural, indigenous leaders and state actors (which itself hinges to some 
degree on the charisma of street-level bureaucrats again).  
The role, influence and presence of community indigenous leaders itself is a 
facilitating condition in that such clout is muted or altogether absent in many 
communities, including some in these communities. In a recent exploration of community 
managed schools (CMS) in Alta Verapaz, Guatemala, and Honduras, for example, the 
role of traditional forms of indigenous leadership had no bearing on the political learning 
outcomes under scrutiny (Altschuler and Corrales 2013). In contrast, and much like in 
this study, the role of mayors, patronage networks, and political networks linking villages 
with the state are key influences on CMS viability (Ibid). 
As Palopó suggests, however, complementarity can also be a perverse political 
outcome, in which government resources are channeled through a trusted interlocutor, but 
one whose actions and presence (as ex-Mayor in this case) actively erodes community 
cohesion, and diminishes the participation of other actors – whether the COCODEs, 
sitting mayor, or more traditional leaders.  
For policymaking, and for harnessing complementarity for good, this means first 
identifying the central “broker” at both the village and state level through which 
complementarity can emerge, and second, utilize his/her networks for distribution and 
empowerment. In the Palopó case, however, this will be especially difficult, pointing to a 
“dark complementarity” that reinforces local patronage cleavages and village level social 
discord, while eroding the scope and influence of the formal authorities. Dark 
complementarity – arguably of long-standing form in Guatemala where cafetales 
dominated local labor practices and inhibited land reforms with government’s blessing, 
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while providing a modicum of (inadequate) social service delivery – is on the one hand 
much harder to subvert given the reinforcing role of the state and/or political parties and 
well-established patronage networks. On the other, even in Palopó the presence of a 
broker like the ex-mayor provides and opportunity for outside donor to utilize informal 
networks for service delivery, so long as it is an equal opportunity exploiter – utilizing 
the local formal channels to the same degree. The implications of complementarity for 
development are discussed more in the Conclusions. 
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CONCLUSIONS and DISCUSSION 
 
This study is a response to the puzzle of spatial variation in human development in 
otherwise similar communities in rural Guatemala. Why have some communities, despite 
persistently low-incomes, made strides across different development indicators, whether 
chronic hunger, literacy or infant mortality? Given widespread variation in state density – 
or the presence of the state in health, education and administration – at the community 
level, a plausible hypothesis is that state density and development outcomes vary in 
parallel: The state’s presence, in other words, especially given its presence in health and 
educational services that are at the core of human development – according to Sen and 
the UNDP since – should explain this variation in development, and that those 
communities performing poorly would benefit from more state presence.  
The Guatemalan state is notoriously weak, however, so any outside intervention for 
development should, according to the wisdom of conventional statebuilding logic, aid in 
building centralized institutions and administrative capacity – the “strength” of a state 
according to Fukuyama (2004: 6). State “scope” is more complex, but decentralization of 
development decision-making, as the COCODE system reflects, should theoretically 
encourage both the democratic participation of citizens – enhancing the legitimacy of the 
central state institutions – and more efficiently allocate resources to communities.  
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From the earliest regressions, however, it became clear that state density and 
development outcomes – whether reflected by HDI scores, HDI scores over time, or by 
robustness checks including literacy, infant mortality and chronic hunger and changes in 
hunger and literacy over time – are completely divorced in Guatemala. The most peculiar 
results reveal inverse relationships between literacy and state presence, underscoring just 
how ineffective state resources are currently translated into development performance at 
the community level. Top-down statebuilding, even after twenty years of post-war 
experimentation and outside assistance in Guatemala, does not bring development. 
As demonstrated in Chapter Three, literature has increasingly recalculated, both 
theoretically and empirically, the feasibility of state-led reform for post-war development. 
The most critical scholars, including hybridity advocates, argue that the OECD-dominant 
normative foundations of statebuilding is a square peg of neo-classical economics, 
electoral reform and liberal institutionalism being pounded into the round hole of local 
context. This context – consisting of non-Western mores, alternate perceptions of 
authority and informal local institutions that are more resonant with local populations 
than imposed western institutions – trumps the technocratic fixes of outsiders. What 
results is either a hybrid system, in which local populations subtly resist top-down 
statebuilding, or more plainly, broken legal-formal systems of governance. This 
dissertation generally embraces this premise – that local conditions, including traditional 
forms of leadership as exist in Guatemala, along with a history of state distrust, result in a 
patchwork of governance realities at the local level. Indeed, anthropologists and 
historians of Guatemala have cited the influence of traditional leadership, or customary 
beliefs as critical variables affecting state incursion, or even levels (and types) of crime at 
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the village level. But this paper is concerned with a more rich sense of human 
development that prioritizes access to education and health, and not only with crime. This 
muddies the otherwise neat distinctions between state and society. 
The agency of local actors, however crucial to the story of Guatemalan state-society 
relations, is insufficient to address development needs. Local actors, no matter how 
autonomous, or governed by local customs, are unable to martial the resources necessary 
to reverse trends preventable childhood death, or reverse decades of staggering chronic 
hunger. The state, meanwhile, is indeed but one actor among many that vie for influence, 
and which struggle to shape outcomes. Development outcomes, I argue here, hinge 
instead on these shifting local ecosystems of governance.  
Development, by its very nature, is a complex phenomenon, and no one factor will be 
enough to reverse the situation in rural Guatemala from one of frustration to one of rich, 
emancipatory prosperity – in which freedom to choose a course of livelihood, or freedom 
from preventable sickness or injury – is taken for granted. Indeed, as the grinding poverty 
rates in even the most “successful” cases in this project illustrate, none of the 
communities are positioned to truly prosper from a human development perspective.  
After triangulating three overlapping methods, however, this paper demonstrates that 
locally-based forces are in fact critical to the implementation of centrally-articulated 
development programs and that, in the context of limited statehood that characterizes 
many rural communities in Guatemala, state-local complementarity is a fundamental 
component of what separates those communities making strides against basic health and 
education deficiencies, from those where chronic hunger, illiteracy, and infant mortality 
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persist at crippling rates. This chapter summarizes some of the key findings and their 
significance. 
On Statebuilding and Human Development 
First, this project adds to a growing literature that underscores the influence of local 
political dynamics, including informal actors and institutions, over a range of state-led 
programs despite international efforts to consolidate post-war states. In fact, given 
Guatemala’s nearly two decades of post-war economic growth, and the absence of armed 
militant groups or the risk of a renewed conflict, the Guatemalan state’s weakness is 
arguably more illustrative of the limitations of top-down statebuilding than even more 
recent cases of post-war statebuilding, whose outcomes remains in doubt given only 
recent conflict or political setbacks.  
This paper, unlike hybridity claims for instance, acknowledges that “strong,” capable 
states with the capacity to distribute resources efficiently, adjudicate disputes fairly, and 
provide citizens with security will more likely support prosperous, healthy citizens than 
their weak-state counterparts. What is in doubt, instead, is the likelihood that such a state-
dominant system of governance can be replicated in Guatemala, or that such a system is 
truly viable. It is even less likely a possibility in the even more complex cases of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, or Libya, as examples. But even in less 
conflict-prone regions, from Central America to Central Asia, local political dynamics, 
and the legitimacy of locally-resonant forms of governance, from clan networks to tribal 
leadership, resist, even if passively, the encroachment of state authority. This has 
profound implications for peacebuilding and development policymaking that, with very 
little adjustment, centers on the premise of centrally-consolidated states. Such efforts, this 
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dissertation argues, are unlikely to generate the desired outcomes that are sought. 
Guatemala’s ongoing crisis with criminality, and emigration, are but small examples of 
statebuilding’s ineffectiveness. But this is not the end of the story. 
Unlike the vast majority of the literature preoccupied with local political dynamics, 
this project demonstrates the importance of the state, whatever its capacity. The state, 
along with locally-based formal and informal actors, is one stakeholder in a melting pot 
that, collectively, influences governance. Whether or not the state’s heft is enough to 
subsume the influence of traditional leaders, the state still cannot be ignored. And 
crucially, while local actors might be central to conflict resolution in Colombia, or 
community policing in Mexico, they are unable to build schools, pay teacher salaries, 
stock clinics with medicine, nor reverse decades old trends in chronic hunger. This 
requires resources that the state can provide, and as is normatively well established, 
should provide. Two important points stem from this observation. 
First, by making the dependent variable human development, versus something more 
minimal – like a negative peace or even homicide rates – this project embraces a more 
complex but arguably more realistic understanding of post-conflict societies which, long 
after conflict ceases, continue to struggle to sustainably improve well-being and welfare. 
As the quantitative component of this study demonstrates, those communities that were 
most affected by violence during the armed conflict remain most likely to suffer from 
poor human development performance – measured across a range of variables. From 
simple regressions, it is unclear whether causation lies in the path dependency of weak 
development stemming from conflict, or whether this reflects more simply the fact that 
those communities that agitated during the civil war were among the poorest then, and 
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remain so today in the country’s radically unequal socio-economic topography. 
Regardless, the most conflict-affected communities have been unable to progress away 
from poor human development, despite two decades of official democracy and outside-
assisted statebuilding.  
Making human development the dependent variable thus requires, on some level, an 
acknowledgment of the myriad actors and social forces that interact to influence 
outcomes, including the role of non-state actors. It is unclear why more post-conflict 
peacebuilding literature does not consider development, specifically, or more intensively, 
but remains focused instead on more minimal definitions of post-war reconstruction 
“success,” like reduction in violent events, or even GDP growth, etc. 
Second, though the state is a critical factor in determining either better, or worse, 
outcomes, this paper does not absolve the state of its failings. Apart from the obvious 
shortcomings of the Guatemalan state – from an anemic legislature and broken judiciary 
system to corruption and situational civil liberties – this project demonstrates how street-
level state actors in most communities under focus engage in petty local politics, place 
political party above objectives, and more generally lack training and experience. But 
nevertheless, the actions of even these low-ranking government officials have important 
consequences for village life, and as is argued here, longer-term development trajectories.  
State-Local Complementarity and its Components 
Guatemala will never prosper without drastic wholesale reforms that augment tax 
revenues, and redistribute investment in poor regions, but in the near future these changes 
are unlikely. It is exactly under these conditions, however – those that dominate the 
reality of so many developing countries – that spatial variation in development is so 
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puzzling. Why are some communities managing to fare better along basic development 
indicators? 
As this project makes clear, on some level better outcomes require what is referred to 
here as state-local “complementarity.” It might seem obvious that the best outcomes in 
the study are in great part the result of a marriage between state resources and local-level 
leadership. But, as the many case study communities which continue to struggle attest, 
such a harmonious relationship is anything but obvious to state and local actors on the 
ground. Indeed, cultivating complementarity is challenging in the context of deep-seated 
distrust and the growing influence of political parties, which makes turning public 
resources into club goods for patronage a readily-available, low-risk, default option. 
Indeed, complementarity itself requires that several other factors be resolved. 
Principally, an embedded distrust of state intentions by local leaders, whether formal or 
informal, is pervasive. This distrust stems from various factors, however. Santa Lucía la 
Reforma was affected far more during the civil war than other communities, yet local 
leaders, including semi-formal indigenous leaders, cooperate with state actors 
constructively. Zacualpa was also impacted severely, but there the legacy of civil patrols 
(in which the current mayor participated) and ladino-indigenous identity and divisions 
still resonate, complicating alliances and thwarting cooperation.  Finally, some of the 
most well organized communities – including Totonicapán city, which has well-
established, highly-trained indigenous leaders – are unable to convert their resources, 
human capital and local influence into development gains. In “Toto,” indigenous 
leadership is organized around resistance to the state, explicitly, and the goal of increased 
autonomy from state influence, despite being relatively unscathed during the civil 
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conflict. Alas, this distrust, which stems not from the civil war, makes state-local 
complementarity impossible in Toto, even if its indigenous leadership is arguably better 
positioned to make a difference in this regard. Here, local leadership “competes” rather 
than “complements” state services. In summary, though conflict intensity demonstrates a 
strong statistical correlation with development outcomes, state-local complementarity can 
overcome this legacy. 
One other cause of distrust is political party affiliation of local formal authorities. 
This is inconsistent as well, however. Indeed, Santa Lucía’s mayor is from the same 
political party that controls the central government, facilitating cooperation between state 
and local actors compared with communities where local mayors from distinct parties 
(like those in Santa María Chiquimula, Zacualpa or Santa Catarina Palopó) attempt to 
carve out autonomy from central authorities, or demonstrate the superiority of their 
party’s patronage over that of the President’s party.  
Party non-alignment is particularly relevant to Zacualpa and Chiquimula, where the 
mayor’s have increasing consolidated local power and openly pitted themselves against 
state actors, who in turn wield their modest access to food packages for vote-buying, or 
organize protests. But party non-alignment in Patzité and San Pablo is less important, and 
multiple state actors from the regional level, and the mayors themselves, reported fruitful 
relations, and modest improvements in development outcomes. In these communities, the 
factor most absent, however, is the presence and influence of indigenous or village-level 
leaders. The increasing influence of political parties, campaigning, and even outside 
money on local elections does not just create state-local distrust, but also creates divisions 
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within small, rural communities, and crowds out the influence of traditional leaders on 
local governance. Another socially divisive factor is church affiliation.  
In virtually every community visited, divisions between traditional Catholic affiliates 
and evangelical Protestants are central to political and familial rivalries within the 
community. Where church and political affiliation overlap explicitly, as it does in 
Chiquimula especially, governance is utterly dysfunctional. Alas, overcoming this 
sectarian divide is yet another piece of the state-local complementarity puzzle, and 
underscores how local political dynamics which vary over space can thwart centrally-
articulated programs. The degree to which small, otherwise homogeneous communities 
remain divided is a key obstacle to state-local complementarity, and more effective 
development-oriented local governance.  
Once again, where the best development outcomes are observed, state and local actors 
coordinate in order to bridge sectarian divisions – not without hardship, but nevertheless 
with far more success than is observed anywhere else. As a result, this paper recommends 
an approach to post-war development policy – from global to local – that is “context-
sensitive.” Context-sensitive statebuilding strips central authorities of their normative 
imperative to dominate all state territory, removing from the state the burden of state 
imposition, freeing it instead to honor local interlocutors with the responsibility of both 
development governance, but also resource distribution. As Altschuler and Corrales 
concluded after their study of community-managed schools in Central America, “to 
expand the scope of spillovers from (participatory governance) would require a concerted 
state effort that is both hands-on and hands-off” (2013: 181, emphasis added). The active 
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role of the state should vary from context to context, in inverse proportion to the strength, 
desire and autonomy of local, frequently informal, leaders.  
To make sense of the variety of outcomes and to guide policymaking with respect to 
complementarity, I put forth the following theoretical typology of complementarity. As 
discussed, complementarity hinges in some ways, first, on the degree of local autonomy, 
which in turn allows for the sustained influence of traditional leaders, which in turn 
shapes even the role of mayors, regardless of political affiliation. 
 
  The State Broker’s Role 
  Engage Disengage 
Degree of 
Local 
Autonomy 
High: Which allows for 
mayoral independence, 
and the influence of 
traditional actors. 
Complementarity (SLR) Resistance (Toto) or Competition (Zacualpa) 
Low: Which allows for 
increased political party 
influence, the crowding 
out of traditional leaders 
and the influence of 
patronage. 
Political Domination 
(SMC) 
Dark Complementarity 
(SCP) 
 
Figure 21: Explaining The Presence or Absence of Complementarity and its Alternatives 
 
Policymakers can utilize complementary political arrangements at the village level to 
augment service delivery, and make innovations in service delivery more sustainable. 
They can simultaneously avoid, as happened in Zacualpa, making local political tensions 
worse by inadvertently using local networks that actively deprived communities of 
resources. Crucially, outside actors can engage with both state and local actors, after 
identifying key brokers, to systematically build, through mediation or similar means, the 
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complementarity that results in the development building blocks witnessed in Santa 
Lucía. 
Remaining Puzzles and Future Research 
From the quantitative component of this study, the “denunciations” variable is among 
those most consistently correlated with better development outcomes. As noted in 
Chapter Three, denunciations were included as a crude measurement of social cohesion, 
or in the very least as an attempt to capture some community level effect. Specifically, 
this paper assumes, a greater number of reported human rights abuses per population 
demonstrates an element of mobilization and solidarity that facilitates this reporting, 
rather than an actual increase in human rights abuses at the local level. Does social 
cohesion influence development? Or, do denunciations capture something else? 
The strength of this relationship is surprising, but alone it is not enough to explain 
human development. Alas, like trust, and internal divisions along party or sectarian lines, 
social cohesion can be another facilitating condition to state-local complementarity. More 
unclear, however, is how development and social “organization,” as it is labeled in this 
study, are related, and which comes first. The quantitative component is unable to 
determine whether the health and well-being of citizens, first, permits protest and social 
organization, or whether an inherent social cohesion permits development. The latter is 
more likely. Regardless, and in keeping with Fine (2010), social cohesion alone is unable 
to explain development, and as was observed, manifests in ways that inhibit development 
as well. 
Finally, this dissertation highlights an important disconnect between economic 
growth and human development, with further important policy implications. The concept 
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of human development and the human development index itself, developed by 
economists Amartya Sen and Mahbub ul Haq, is grounded by the idea that economic 
prosperity alone does not automatically translate into individual well-being, as the means 
and ends of development are confused. As is already well documented, Guatemala’s 
entrenched social inequalities have in turn prevented the country’s generally strong 
economic performance from improving the well-being and opportunities of rural 
Guatemalans, and particularly its large indigenous populations. What is unique from this 
study, however, is the finding that some communities – remote, with a tragic history of 
conflict, and with shockingly high rates of poverty (and thus extremely low incomes) – 
have made marked improvements in literacy, infant mortality and chronic hunger.  
It is uncertain, without improvements in income over time, whether such strides are 
sustainable, or whether current trends will translate into intergenerational social mobility. 
Guatemala, make no mistake, has a long road ahead. But this finding alone underscores 
the necessity of policy that makes access to basic services, with a special emphasis on 
health and education, the backbone of national development policy. Crucially, in a 
developing country context, and/or under conditions of limited statehood that is the 
empirical reality of much of the rural developing world, this will require coordination 
with local, and frequently non-state actors if it is to be effective. As it stands today, the 
children of one community in rural Guatemala, Santa Lucía, will have a greater capability 
set – or tool box with which to survive illness, pursue further educational opportunities, 
or be an informed and healthy parent someday – than their neighbors. The framers of the 
emerging Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which continue to overlook local and 
participatory governance mechanisms, should take notice. 
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APPENDIX A. List of Interview and Focus Group Participants.  
 
Date Name Organization/Title Type Location 
7/8 Dr. Carlos Enrique Lix Socop Health Minister Interview Guatemala City 
7/9 Brendan Halloran USAID Interview Guatemala City 
7/9 Artruro Matute Universidad del Valle Interview Guatemala City 
7/10 Marcel Arévalo FLACSO Interview Guatemala City 
7/10 Gustavo Arriola UNDP Interview Guatemala City 
7/10 Edelberto Torres-Rivas UNDP Interview Guatemala City 
7/10 Petrona García Muni, Zacualpa Interview Zacualpa 
7/10 María Reyes OMM, Zacualpa Interview Zacualpa 
7/11  Alcadía Indígena Interview Zacualpa 
9/4 “Mari” ADESMA Interview SMC 
9/4 “David” ADESMA Interview SMC 
9/4 “Juan Carlos” student Interview SMC 
9/4 Don Pedro T’zolojche’ / Ancestral Authorities Interview SMC 
9/5 Padre Naxto Jesuit Dioces, SMC Interview SMC 
9/5 Helena Citizen Interview SMC 
9/5 Augustín Citizen Interview SMC 
9/5 Karina ADESMA Interview SMC 
9/5 Augusto Santos Norato 48 Cantons of Totonicapán Interview SMC 
9/6 Giovanni MIDES Interview SMC 
9/6 Garcia INGEP Interview SMC 
9/6 Juan Tzoy Calel Muncipality, Alcalde Interview SMC 
9/7 Esaú Guerra Samayoa  Interview Xela 
 Armando SESAN Interview SMC 
9/9 6 women Citizens Focus Group Xecaxelaj (SMC) 
9/9 Ana María Government Health Post Interview Xecaxelaj (SMC) 
9/9 10 women Citizens Focus  Xesana  (SMC) 
9/9 10 women Citizens Focus  Xesana I (SMC) 
9/10 12 women Citizens Focus  Pajojchiyats (SMC) 
9/10 5 men and women Citizens Focus  Josefina (SMC) 
9/10 10 mean and women Citizens Focus Centro (SMC) 
9/11 Julia M. Asturias USAID Interview Guatemala City 
9/13 Dr. Peter Rohloff Wuku Kawoq’ / Harvard Medical Interview Phone 
10/4 Esaú Guerra Samayoa SESAN Interview Totonicapán 
10/6 Augusto Santos Norato 48 Cantons Interview Totonicapán 
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10/7 Dr. Carlos Enrique Lix Socop Minister of Health Interview 
Santa Cruz del 
Quiché 
10/8 José MAGA Interview SLLR 
10/8 Rodrigo CONALFA Interview SLLR 
10/8 Carlos Elections Interview SLLR 
10/8 Norma RENAP Interview SLLR 
10/9 10 men Alcaldes Comunitarios Interview SLLR 
10/10 Roni Morales SESAN Interview SLLR 
10/11 Don Francisco Alcalde Interview SLLR 
10/14 María Reyes OMM, Zacualpa Interview Zacualpa 
10/14 Petrona García Muni, Zacualpa Interview Zacualpa 
10/14 Victor MAGA Interview Zacualpa 
10/14 Alejandra, Mateo, and Rolando MIDES Interview Zacualpa 
10/15  Ernesto Calachij Riz Alcalde Interview Zacualpa 
10/15 “Lucy” ADIZ Interview Zacualpa 
10/15 Hermana Ana María Alvarez Lopez Catholic Church Interview Zacualpa 
10/16 13 men, 12 women Citzens Focus Pasajoc I, Zacualpa 
10/16 Lorenzo Alvarado Ti-Paz Defensoría Indígena Wajxaqib’ Noj Interview Pasajoc I, Zacualpa 
10/17 2 Unidentified Workers ASODINZA Interview Zacualpa 
10/17 Dora ACOMQUI Interview Zacualpa 
10/17 Unidentified Worker ASODEZA Interview Zacualpa 
10/17 56 men and women from 5 different aldeas Citizens Focus 
Chuchuca, 
Zacualpa 
10/18 Roberto Doctor at Center’s Health Clinic Interview Zacualpa 
10/18 María Citizen Interview Zacualpa 
11/14 Mayor and associates Local Government Interview Patzité 
11/14 Harvi MIDES Interview Patzité 
11/14 Diego MAGA Interview Patzité 
11/14 Yolanda OMM Interview Patzité 
11/14 Mike 
Oficina de la Protección 
de la Niñez y 
Adolescencia 
Interview Patzité 
11/14 Evelyn Physician, Health Clinic (CAP) Interview Patzité 
11/14 Judge and Assistant Justice of Peace Interview Patzité 
11/14 Jorge Santiago MINEDUC Interview Patzité 
11/14 Unknown Agricultural Worker Interview Patzité 
11/14 Unknown Agricultural Worker Interview Patzité 
11/15 Sergio Gonzales SESAN Interview Santa Cruz del Quiché 
11/15 Diego Hernández CORSADEC Interview Santa Cruz del Quiché 
11/15 
Freddy Oscar Lee Argueta 
Merida, Gilberto E. Barrios 
M. 
INFOM Interview Santa Cruz del Quiché 
11/16 Ruben Consejos de Pueblos K’iché Interview 
Santa Cruz del 
Quiché 
11/18  Mayor Interview Santa Catarína 
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Palopó (SCP) 
11/18 Health Worker Community Clinic Interview SCP 
11/18 Anonymous OMM Interview SCP 
11/18 Anonymous SOSEP Interview Sololá 
11/19 Leadership  Sololá Alcadía Indígena Interview Sololá 
11/19 Data Specialist Minister of Health Interview Sololá 
11/19 Marvin SESAN/ Hambre Cero Interview Sololá 
11/19 Maureen Herman Peace Corps / SESAN Interview Sololá 
11/19 Dr. Diego Hernández Director, Área de Salud Interview Sololá 
11/20 Don Mariano Former Mayor Interview SCP 
11/21 Jonathan Menkos ICEFI Interview Guatemala City 
11/21 Angel USAID Interview Guatemala City 
11/22 Dr. Walter Flores CEGGS Interview Guatemala City 
12/4 Hirma Osorio Nutri Salud (Zacualpa) Interview Via email 
12/10 Ernesto Physician, Health Post Interview San Pablo 
12/10 Muni Worker OMM Interview San Pablo 
12/10 Bartolo Sojven Ujpan CONALFA Interview San Pablo 
12/11  12 women (names available as needed)  
Focus 
Group San Pablo 
12/12  San Pablo Mayor Interview San Pablo 
12/12 Luis Felipe Lejá Quiacam Young worker Interview San Pablo 
12/12 Vicenta El Hospitalito, Santiago Interview San Pedro 
12/12 Agricultural Worker  Interview San Pablo 
12/12 Agricultural Worker  Interview San Pablo 
12/12 Agricultural Worker  Interview San Pablo 
12/12 Agricultural Worker  Interview San Pablo 
12/12 Agricultural Worker  Interview San Pablo 
12/12 Agricultural Worker  Interview San Pablo 
12/12 Agricultural Worker  Interview San Pablo 
12/12 Agricultural Worker  Interview San Pablo 
12/12 Agricultural Worker  Interview San Pablo 
12/12 Agricultural Worker  Interview San Pablo 
12/12 Maureen Peace Corps/SESAN Interview Sololá 
12/15 Juan Carlos Mendez DeviTech Interview Guatemala 
Total: 254 interview and focus group participants (251 individuals, 146 focus group participants, 107 
discrete interviews) 
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APPENDIX B. State Density Index calculation, borrowed and translated from UNDP 
Guatemala 2010 
 
 
 
Components 
Education  Health Other Sub-Inidices 
a. Presence of 
state 
dependents 
Coverage Level of service Numer of “dependants” ia=µ(x1j)  
b. Bureaucracy 
(per 
population)  
Teachers 
Personnel, Minister of Public 
Health and Social Services 
(MSPAS) 
Employees ib=µ(x2j)  
c. Budget (per 
capita)  Q / person Q / person Q / person ic=µ(x3j)  
Sub-indices iedu= µ(xi1) isal= µ(xi2) iotr= µ(xi3) 
IDE= 
µ(xij)  
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APPENDIX C. Percentage of Total Rural Poverty per Municipality (adapted from Mapas 
de Pobreza Rural en Guatemala 2011) 
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APPENDIX D.  “Quality of Life” Scores per Municipality (as reported in the report 
titled, Vulnerbailidades de Muncipios y la Calidad de Vida de Sus Habitantes) 
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APPENDIX E. Invitation to the official commemoration of the October 4, 2012 shooting 
by police of six Totonicapán residents. 
 
 
  
LAS COMUNIDADES ORGANIZADORAS DE LA CONMEMORACIÓN DEL 
PRIMER ANIVERSARIO DE LA MUERTE DE LAS VÍCTIMAS DE LA 
MASACRE DEL 4 DE OCTUBRE DEL AÑO 2012
JUNTA DIRECTIVA DEL CONSEJO DE ALCALDES COMUNALES DE LOS 48 
CANTONES DE TOTONICAPÁN
CONVOCANA todos los pueblos y organizaciones indígenas de Guatemala, a las organizaciones sociales e instituciones solidarias nacionales e internacionales a participar en la conmemoración del primer aniversario de la masacre de los mártires del pueblo de Totonicapán a realizarse el día 4 de octubre del presente año a partir de las 08:00 de 
la  mañana  en  el  lugar  denominado  “La  Cumbre  de  Alaska,  Kilómetro  169,  de  la  
Carretera  Interamericana”.
LOS MÁRTIRES DEL 4 DE OCTUBRE DEL AÑO 2012, NO ESTÁN MUERTOS, 
SIGUEN VIBRANDO EN NUESTRO CORAZONES Y LUCHAREMOS PORQUE SE LES 
HAGA JUSTICIA
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APPENDIX F.  Post-estimation Tests for Marginal Effects, Multicollinearity and 
Heteroskedasticity per Model 
Table 6 (P. 92): Variation in HDI_extrap 
Model 1 
CoVariate 
Marginal 
Effects at 
means* 
(ey/ex) 
Multicollinearity** 
VIF 
log_SDI .2300021 1.03 
Gasto_Mun .0095439 1.21 
Conf_Intens -.0126931 1.03 
Denperpop .01221914 1.22 
Elect_Align .0028438 1.03 
* Stata Command: mfx compute, eyex 
** Stata Command: estat vif 
 
Heteroskedasticity: Distribution of residuals*** 
 
***Stata: predict rstu1, rstu; 
Histogram rstu1, norm 
 
Marginal Effects: Fitted Values of HDI_extrap Across log_SDI 
 
 
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
De
ns
ity
-4 -2 0 2 4
Studentized residuals
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
Fi
tte
d 
va
lue
s
2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
log_SDI
 
 
215 
 
 
Table 7 (p. 96): HDI_extrap When Population <25,000 
 
Model 1 
CoVariate 
Marginal 
Effects at 
Means 
(ey/ex) 
Multicollinearity 
(VIF) 
log_SDI -.3739102 1.25 
Gasto_Mun .0279199 1.16 
Conf_Intens -.0100656 1.15 
Denperpop .0194039 1.03 
Elect_Align .0048091 1.02 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity: Distribution of residuals 
 
 
 
Marginal Effects: Fitted Values of HDI_extrap Across log_SDI 
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Table 8 (p. 97): 2011 Guatemalan Municipal-Level Illiteracy Rates 
 
Model 1 
 
CoVariate Marginal Effects at means (ey/ex) 
Multicollinearity 
(VIF) 
log_SDI -.494517 1.01 
Gasto_Mun -.0099134 1.12 
Conf_Intens .043518 1.03 
Denperpop -.057991 1.12 
Elect_Align -.0023829 1.02 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity: Distribution of residuals 
 
 
 
Marginal Effects: Fitted Values of HDI_extrap Across log_SDI 
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Table 9 (p. 98): 2011 Illiteracy Rates where Population < 25,000 
 
Model 1 
 
CoVariate Marginal Effects at means (ey/ex) 
Multicollinearity 
(VIF) 
log_SDI .3486531 1.09 
Gasto_Mun -.0117906 1.14 
Conf_Intens .0343491 1.03 
Denperpop -.0810317 1.06 
Elect_Align .0114377 1.01 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity: Distribution of residuals 
 
 
 
Marginal Effects: Fitted Values of HDI_extrap Across log_SDI 
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Table 10 (p. 99): Change in Illiteracy (2000-2011) 
 
Model 1 
 
CoVariate 
Marginal 
Effects at 
means 
(ey/ex) 
Multicollinearity 
(VIF) 
log_SDI y=-1.6495 < 0, 
eyex not avail 1.01 
Gasto_Mun  1.12 
Conf_Intens  1.03 
Denperpop  1.12 
Elect_Align  1.02 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity: Distribution of residuals 
 
 
 
Marginal Effects: Fitted Values of HDI_extrap Across log_SDI 
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Table 11 (p. 101): Difference in Chronic Hunger (2002-2008) 
 
Model 1 
 
CoVariate Marginal Effects at means (ey/ex) 
Multicollinearity 
(VIF) 
log_SDI y=-7.1427 < 0, eyex 
not available 1.03 
Gasto_Mun  1.21 
Conf_Intens  1.03 
Denperpop  1.22 
Elect_Align  1.03 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity: Distribution of residuals 
 
 
 
Marginal Effects: Fitted Values of HDI_extrap Across log_SDI 
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APPENDIX G. Summary Statistics of Variables Under Examination 
 
 Variable N Mean min max sd 
 
 
IVs 
 
 
SDI_2009   331 .2185 .11 .75 .0794 
log_SDI  331 3.0403 2.40 4.32 .2719 
Gasto_Mun 283 234.54 0 2886.7 282.70 
Elect_Align 334 .3533 0 1 .4787 
Denuncias_2012 332 86.61 0 1190.38 111.25 
DenperPop 332 4.2743 0 81.75 7.20 
elev 333 4197.14 0 10898 2690.85 
DV
s 
Analf_DIFF 303 -1.5818 -43.81 19.79 4.98 
HDI_extrap 330 .6578 .277 .915 .1076 
Cron_Hun_2008 332 44.8837 10.1 91.4 17.81 
Cron_Hun_Diff 331 -7.05 -31.1 9.8 5.83 
 
 
